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The startling successes of contemporary international arms con-
trol negotiations call to mind the old aphorism that one should be
careful about what one wishes for, because the wish just might come
true.
Today, disarmament diplomacy has wrought unprecedented tri-
umphs across a wide range of global bargaining issues, producing a
series of watershed treaties that offer spectacular new advantages for
the security of the United States and for the prospect of enduring
world peace. At the same time, however, these unanticipated negotia-
tion breakthroughs have themselves generated unforeseen implemen-
tation problems, spawning a host of novel difficulties for which the
traditional tools and methods of arms control are ill-prepared or
inappropriate.
This Article examines one such difficulty: the potential legal and
political conflict posed when a dramatic and crucial new arms control
agreement, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),1 con-
fronts the equally fundamental and pressing dictates of national envi-
ronmental protection policy. In short, the CWC will mandate the
peaceful dismantling of massive national arsenals of now obsolete, but
still exceptionally lethal chemical weapons (CW) agents, armaments,
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author gratefully notes the
support of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security in the preparation of this Article. The au-
thor thanks Hope Babcock, George Bunn, Barry Kellman, and Amy E. Smithson for their com-
ments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article, and Jonathan Jackel for his creative and
persistent research assistance, supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.
Any nonprofit organization is hereby given permission to make copies of all or any portion
of this Article for educational purposes without written permission or the payment of any fee.
1 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800
[hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC]. The CWC will enter into force 180 days
after 65 countries have deposited an instrument of ratification, but no earlier than January 1995.
ld. art. XXI, para. 1.
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and facilities-and the destruction must be accomplished relatively
promptly, reliably, and under the supervision of international inspec-
tors. In the United States, however, long-standing environmental leg-
islation, starting with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)2 and continuing through a sequence of resource-specific anti-
pollution enactments, mandates punctilious adherence to procedural
safeguards (such as the preparation of disclosive Environmental Im-
pact Statements) and compliance with stringent national and local
substantive standards on emissions, hazardous wastes, community par-
ticipation, and safety.
At present, there is no established technology that can credibly
promise to dismantle the United States CW stockpile in a manner that
is entirely consistent with both of these sets of legal compulsion. Un-
less some Solomonic and politically tolerable mechanism can quickly
be invented, therefore, the United States (and other treaty parties)
may be forced to depart from one, or both, of our hard-fought priori-
ties: it is not entirely clear, at this point, that the United States can
simultaneously remain fully faithful to the language and spirit of both
the CWC and the NEPA. Under those circumstances, arms control-
lers and environmentalists are suddenly cast into the uncomfortable,
mutually-antagonistic posture of asking which set of laws should the
country abandon, modify, defer, or violate?
Following this Introduction, Part II of the Article addresses the
public policy of arms control, highlighting the accomplishments-es-
pecially the provisions requiring weapons dismantling-of earlier
arms control agreements and contrasting them with the greater exacti-
tude of the CWC. That Part demonstrates why the novel approach to
the regulation of chemical weapons will pose challenges far greater
than those associated with prior generations of disarmament obliga-
tions pertaining to nuclear, biological, conventional, or other weap-
onry. Part III addresses the public policy of environmental protection,
summarizing what NEPA and its legislative and judicial progeny now
require before (and while) undertaking certain major federal actions.
It constitutes essentially a primer highlighting those aspects of Ameri-
can environmental law that will be most relevant to chemical weap-
ons disposal. Part IV next identifies two prominent types of
jurisprudential issues arising in this hierarchy-of-laws context under
the Supremacy Clause3 of the Constitution. One set of questions con-
2 National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190,83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321) (1970).
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State




cerns the legal priority accorded to treaties (such as the CWC) versus
statutes (such as NEPA); the other addresses the pre-emption vel non
of state and local environmental regulation by overarching federal
policy.
In Part V, the Article scrutinizes the current, deeply flawed effort
to fashion a technological solution to these conflicts-the "baseline"
incineration approach embodied in the Johnston Atoll Chemical
Agent Disposal System (JACADS). The United States Army's proto-
type facility, located on a minute, isolated Pacific Ocean island, JA-
CADS relies upon a dedicated high-temperature, multi-furnace
process which, based on performance to date, augurs to serve per-
fectly the interests of neither arms control nor environmentalism. The
prospect of replicating this experimental facility at eight sites around
the continental United States, as the Army currently plans, is there-
fore daunting-for its social and ecological implications, as well as for
its estimated $8.6 billion pricetag.4
The international ramifications of this dilemma are described in
Part VI, where the cognate problems-and the associated domestic
political and legal disquietude-of Russia and other key CWC coun-
tries are displayed. The CWC's dismantling mandate is no more ac-
cessible in other nations than it is in the United States, as the
imperatives of deweaponization and environmental protection con-
tinue to clash worldwide. Russia alone has more CW than does the
United States (an estimated forty thousand metric tons of chemical
agent in Russia, compared to approximately thirty thousand tons for
the United States) and fewer technological and financial resources
available to cope with the challenges. s
Part VII then recapitulates the overall problem posed by this con-
flict of social interests and proposes some solutions. These include
recommendations for improving the operation of JACADS, exploring
technological alternatives to that baseline approach, and-as a tempo-
rary expedient-deferring some aspects of the problem by distin-
guishing between "deweaponizing" the CW arsenal in the short term
4 The eventual pricetag for the chemical weapons stockpile destruction effort is difficult to
calculate, as the program undergoes recurrent modifications and stretch-outs and as the official
estimates continuously rise. The current projection is $8.6 billion. Department of Defense Au-
thorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hear-
ings on S. 1298 Before the Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 302 (1993) (statement
of Michael W. Owen, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army) [hereinafter Owen Statement].
See also Michael Satchell, Death Rattle of Poison Gas, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 13,1993,
at 54 (estimating $9 billion or more). Not long ago, the Army had consistently publicly placed
the total cost of the program at $7.9 billion. Amy E. Smithson, Chemical Destruction: The Work
Begins, BULL. ATOM. ScIENnSTS, Apr. 1993, at 38-39. The completed destruction program may
eventually cost approximately 100 times as much as the original construction of the chemical
weapons. Timothy M. Beardsley, Easier Said Than Done, Sci. AM., Sept. 1990, at 48, 50.
5 Smithson, supra note 4, at 38-39.
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and "destroying" it over a longer time. The Army's current eight-site
plan for constructing CW incinerators should be abandoned, while the
essence of NEPA and fundamental goals of the CWC should be simul-
taneously honored via a pragmatic compromise approach.
Finally, some concluding comments are offered, reflecting upon
any democracy's inherent difficulty in making decisions about this
type of complex, pressing, and obtuse social and scientific dilemma.
Public choice theory confirms the empirical investigation contained in
this Article, identifying the recurrent obstacles to rational group pol-
icy-setting, especially under conditions of legal uncertainty and polit-
ical urgency.
Overall, the thesis of this Article is that environmentalism and
arms control, two crucial sectors of American and international public
life that have long existed in segregated "parallel universes," are now
starting to intersect. Each of these areas contains its own hard
choices, irreconcilable alternatives, and political controversies; when
the two sets collide, the uncertainties and the barriers can become
paralyzing. Nonetheless, analysts and government officials must at-
tempt to make sense of the morass, plowing some tenable course to
serve the full range of United States and global interests. In the case
of chemical weapons dismantling, these competing concerns can be
accommodated-but only partially, temporarily, and uncomfortably.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF ARMS CONTROL
Throughout the twentieth century, Americans and others have la-
bored mightily to constrain the growth of their respective military
arsenals, attempting to reduce the likelihood of war, the financial
costs of defense preparations, and the devastating consequences of in-
ternational conflict.6 After World War II, as the disastrous implica-
tions of general warfare became more apparent, efforts at achieving a
broad range of disarmament measures accelerated.7 Only in the post-
cold war era, however, has it become possible to achieve true break-
throughs, and recent years have witnessed sudden successes con-
straining nuclear, conventional, and other weaponry in dazzling
fashion.8
6 See 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (Supp. 1990) (setting forth the congressional statement of purpose in
enacting Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961).
7 See generally GEORGE BUNN, ARMS CONTROL BY COMMITTEE: MANAGING NEGOTIA-
TIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS (1992); U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEX-Ts AND HisTORIs OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
(1990) [hereinafter ACDA TREATY BOOK].
8 See, e.g., Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-U.S.S.R. (not in force) [hereinafter START J.], reprinted in ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at START II Supp. 5; Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strate-
gic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., available in Senate Treaty Document 102-20,
Dismantling Excess Weapons
The subject of the actual dismantling of the excess weapons, how-
ever, has only barely been addressed, and the arms control community
is now engaged for the first time in sustained, controversial analysis of
the most suitable mechanisms and legal procedures for destroying the
military capabilities so laboriously built up by prior generations.9
A. Dismantling Obligations Under Prior Treaties
Earlier iterations of arms control efforts had adopted several dis-
tinct attitudes toward the disposal of the regulated weaponry. At the
simplest level, the 1925 Geneva Protocol' o on chemical weapons con-
stituted essentially just a "non-use" regime, permitting its parties to
retain and augment their CW arsenals unconstricted."1 Other treaties
basically amounted to mere geographic limitations upon the deploy-
ment or positioning of weapons, rather than prohibitions or limita-
tions upon their possession, and therefore did not mandate any
numerical reductions. 12 In a similar vein, some arms control treaties
102-32 (not in force) [hereinafter START I]; reaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,
Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 6 [hereinafter CFE Treaty].
9 See generally STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INsTrru'TE, CHEMICAL
WEAPONS: DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION (1980); Lawrence E. Rouse, The Disposition of the
Current Stockpile of Chemical Munitions and Agents, 121 Mir- L. REv. 17 (1988); Lois R. Ember,
Chemical Weapons DisposaL Daunting Challenges Still Ahead, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS, Aug. 13, 1990, at 9; Trevor Findlay, Chemical Disarmament and the Environment, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1990, at 12; Triana Silton, Out of the Frying Pan..., ECOLOGIST, Jan.-
Feb. 1993, at 18; Sara Wylie, The Army's Chemical Weapons Disposal Program: Noncompliance
with NEPA (1992) (unpublished J.D. seminar paper, Georgetown University Law Center, on file
with the author).
10 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571,94 LN.T.S. 65 [herein-
after Geneva Protocol].
11 Under the Geneva Protocol, parties undertook not to use certain chemical and biological
weapons in international conflict; however, several reservations to the treaty essentially con-
verted it into a prohibition against thefirst use of the regulated weaponry. Id. The treaty con-
tains no provisions regarding the dismantling of the weapons or the inspection of suspicious
activities. Id.
12 For example, the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered
into force June 23,1961), prohibits the emplacement in Antarctica of certain weapons, but does
not limit them elsewhere. Similarly, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of
the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 610 U.N.T.S.
(entered into force May 18, 1972) [hereinafter The Seabed Arms Control Treaty], both carve out
certain "special areas" to be relatively free from military competition, but do not inhibit their
parties' possession of weapons elsewhere. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, bans nuclear weapons programs
by Latin American states; through its protocols, other countries also undertake not to conduct
their nuclear weapons activities within the geographic area defined by the treaty. See Additional
Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14,
1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S. 364.
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attempted to constrain the testing or development of new types of
weapons, but these, too, failed to prohibit continued production or
deployment of the existing types.13 Moreover, several prominent in-
ternational arrangements-notably, the 1968 Non-Proliferation
Treaty14-are designed to inhibit the spread of a designated weapon
capability, without directly requiring the states that already possess
the specified arms to dismantle or otherwise limit them.15
In other instances, a treaty established numerical ceilings upon
the parties' permitted weaponry, but deliberately set those caps so
high that little, if any, actual dismantling was contemplated. 16 The two
SALT I documents (the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty17
13 The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter LTBT]; the Treaty on the
Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty), July 3, 1974,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 13 I.L.M. 967 [hereinafter TTBT]; the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explo-
sions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 893 U.S.-U.S.S.R. [hereinafter PNET]; the
Verification Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,
June 1,1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M. 969; and the Verification Protocol to the Treaty on Under-
ground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, June 1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M. 1025,
together regulate the size, location, purpose, and other characteristics of nuclear explosions.
These treaties have played a key role in inhibiting the development of new generations of nu-
clear weaponry, but they do not require the parties to dismantle any existing devices. Similarly,
the Agreement on Notification of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Subma-
rine-launched Ballistic Missiles, May 31, 1988, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 1200, requires the parties
to notify each other in advance of the test firing of strategic weaponry, but does not obligate
them to dismantle or otherwise limit the arms.
14 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.S.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPr]. The NPT bars its parties from
assisting additional countries' efforts at acquiring a nuclear weapons capacity, but it only margin-
ally commits the states that already possess those weapons to pursue efforts at nuclear disarma-
ment. Id. arts. I, II, VI.
See also the nascent Missile Technology Control Regime, a cartel among the relatively tech-
nologically advanced countries, designed to inhibit other countries which might be attempting to
acquire the capacity to deploy or produce ballistic missiles. Members of the Control Regime
pledge themselves to resist proliferation attempts, but they have not undertaken to reduce their
own reliance upon those weapons. John R. Harvey & Uzi Rubin, Controlling Ballistic Missiles:
How Important? How To Do It?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1992, at 13.
15 Many countries have complained about the "discriminatory" aspects of key arrangements
such as the NPT, which allows states that already possess nuclear weapons to retain them, but
prohibits other states from acquiring those devices. Joseph F. Pilat & Robert E. Pendley, Con-
clusions, in BEYOND 1995: THE Futruu OF THE NPT REGIME 165 (Joseph F. Pilat & Robert E.
Pendley eds., 1990).
16 Skeptics complained that throughout the Cold War era, the leading nuclear weapon states
cynically avoided accepting real constraints upon their weapons activities, pursuing instead poli-
cies which appeared to support disarmament, but which in reality allowed them essentially unfet-
tered discretion to proceed with their hegemonic weapons programs. See ALVA R. MYRDAL,
THE GAME OF DISARMAMEN. How THE UNrrED STATES AND RUSSIA RUN THE ARMS RACE
294 (1976).
17 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23
U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
Dismantling Excess Weapons
and the 1972 Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms18) and
the 1979 SALT II Treaty19 essentially fit this description. 20 Even in
those cases where a treaty purported to abolish a category of weap-
onry altogether, as with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC),21 it typically dealt with weapons that no country had actually
deployed in sizeable numbers, and little attention was consequently
paid to the question of how to verifiably and safely dispose of the
now-illegal arms.22
Moreover, on those occasions when the disarmament obligations
did amount to compulsory dismantling, the enforcement timetable
18 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972)
[hereinafter SALT I Interim Agreement].
19 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 18
I.L.M. 1138 (not in force) [hereinafter SALT II Treaty].
20 For example, the ABM Treaty, supra note 17, limited the two parties to no more than two
anti-ballistic missile sites apiece, at a time when neither side had completed any. ACDA
TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 152. Similarly, the SALT I Interim Agreement, supra note 18,
was essentially a "freeze" on the parties' arsenals of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, al-
lowing each side to retain its existing stockpiles (and to complete the construction of any weap-
ons then being built). ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 167. The SALT II Treaty, supra
note 19, would have required some modest dismantling of American nuclear weapons, and a bit
more reduction on the Soviet side, but these could have been accomplished merely by retiring
selected obsolete weapons, without altering either country's true military capability very much.
United States Department of State, SALT II: The Path of Security and Peace, CuRRwrr PoL'Y,
Apr. 1979, at 3; Edward N. Luttwak, Ten Questions about SALT II, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1979, at
21.
21 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacte-
riological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T.
583, 1015 U.S.T.S. 163 (entered into force Mar. 26, 1975) [hereinafter BWC].
22 In the case of biological weapons (BW), the United States had unilaterally decided to
renounce those arms and to dispose of its entire BW stockpile even before treaty negotiations
were initiated. The American military leaders had determined that biological weaponry was of
so little battlefield utility (being uncontrollable, unsafe, and unpopular) that it was relatively
easy to give up that military option, regardless of what other countries might do or not do in
response. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 129-30. The BWC, therefore, was negotiated
with precious little attention to dismantling procedures, verification arrangements, or dispute-
resolution mechanisms-omissions that some countries are now belatedly attempting to redress
in the aftermath of unresolved compliance controversies. Nicholas A. Sims, Reinforcing Biologi-
cal Disarmament: Issues in the 1991 Review (1991) (discussion draft, on file with the author).
Article II of the BWC states simply that each party is to destroy its biological "agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment and means of delivery" within nine months after the treaty enters into
force, but no mechanisms are established to monitor or control these efforts, or to ensure their
environmental soundness. BWC, supra note 21, art. II.
A similar set of conditions underlay the negotiations of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty,
supra note 12, and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18,1977,31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. 9614 [hereinafter
EnMod Convention]. Both these agreements prohibit weapons systems or applications that no
country has ever built or used. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 107-08, 211. These
seemingly bold absolute bans may have prophylactic utility as arms control measures, but they
do not raise any issues about a dismantling timetable or process.
89:445 (1995)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
was generally gradual;23 the quantities and locations of the weapons
were well-known; 24 and the verification methodology was mainly via
remote, satellite-based reconnaissance, as opposed to intrusive on-site
inspection.25 Most important, these treaties typically required de-
struction of only the "launcher" or the "delivery vehicle" (i.e., the mis-
sile silo, missile, airplane, or other device for containing the warhead
and transporting it to the intended target) instead of mandating disas-
sembly of the explosive or lethal element (i.e., the warhead or bomb)
itself.26 Therefore, treaty negotiators did not usually concern them-
selves with the interstices of the dismantling process, being content to
leave the operational details of the elimination to subsequent deliber-
ations-political conditions simply did not yet permit the disarmers to
pursue more effective and creative solutions. 27
23 For example, under the SALT II Treaty, supra note 19, each side was allowed an original
ceiling of 2400 strategic nuclear weapons, and that aggregate was later to be reduced to 2250.
Parties were allowed approximately 18 months after signature of the treaty to reach the 2400
level, and a further 12 months to complete the dismantling required to reach the lower aggre-
gate. Id. art. III, para. 1-2, XI, para. 3.
24 The United States has long enjoyed high confidence in its ability to locate, identify, and
count the large, immobile weapon systems (eg., ICBM silos, ABM radars, submarine bases)
which were the primary focus of the early SALT reductions. See generally Les Aspin, The Verifi-
cation of the SALT II Agreement, Sci. AM., Feb. 1979, at 38.
25 See T.R. Reid, Dismantling Nuclear Missiles is a 77tanic Task, WASH. POST, Apr. 30,1985,
at A3. A primary mechanism for monitoring arms control treaties has been the array of so-
called National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. NTM include the network of photo-
reconnaissance satellites, long distance seismic sensors, over-the-horizon radars, and other appa-
ratus capable of remote sensing of military targets. See also Aspin, supra note 24. NTM may be
contrasted to the more proximate forms of treaty monitoring, including various programs of on-
site inspection (OSI) through which foreign personnel are permitted to visit the site of suspicious
activities. See LEwis A. DUNN, ARMS CONTROL VERIFCATiON AND THE NEW ROLE OF ON-SrrE
INSPECTION (1990).
26 To a large extent, the early SALT accords adopted the strategy of focusing on the limita-
tion and dismantling of delivery systems (rather than of the nuclear warheads) because of verifi-
cation considerations: only the launchers, airplanes, and submarines were large enough to be
monitored by NTM. Neither side was yet willing to contemplate intrusive on-site inspection (of
the sort that would be necessary, for example, to count individual nuclear devices reliably), so
the treaties were crafted to embrace only the most conspicuous items. As later generations of
arms control agreements began to deal with weaponry that was small, mobile, or malleable, the
monitoring challenges multiplied, and additional verification methodologies, especially intrusive
on-site inspection, became necessary. Kenneth L. Adelman, Verification in an Age of Mobile
Missiles, Address Before the City Club in San Diego (Sept. 1987), in DEP'T ST. BULL- at 27;
William J. Broad, Russian Says Soviet Atom Arsenal Was Larger Than West Estimated, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 26, 1993, § 1, at 1.
27 For example, the ABM Treaty simply requires that excess equipment "shall be destroyed
or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time."
ABM Treaty, supra note 17, art. VIII. Subsequent accords then established the applicable prin-
ciples and outlined the procedures to govern the requisite ABM dismantling-but even these
subsidiary accords did not approach the level of detail and specificity crafted into later treaties.
Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1647; Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing the
Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems and
Dismantling Excess Weapons
Even at this modest level of arms control, controversies were fre-
quent. Critics asserted that by focusing exclusively on the launchers
and delivery vehicles, the United States was inadvertently permitting
the Soviet Union or others to continue to stockpile dangerous weap-
onry without effective limits. Allegedly, these latent arms could be
brandished with decisive effect in some hypothetical "breakout" sce-
nario, in which a rogue country would suddenly abrogate its disarma-
ment obligations, pull a ream of functioning weaponry out of well-
maintained retirement, quickly remanufacture any necessary associ-
ated elements, and then seize an advantage over other countries that
had not so assiduously sustained their re-armament capabilities.28
Similarly, there was plenty of grist for critics to argue that the
Soviets had incompletely complied with those few treaties that did
mandate some degree of dismantling.29 Even where the retired weap-
onry was patently no longer useable-the equivalent of being disas-
sembled and left to rust in an open field-punctilious attention to the
legal standards seemed to require more.30
Through it all, the leading negotiating parties, as well as those
monitoring their progress, consistently reasserted their dedication to
Their Components of July 3, 1974 (Oct. 28, 1976) (unpublished document on file with author)
[hereinafter Protocol on Procedures Governing ABM Replacement].
28 SALT's focus on limiting delivery systems, rather than nuclear devices, was criticized by
Ralph K. Bennett, The Fateful Illusions ofSALT 11, READER'S DIG., May 1979, at 97; Edward L.
Rowny, START in a Historical Perspective, Address Before Atlanta Kiwanis Club (Apr. 10,
1984), in CURRENT POLICY No. 563, Apr. 10, 1984, at 3. See also Michael R. Boldrick, START
Again, REASON, Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 60 (asserting similar arguments regarding START I and II
treaties).
29 See Robert W. Buchheim & Philip J. Farley, The U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Com-
mission, in U.S.-SovIEr SECURITY COOPERATION: AcamvEmENTs, FAILURES, LEssONs 254 (Al-
exander L. George et al. eds., 1988).
30 The test for efficacy in dismantling could plausibly be stated as the effort to ensure that the
object (weapon, warhead, silo, etc.) is so completely disassembled that the task of reconstituting
it would be virtually as difficult (in speed, financial cost, risk of being detected, etc.) as the task
of starting from scratch in building a completely new version of the item. Letter from Manfred
Eimer, former Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to David A.
Koplow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 19, 1993) (on file with the
author). See also Protocol on Procedures Governing ABM Replacement, supra note 27, art. IlI.
In implementing the SALT I accords, there were occasions upon which the Soviet Union
was tardy or incomplete in effectuating the dismantling procedures. These omissions carried no
military significance, but were nonetheless pursued in detail in high-level diplomacy. U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, SALT ONE: COMPLIANCE, SALT Two: VERIFICATION, SELEcTED DOCUMENTS No. 7,
at 7 (1978); Sidney N. Graybeal & Michael Krepon, SCC: Neglected Arms Control Tool, BULL.
ATOM. SciENTisrs, Nov. 1985, at 30, 32; Robert W. Buchheim & Dan Caldwell, The US-USSR
Standing Consultative Commission: Description and Appraisal 11 (May 1983) (unpublished
working paper, on file with the author); Buchheim & Farley, supra note 29; Gloria Duffy, Arms
Control Treaty Compliance, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARms CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 279
(Richard D. Burns ed., 1993); Sidney N. Graybeal & Michael Krepon, Making Better Use of the
Standing Consultative Commission, 10 INT'L SECURrrY 183 (1985).
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the goal of more meaningful reductions. 31 Numerous treaties and in-
ternational declarations cited, with almost liturgical fealty, the ulti-
mate objectives of "nuclear disarmament" or "general and complete
disarmament" even as they were notching only very small increments
toward that nirvana.32 The actual practice of arms control gradualism
succeeded in bringing only a precious few weapons from the active
stockpile to the scrapyard.
This lackadaisical approach to dismantling, however, was altered
forever with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty,33 which abolished an entire category of deployed nuclear arms
and established exacting procedures for destruction or retirement of
the missiles. Under the INF Treaty, unique elimination procedures
are identified for each category of weaponry and supporting equip-
ment. These procedures define specific methods, such as explosive
demolition, burning, crushing, flattening, or cutting the item into
pieces.34 The INF Treaty set a new standard for punctilious attention
to the details of the dismantling process,35 and the eliminations it con-
templated were all completed on schedule, with a minimum of polit-
ical or technological snafus.36
For all of this excruciating exactitude, however, the INF Treaty
still did not require destruction of the nuclear warheads formerly
31 See NPT, supra note 14, art. VI (committing the parties to far-reaching measures toward
cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete
disarmament).
32 See generally SALT II Treaty, supra note 19, pmbl.; BWC, supra note 21, pmbl.; ABM
Treaty, supra note 17, pmbl.
33 Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec.
8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 84 [hereinafter INF Treaty].
34 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of Missile Systems Subject to the
Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles to the INF
Treaty, Article II., Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 183. For example, the dismantling of
the Soviet Union's SS-20 system requires separate steps applicable to the missile, the launch
canister, and the launcher. To dispose adequately of just the launcher, the protocol requires
removal of various mechanisms, instrumentation, and mountings; cutting the components at lo-
cations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of equal size; and severing an aft portion of
the chassis at least 0.78 meters in length. Id. art. II, para. 10.
35 See generally JOSEPH P. HARAHAN, ON-SrrE INSPECTIONS UNDER THE INF TREATY: A
HisToRy OF THE ON-Srrn INSPECT[ON AGENCY AND INF TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 1988-1991
(1993). The Treaty also inaugurated unprecedented verification procedures, including a perva-
sive set of different types of on-site inspections, allowing each party to monitor the other's pro-
gress toward elimination of the stockpile. See Protocol on Procedures Governing the
Elimination of Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, supra note 34, art. II, para. 2.
36 HARAHAN, supra note 35. The INF Treaty eventually required the elimination of over
7600 items and the inspection of 133 Soviet sites and 31 U.S. sites. All of these activities were
completed within the applicable time limitations, at a cost to the United States of approximately
$522 million. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION, NSIAD-91-262 1-4 (1991).
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deployed atop the destroyed ballistic and cruise missiles.37 Both the
United States and the Soviet Union contemplated the possibility of
reusing those explosive devices, or the fissile components, in future
generations of weaponry, and they both insisted upon retaining the
right to stockpile the radioactive material, even as they were crushing
and burning the INF delivery vehicles 38 This approach, under which
the INF Treaty arguably did, or did not, constitute a real reduction in
the nuclear threat, was roundly criticized by Senator Jesse Helms,
among others, who alleged that, "The truth is that not one nuclear
weapon-not a single nuclear warhead-will be destroyed under the
terms of this Treaty. '39
The INF Treaty, furthermore, provides inadequate guidance for
the CWC dismantling process in another important respect because it
fails to include any specifications related to environmental protection.
Neither the IN Treaty itself, nor its detailed protocols, established
any standards or articulated any principles to circumscribe the envi-
ronmental impacts of the disarmament.40 Even the simple expedient
of disposing of unarmed missiles by launching them into the ocean
was approved.4'
Other recent arms control accords have adopted similar postures.
The 1991 START 142 and 1993 START I143 agreements reflected the
Reagan and Bush administrations' view that real reductions in strate-
gic nuclear arsenals, rather than simple caps on the rate of increase,
were essential.44 The mandated "deep cuts" in strategic weaponry will
alter forever the prior "balance of terror," and the intrusive verifica-
37 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of Missile Systems Subject to the
freaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, supra note
34, art. II, para. 3; U.S. ARMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, UNDERSTANDING THE
INF TREATY 21.
38 See generally Robert S. Norris & William M. Arkin, Beating Swords into Swords, Buu.m
ATOM. Scr-msrs, Nov. 1990, at 14-16 (stating that nuclear warheads retired from INF missiles
are repackaged as B61 bombs).
39 The INF Treaty, Report of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. Exec. Doc. No.
100-15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1988) (setting forth Sen. Helms's views).
40 The effectuation of the INF Treaty's destruction requirements did raise environmental
concerns. The open air "static firing" of the solid fuel Pershing missiles in Utah, Colorado, and
Texas generated huge plumes of noxious smoke, sparking research into alternative disposal tech-
nologies. Villiam J. Broad, New Methods Sought To Dispose of Rockets With No Harm to Earth,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 17, 1991, at C4.
41 INF Teaty, supra note 33, art. X, para. 5; Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimina-
tion of Missile Systems Subject to the leaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range
and Shorter-Range Missiles, supra note 34, art. III.
42 See START I, supra note 8.
43 l See START II, supra note 8.
44 Pat Towell, Turning the Goals of One Presidency into a Treaty for Those Who Follow, 50
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3070 (1992); Dunbar Lockwood, START: An Essential Step in a New Era,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 1991, at START Supp. 2. But see Boldrick, supra note 28, (criti-
cizing START for not going far enough to reduce threat).
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tion arrangements provide a degree of openness previously consid-
ered unthinkable between suspicious superpower antagonists.45
Hundreds of missile launchers, submarines, and airplanes46-but
again, not necessarily the actual warheads47 -will be reduced by both
sides in sequential phases over a period of years.48 The START ac-
cords extend the verification breakthroughs initiated in the INF
Treaty, including agreement upon a system of "portal/perimeter"
monitoring, whereby each party allows the other to station permanent
inspectors outside the formerly secret facilities where missile compo-
nents or other sensitive military apparatus are produced.49 In some
instances, a facility itself is to be disassembled or converted to civilian
applications. In other cases, foreign inspectors are entitled to enter
45 See generally KERRY M. KARTCHNER, NEGOTIATING START: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUC-
TION TALKS AND THE QUEST FOR STRATEGIC STABILrrY SECURITY (1992); STROBE TALBOTI,
THE MASTER OF THE GAME: PAUL NrrZE AND THE NUCLEAR PEACE (1988).
46 START I establishes benchmarks for the dismantling of weaponry at 36, 60, and 84
months after the treaty enters into force. START I, supra note 8, art. 11. A protocol then defines
the precise procedures relevant to the effective dismantling of each type of weaponry-as well as
selected related facilities-covered by the accord. Id The treaty not only limits the delivery
vehicles and associated instruments, it also, for the first time, effectively caps the "throw-weight"
of the missile fleets, by placing a ceiling upon the total tonnage of weaponry available to each
side. Id. art. II, para. 3.
The START I Treaty adopts the START I structure (including the key verification arrange-
ments) and advances the disarmament process by providing for substantially deeper reductions
in strategic forces, to be accomplished within seven years after entry into force. START II, supra
note 8, art. I; START II Executive Summary, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at START
I Supp. 3.
47 Neither START I nor START II directly requires the destruction of nuclear warheads.
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR STRATEGIC
ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (1991) [hereinafter START I LEIS]; U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SUP-
PLEMENTAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR START 11 6 (1993); Bol-
drick, supra note 28. However, it is expected that the United States will, in fact, disassemble
large numbers of warheads under the treaties in the coming years-if adequate facilities can be
developed to perform the work and safely store the resulting nuclear materials. Matthew L.
Wald, U.S. Is Unprepared To Disarm A-Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at A13; Thomas W.
Lippman, U.S. Has No Firm Disposal Policy For Plutonium, Study Maintains, WASH. POST, Sept.
24, 1993, at A2. It is likewise anticipated that Russia will also destroy a great many of its strate-
gic nuclear warheads pursuant to the START process. However, despite START's intrusive ver-
ification apparatus, the United States is still not entirely confident about the degree to which
Russia has actually dismantled the nuclear devices to date. Martin Sieff, Moscow Balks at Verifi-
cation of Scrapped Nukes, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A17. A recent U.S.-Russia agree-
ment on mutual inspections of plutonium storage facilities should facilitate the dismantling
process. Dunbar Lockwood, U.S., Russia Reach Agreement For Plutonium Site Inspections,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1994, at 22; John Deni & Dunbar Lockwood, DOD Plan Calls for
More Transparency in Managing U.S.-Russian Plutonium, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1994, at
23.
48 START I also allows the two parties to re-use many of their long-range ballistic missiles
after the associated launchers, submarines, or aircraft are eliminated. As a practical matter,
however, it is expected that many more missiles will actually be destroyed. R. Jeffrey Smith,
Treaty Won't Require Arms Destruction, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1991, at Al.
49 INF Treaty, supra note 33, art. XI, para. 6; START I, supra note 8, art. XVI.
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the plant site to take measurements or install "black box" technical
monitoring equipment, or to observe all outgoing traffic to ensure that
no contraband hardware is shipped from the plant.50 These verifica-
tion assurances amply support START's detailed provisions regarding
weapons destruction, but as with the INF Treaty, they are silent re-
garding any possible environment-, health-, or safety-related limita-
tions, standards, or protections.
In the same vein, the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty strongly stresses the importance of achieving a permanent re-
duction in non-nuclear military capacity5' by requiring the disassem-
bly of huge quantities of tanks, armored personnel carriers,
helicopters, and other devices.5 2 Like the INF Treaty, it specifies pre-
cise procedures for neutralizing each type of covered equipment, and
it provides for detailed on-site inspection to ensure fidelity to the
agreed standards.53 The CFE Treaty, however, retains for each party
"the right to use any technological means it deems appropriate" to
accomplish the requisite eliminations, and it, too, imposes no environ-
mental, safety, or other inhibitions.54
Finally, it is noteworthy that several of these recent international
accords and governmental actions have sponsored, in various ways,
the "conversion" of selected defense resources to civilian purposes.55
50 U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 37, at 26-30. The INF
Treaty permits the United States to maintain, for 13 years, a continuous monitoring presence
outside the missile facility at Votkinsk, Russia. The American inspectors are permitted to mea-
sure and weigh cargoes that exit the facility and to use a nondamaging imaging sensor (roughly
comparable to an X-ray machine) to ascertain that no treaty-related items are escaping. Russia
maintains a comparable portal/perimeter installation outside a former U.S. missile facility at
Magna, Utah. Id.
51 See CFE Treaty, supra note 8. In comparison, the 1921-22 Washington Naval Treaties had
helped to establish a temporary respite from the emerging race to develop and deploy additional
sea power, by mandating fixed ratios and tonnage limits for the major ocean-faring states. These
understandings did not, however, require reductions in existing naval strength, and they proved
to be of only short duration. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 4.
52 Under the CFE Treaty, the 29 participating countries are required to draw down their
stockpiles of key military hardware in five categories: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery,
aircraft, and helicopters. Lee Feinstein, Weapons in Europe Before and After CFE, ARMs CoN-
TROL TODAY, June 1992, at 32. Under a subsequent CFE IA agreement, the numbers of combat
personnel in Europe will be reduced, too. Thomas Graham, Jr., The CFE Story: Tales From the
Negotiating Table, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 9.
53 See generally Protocol on Inspection, Nov. 19, 1990,30 I.L.M. 52 (setting forth the inspec-
tion procedures for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) [hereinafter CFE
Inspection Protocol]; Gregory Webb, CFE Update, BuL.. ATOM. ScmNTIsrs, Dec. 1993, at 24.
54 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and
Equipment Limited By the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990,30
I.L.M. 32, at § I, para. 2 [hereinafter CFE Reduction Protocol].
55 The increased interest in eliminating or converting selected military assets has also spon-
sored something of a boom in the related private-sector environmental services industry. Addi-
tional firms are entering the field, hoping to capitalize on the government's newfound need for
cleanup technology and safe industrial capacity. F. Housley Carr, Chemical Weapons Are for
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At the smallest level, the CFE Treaty contemplates that some of the
regulated hardware-individual trucks and tanks, for example-may
properly be deweaponized and converted to heavy-duty nonmilitary
applications instead of being completely destroyed or disassembled,
and it specifies steps to guard against reconversion back into military
usefulness.5 6 Likewise, in the START accords, the United States and
Russia have agreed that at least a few of their expensive interconti-
nental ballistic missiles may be saved from the scrapyard by conver-
sion into space launch vehicles, projecting artificial satellites toward
orbit, instead of weapons toward a target.5 7 At a higher level, coun-
tries have attempted to reconfigure their weapons design or
fabrication facilities for more benign purposes-Russia's adaptation
of a former INF missile production plant into a factory for producing
baby carriages is the most conspicuous example.58 At a still more
macroeconomic level, entire industries in the United States, Russia,
and elsewhere are facing the stark challenge of converting to lower
military spending, and the entire defense "food chain"-including re-
search laboratories, test sites, production facilities, and deployment
bases-is experiencing the pressures of demobilization.5 9
Burning, CHEMICAL WK., Mar. 16, 1988, at 84; Gregory D. Morris, E&C Firms Gain in Nerve
Gas Treaty, CHEMICAL WK., June 13, 1990, at 30.
56 CFE Reduction Protocol, supra note 54, § VII. For example, limited numbers and se-
lected types of battle tanks may be converted for service as bulldozers, fire fighting vehicles, or
rescue vehicles, pursuant to articulated standards. Id In addition, some of the armaments may
be placed on "static display" (for example, in a museum) or used as targets or for other military
training functions. Id §§ XI, XII.
57 START 1I Executive Summary, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at START II
Supp. 3, 4. See Bruce D. Nordwell & Jeffrey V. Lenorovitz, U.S.-Russian SLBM Venture Plans
Initial Test for 1994, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 3, 1993, at 60 (discussing development
of a new commercial space launch vehicle, using elements from stockpiled Russian SS-N-23 and
SS-N-20 missiles). See generally Edmund L. Andrews, New Careers for Cold War Relics, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at D1; Ann M. Florini & William C. Potter, Goodwill Missions for Castoff
Missiles, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Nov. 1990, at 25. But see Ben lannotta, NASA Hesitates To
Employ Missiles as Space Launchers, DEF. NEWS, Aug. 2, 1993, at 2-8 (stating that a sudden glut
of government-sponsored space launch capacity may undercut emerging industry efforts to de-
velop private launch services market).
58 See generally U.N. OFIcm OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, POTENTIAL USES OF MILITARY-
RELATED RESOURCES FOR PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1993) [hereinafter POTENTIAL
USES]; Christopher Anderson, Weapons Labs in a New World, 262 SCl. 168 (1993); Margaret
Shapiro, Switching From Missile Systems to Teapots, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1993, at A16; R.
Jeffrey Smith, Environmental Cleanup Role Considered for A-Weapons Lab, WASH. POST, Mar.
9, 1993, at A10; Amy E. Smithson, Russia Wants Plastics, Too, BuLL ATOM. SCIENTSTS, May
1994, at 14.
59 See generally DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS: THE ECONOMIC DIMEN-
SION (Serge Sur ed., 1991); John Burgess, Bombs Into Bulldozers, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1992, at
H1; Holly Idelson, Nuclear Weapons Complex Braces For Overhaul, CONG. Q., Apr. 25, 1992, at
1066; Alexei I. Izyumov, Conversion: Economic Adjustments in an Era of Arms Reduction, 1991
DISARMAMENT 53; Gary Lee & Rick Atkinson, The Battle to Beat Swords Into Shoes, WASH.
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Perhaps the most dramatic instance of beating swords into plow-
shares is the recent arrangement under which the United States has
agreed to purchase, on mutually advantageous terms, five hundred
metric tons of Russia's now surplus weapons-grade highly enriched
uranium over a twenty-year period.60 The plan is to dilute the radio-
active mass, rendering it unusable for weaponry, and to transform it
into fuel for United States civilian nuclear power reactors. The cash
payments will bolster Moscow's faltering economy at the same time
that the exchange whittles away the size of the nuclear weapons threat
facing the United States. 61
B. Dismantling Obligations Under the Chemical Weapons
Convention
The above chronology demonstrates that the key weapons negoti-
ating states have come a long way from their earlier indifference to
actual disarmament. Recent accords have addressed the elimination
process in conspicuous detail and have initiated the process of walking
swiftly back from the abyss of "overkill." The world has already
learned a great deal about the challenges of effective dismantling of
military equipment and about the opportunities for conversion of de-
fense assets to more productive applications.
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, however, raises all
these issues in an even more acute, intractable form. The treaty at-
tempts to achieve the comprehensive abolition of CW arsenals world-
wide-not just among two superpowers, but for all states, including
several that continue to deny possession of any CW.62 It aims, more-
POST, Nov. 21, 1990, at A12 (part 4 of 4); Tom A. Zamora, New Jobs For Old Labs?, BULL.
ATOM. SCmNTISTS, Nov. 1992, at 14.
60 Agreement Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nu-
clear Weapons, Feb. 18, 1993, U.S.-Russian Federation, Hein's No. KAV 3503.
61 William J. Broad, From Soviet Warheads to U.S. Reactor Fuel, N.Y. TIms, Sept. 6, 1992,
§ 4, at 1; Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. to Buy Russian Uranium, WASH. PoST, Sept. 1,1992, at Al.
See also William J. Broad, Russian Says Soviet Atom Arsenal Was Larger Than West Estimated,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, § 1, at 1 (reporting that when United States contracted to purchase
the 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, American officials believed that quantity consti-
tuted almost all of Moscow's supply, but recent reports estimate that Russia may now have a
total inventory of 1200 metric tons). More recently, the terms of this tradeoff have been ex-
tended to include American purchases of uranium derived from former Soviet missiles located
inside the Ukraine, and Kiev, too, is expected to share in the financial aid. R.W. Apple, Jr.,
Ukraine Gives in on Surrendering Its Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1994, at Al.
62 Only three states (the United States, Russia, and Iraq) currently admit possessing chemi-
cal weapons, but the number of other countries suspected of covertly maintaining a CW capacity
(or of working assiduously in that direction) ranges as high as twenty or more. See Charles C.
Flowerree, Current Chemical Weapons Proliferation, in CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILE
PROLIFERATION: WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AsIA/PAcEFIc REGION 9,13 (RTevor Fimdlay ed.,
1991); U.S. GEN. AccouTInG OFmCE, ARMS CONTROLU U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO
BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS (1991) [hereinafter EFFORTS TO BAN]; Brad Roberts, Controlling
Chemical Weapons, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROs. 435, 438 (1992).
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over, at a permanent injunction against chemical warfare, by essaying
to destroy the capability for quick weaponization of chemicals,
through elimination of the facilities where the combat agents have
been produced or armed.63 Crucially, the CWC regulates even "dual
use" and "precursor" chemicals-substances which are not them-
selves lethal warfare agents, but which could be converted into weap-
ons relatively easily-even when those same chemicals have become
exceedingly widespread in an immense variety of civilian applications
across the breadth of the international economy, ranging from pesti-
cides to plastics to paint.64
Unlike most of its arms control ancestors, therefore, the CWC
will strive: (1) to eliminate the lethal warheads, not merely the deliv-
ery systems, and even to destroy the facilities formerly used to pro-
duce them; (2) to root out even small quantities of weapons, which
might still prove militarily meaningful; (3) to deal with protean sub-
stances, which can be secretly converted from weaponry into benign
fluids and gases (and back again) with unsettling rapidity; (4) to in-
trude its verification obligations upon private industry, which handles
toxic chemicals in great profusion, as well as upon the more familiar
governmental sector; and (5) to anticipate possible future ordnance
concepts, which might midwife new types of chemical weapons even
as the old versions are being dismantled.65
Central to this Article, the CWC is different from even its most
ambitious predecessors in yet another way: its nascent attention to
the environmental implications of the dismantling process. Unlike the
INF, START, CFE, and other treaties, which were silent about their
potential ecological ramifications, the CWC explicitly provides that:
"Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under
this Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety
of people and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as
appropriate with other State Parties in this regard. '66
While this passage is not nearly as fulsome or as detailed as it
might be (or as many other provisions of the exceptionally fastidious
63 As noted above, the 1925 Geneva Protocol had established an international norm against
the first use of chemical weapons in international combat, but it did not prohibit the production
or deployment of lethal agents. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
CWC negotiators determined to outlaw not only the hostile application of chemical agents, but
also their possession, and the new treaty extended its ban to require the destruction or conver-
sion of key CW-related production facilities. CWC, supra note 1, arts. IV, V.
64 Gordon M. Burck, Chemical Weapons Production Technology and the Conversion of Civil-
ian Production, ARMS CONTROL, Sept. 1990, at 122; Kyle B. Olson, The U.S. Chemical Industry
Can Live With A Chemical Weapons Convention, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 1989, at 21.
65 Regarding the provisions of the CWC and its effect upon existing United States law, see
EDWARD A. TANZMAN & BARRY KELLMAN, DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, HARMONIZING THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVEmTION wrrH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1991).
66 CWC, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 3.
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CWC certainly are67), it does establish a basic mandate, and the par-
ties have taken seriously their obligation to respect the environmental
concerns in addressing the dismantling process.68
The tasks of understanding and implementing the multifarious
CWC provisions related to dismantling will now mandate some unrav-
eling of the tortured history of the weaponry and the longstanding
disarmament negotiations, asking first how the weapons and the
treaty text evolved; second, what the treaty actually requires of the
parties regarding dismantling; and third, what the planet's existing
CW arsenal now includes.
1. How We Got These Things: The Evolution of CW and the
CWC.-Explicating the legal and political imperatives of the Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention requires some background in the problem of
chemical weaponry itself.69 Various forms of "fulminating smoke,"
"noxious gases," and "hellish poison" have been applied in combat for
centuries, occasionally with telling military consequences. 70 At the
same time, public opinion has recoiled against the mysteries of CW,
reviling the incorporeal application of violence as a particularly loath-
some form of combat.71 During World War I, both these factors inten-
67 The CWC is an exceptionally long and detailed instrument, even by the standards of mod-
em arms control agreements, which have recently assumed monumental length. The CWC runs
to almost 200 pages, laden with technical minutiae that dwarf its predecessors such as the Ge-
neva Protocol and the BWC.
68 The CWC also incorporates environmental protection into the provisions regarding (1)
transporting, sampling, storing, and destroying chemical weapons, and (2) destroying chemical
weapons production facilities, by requiring that each party "shall assign the highest priority to
ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment" during those operations.
CWC, supra note 1, arts. IV, para. 10, art. V, para. 11. In addition, the CWC-while generally
affirming the right of each party to determine its own process for destroying its weaponry-
specifically forbids disposal via ocean dumping, land burial, or open-pit burning. lId Verification
Annex, Part IV (A), para. C, § 13. See also the provisions related to securing whatever permits
and adhering to whatever procedures are required pursuant to domestic environmental and
safety laws during the elimination and inspection operations. lId Part II, para. B, § 11(d); Part
II, para. E, § 43; Part IV(A), para. C, § 32; Part VI, para. C, § 7.
69 See generally THOMAS BERNAUER, THE CHEMISTRY OF REGIME FORMATION: ExPLAnqnGO
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS 17-30
(1993); GORDON M. BURCK & CHARLES C. FLOWERREE, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION (1991); John E. Moon, Controlling Chemical and Biologi-
cal Weapons Through World War II, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DisAzmA-
MENT 657 (Richard D. Bums ed., 1993); MARK STORELLA, POISONING ARMS CONTROL: THE
SOVIET UNION AND CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (1984); VICTOR A. UTGOFF, THE CHAL-
LENOE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (1991); John P. Jones & Eileen Wagner, Poison Gas Prolifera-
tion: Paradox, Politics, and Law, 15 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 521 (1993); Symposium,
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 262 JAMA 640 (1989).
70 UTGOFF, supra note 69, at 1-3; JOHN HEMSLEY, THE SOVIET BIOCHEMICAL THREAT TO
NATO 66-69 (1987).
71 UTGOFF, supra note 69, at xviii. Early efforts to emplace some types of primitive controls
on chemical weapons date back at least to a 1675 French-German agreement to outlaw poison
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sifted, as new genres of phosgene, mustard gas, and other CW claimed
over one million casualties, including one hundred thousand fatali-
ties,72 resulting in a public revulsion that impelled progress toward the
Geneva Protocol.73
Remarkably, chemical agents were not generally employed dur-
ing World War II, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that par-
tisans on both sides had assembled massive CW arsenals,74 including
new generations of extraordinarily lethal organophosphorus nerve
gases.75 Through the succeeding decades, many states flirted with a
CW capacity; quite a few devoted considerable resources to develop-
ing and deploying active arsenals; and several delib'erately maintained
a studious ambiguity in which they never quite acknowledged the CW
capabilities and aspirations they were widely suspected of sustaining.76
Many leading strategic authorities, however, eventually drifted toward
the conclusion that chemical arms were relatively unattractive milita-
rily, being too uncontrollable on the battlefield, since their location,
persistence, and lethality would be heavily influenced by wind, precip-
itation, temperature, terrain, and other autonomous factors 77 CW
bullets, and continued through the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Id. at 3-4; ACDA
TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 3-4.
72 UTGOFF, supra note 69, at 5-11; JULIAN P. ROBINSON, THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THE RISE OF CB WEAPONS (1971) (published by the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute); ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 129.
73 BURCK & FLOwERREE, supra note 69, at 540-41; UTGOFF, supra note 69, at 11-18; Jean P.
Zanders, Chemical Weapons: Beyond Emotional Concerns, 21 BuLL. PEACE PROPOSALS 87
(1990); BERNAUER, supra note 69, at 18.
The visceral reaction to the horrors of chemical warfare during World War I has had a
lasting impact. When I taught a seminar course entitled "Chemical and Biological Weaponry"
during the fall 1991 semester at the Georgetown University Law Center, several students volun-
teered that a primary reason for enrolling in the course was a curiosity prompted by recalling
family stories they had been told about their grandfathers' experiences with gas during The
Great War.
74 BERNAUER, supra note 69, at 19. Chemical weapons were used by Japan against China
and by Italy against Ethiopia, but they were not widely applied in the main battlefronts of the
war, even though both sides were well equipped to use CW and even though both experienced
severe provocations in which chemical use was strongly considered. UTGOFF, supra note 69, at
27-68; STORELLA, supra note 69, at 9-11.
75 UTGOFF, supra note 69, at 22-26. There is a wide variety of types of chemical weapons,
including "blister agents" (such as mustard gas), "blood agents" (such as hydrogen cyanide), and
"nerve agents" (such as soman and tabun). These chemicals differ in their lethality, persistence,
mode of delivery, and other parameters. U.S. GOV'T, REPORT OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE
REVIEW COMM'N 5-9 (1985) [hereinafter STOESSEL COMM'N]; BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note
69, at 20-21, 579-81; see infra text accompanying notes 129-35.
76 BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 69, at xxi-xxiii, 162-77.
77 BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 69, at 579; Jones & Wagner, supra note 69, at 554.
Despite this seeming inutility of chemical weaponry, the Soviet Union built a massive CW capa-
bility, which it continued to update, train, and integrate into its main warfighting doctrine-
activities which many Western tacticians viewed with considerable alarm. UTGOFF, supra note
69, at 143-98; STORELLA, supra note 69, at 42-73; HEMSLEY, supra note 70.
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were therefore widely considered unsuitable for application against a
reasonably well-trained and defensively equipped adversary,78 and
their primary function became deterrence: to persuade a foe not to
initiate chemical hostilities, for fear of inciting retaliation in kind.7 9
At the same time, there were occasional episodes of the use, al-
leged use, or threatened use of chemicals in isolated hostilities around
the globe,80 including by Egypt against Yemen in the 1960s8 1 and per-
haps by the Soviet Union or its surrogates in Afghanistan and South-
east Asia twenty years later.82 Particularly after the widespread use of
CW by both sides in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war-with greater appar-
ent military effectiveness than generally predicted 3-the widespread
international taboo against chemical warfare appeared to be in jeop-
ardy.84 Even if the most militarily sophisticated countries could afford
78 Chemical weapons have rarely, if ever, been used with decisive military impact against a
force that was outfitted with state-of-the-art defensive systems. Contemporary "gas masks" and
associated protective clothing, equipment, and decontamination techniques could substantially
reduce the lethality of even a large, modem chemical attack. Matthew Meselson, The Myth of
Chemical Superweapons, BULL ATOM. ScmENTrsTs, Apr. 1991, at 12; Jane M. Orient, Chemical
and Biological Warfare: Should Defenses Be Researched and Developed?, 262 JAMA 644 (1989).
79 BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 69, at 14-15. Tactical use of chemical weaponry could
potentially have a significant effect as a "force multiplier" even against a well-prepared enemy in
degrading the enemy force's fighting ability, by compelling the soldiers to don cumbersome, hot,
protective clothing, thereby inhibiting their mobility, communication, and overall effectiveness.
Id.; STOESSEL COMM'N, supra note 75, at 50-54.
80 There were at least 20 occasions since World War II in which serious allegations were
asserted about the possible use of chemical weapons. Many of these instances were patently
spurious, but several remain plausible. UTrOFF, supra note 69, at 69-87; STORELLA, supra note
69, at 49-54.
81 Reliable evidence demonstrated that Egypt used lethal chemical weapons repeatedly dur-
ing its intervention in the Yemeni civil war of the 1960s. UTGoI'i, supra note 69, at 70-71.
82 The United States accused the Soviet Union of employing a variety of chemical, biologi-
cal, or toxic weapons (in the form of a "Yellow Rain") against indigenous rebels in Afghanistan,
Laos, and Cambodia during the early 1980s. In-depth investigation, however, failed to adduce
dispositive evidence to substantiate the claim, and alternative explanations-establishing that
the substances detected were of natural origin-became more widely accepted. Thomas White-
side, Annals of the Cold War, NEw YoRKER, Feb. 11, 1991, at 38 (part 1 of 2); Thomas Whiteside,
Annals of the Cold War, NEw YORKER, Feb. 18, 1991, at 44 (part 2 of 2); UTOOFF, supra note 69,
at 74-80; STORELLA, supra note 69, at 19-32; Howard Hu et al., The Use of Chemical Weapons:
Conducting an Investigation Using Survey Epidemiology, 262 JAMA 640 (1989).
83 Iraq used various chemical weapons frequently against a variety of Iranian military and
civilian targets, achieving some degree of local success, especially early in the war. Iran's CW
retaliation was of much more limited scope and effectiveness. BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra
note 69, at 31-137; UTrOFF, supra note 69, at 80-86; Hu et. al., supra note 82.
84 A major international conference on chemical weapons convened in Paris in 1989, and
provided the occasion for 149 countries to express the world's revulsion with chemical weapons
and their commitment to control the dangers. The conferees refused, however, to condemn Iraq
by name for its CV attacks on Iran, and generally adopted a less vigorous posture on chemical
proliferation and on international sanctions against the renegades than the United States and
other key players had expected. Edward Cody, 149 Nations Vow to Shun Poison Gas, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 1989, at Al; Jill Smolowe, Chemical Warfare: Return of the Silent Killer, TIME,
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to eschew chemical weapons in favor of more effective and managea-
ble ordnance, CW still retained its considerable cachet among the less
developed nations' arsenals, as "the poor country's atomic bomb."8 5
The recent (so far, fragmentary and unconfirmed) reports that Iraq
may have employed some level of chemical warfare during the 1991
Desert Storm battles;86 that Serbian military units may have utilized
poison gas inside Bosnia-Herzegovina;8 7 and that chemical ordnance
may even have found their way into the Angolan civil war; 8 add still
newer chilling chapters to this fearsome ledger.
Meanwhile, international negotiations toward a CWC had been
underway, with only glacial progress, for decades.89 Most of the delib-
erations occurred within or around the Geneva-based Conference on
Disarmament, a multilateral United Nations affiliate widely recog-
nized as the leading disarmament negotiating body,90 but substantial
bilateral United States-Soviet Union bargaining inevitably played a
key role, too.9' (The superpowers even concluded, but have not yet
fully effectuated, two interim bilateral agreements related to CW non-
production, destruction, and verification. 92) As a draft multilateral
Aug. 22, 1988, at 46; UTGOFF, supra note 69, at 123-25; BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 69, at
545-47.
85 Orient, supra note 78, at 645 (reporting that inflicting casualties via chemical warfare is
much cheaper than conventional or nuclear means, and does not require advanced technology).
86 Bill McAllister, Riegle Suggests Iraq Conducted Chemical Warfare, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
1993, at A18; Bill Gertz, Nerve Gas Detected by Czechs During Gulf War, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 7,
1993, at A3.
87 News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Sept. 1993, at 11, 12, 24.
88 Id. at 17-18.
89 BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 69, at 541-45; UTGOFF, supra note 69, at 88-97, 104-20.
In the 1970s, the problem of biological weapons was diplomatically split off from the problem of
chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol had dealt with both types of arms, but the effort to
develop a more comprehensive follow-on accord proved far easier for BW than for CW, and the
BWC, supra note 21, was concluded in 1972. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 129-32.
90 THOMAS BERNAUER, THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A GUIDE TO
THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 5-7, 20-32 (1990); BERNAUER,
supra note 69, at 25-30,59-75. The Conference on Disarmament, and its several percursor orga-
nizations, had played a key role in the evolution of prior arms control accords, including the
BWC, the NPT, and others. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 89-97, 129-32.
91 UTOOFF, supra note 69, at 110-12.
92 In September 1989, the United States and Soviet Union concluded a bilateral Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) to establish a two-part program of data exchanges and reciprocal
verification inspections. (The first phase of the MOU has been implemented, but the second has
been deferred.) In June 1990, the two parties also signed a Bilateral Destruction Agreement to
eliminate most of their chemical weapons stockpiles on an accelerated timetable, long before the
CWC was concluded. Difficulties in deriving a suitable destruction methodology, however, have
delayed the entry into force and the implementation of this accord, and the timetable for the
required disarmament is being stretched out to coincide largely with that of the CWC. See
Agreement Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohi-
bition of Chemical Weapons, Sept. 23, 1989, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 28 I.L.M. 1438; Agreement on De-
struction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the
Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, June 1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M.
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treaty text gradually evolved, a multiplicity of thorny issues also
emerged, leading to only fitful, incremental progress and eventually to
a carefully balanced set of tradeoffs through which no country ob-
tained everything it wanted, and each had to accept compromises and
offsetting obligations.93
Crowning the negotiations was the January 1993 signing cere-
mony in Paris, at which 130 countries affiliated themselves with the
instrument 94-but even this event was jeopardized by a threatened
Arab League boycott, which only partially dissipated at the last min-
ute.95 The process of obtaining ratifications by the necessary sixty-five
states96 and establishing the institutional framework essential for op-
erating the treaty will likely consume at least two years prior to entry
932; Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
Arms Control and Disarmament, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 232, 312 (1992); BURCK & FLOWERREE,
supra note 69, at 548-50; KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF MANY:
THE ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGE OF THE '90s, at 75-78 (1991); Amy Smithson, Conventional
Wait, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept. 1993, at 10; THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
HANDBOOK 40-41 (Amy E. Smithson ed. 1993) [hereinafter SMrrHSON HANDBOOK]; BERNAUER,
supra note 69, at 27-28.
Other groups of countries have also crafted interim restraints against chemical weaponry in
anticipation of the CWC, notably the Mendoza Agreement of 1991, under which Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay jointly foreswore the development, production, retention, use, and
transfer of CW. Id. at 29.
93 BERNAUER, supra note 90, at 11-32; Amy E. Smithson, Chemical Weapons: The End of the
Beginning, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTIsTs, Oct. 1992, at 36; Carl-Magnus Hyltenius et al., Symposium
on the Chemical Weapons Convention, 16 DISARMAMENT 82 (1993). George Bush had taken a
substantial personal interest in the CWC negotiations, both as vice-president and as president.
The United States, however, adopted a number of controversial negotiating positions (on verifi-
cation, the timetable for dismantling, and the retention of some residual CW stockpiles) that
inhibited more rapid progress toward a treaty. In the endgame, movement on many of these key
issues finally produced the complete package of balanced compromises. Amy E. Smithson, Tot-
tering Toward a Treaty, BULL. ATOM. SCmNTSTS, July-Aug. 1992, at 9; R. Jeffrey Smith & John
E. Yang, Bush Pushes for ChemicalArms Treaty, WASH. POST, May 14,1991, at A12; Paul Lewis,
U.S. Now Prefers Limited Inspection of Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al; Peter
Grier, US Stance on Inspections Roils Chemical-Arms Talks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 19,
1991, at 1.
94 At the Paris summit, 130 countries signed the CWC; others joined in the succeeding
months, so the current "scorecard" shows 151 signatories, four of which have already deposited
an instrument of ratification. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, FACr SHEET.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION SIGNATORIES/PARTIES (1993); The Prepatory Commission,
CWC CHRONICLE, May 1993, at 1, 3; U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ISSUES
BRm RATCATION AND ADHERENCE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1993).
95 The Arab League had indicated that its members would not sign the CWC until the prob-
lem of nuclear weaponry was resolved in the Middle East, too-specifically, with Israel adhering
to the NPT. In the end, however, 10 League countries broke ranks and signed the chemical pact.
Smithson, supra note 4, at 38.
96 The CWC will enter into force 180 days after the 65th country deposits its instrument of
ratification with the United Nations Secretary General, but in no case sooner than 2 years after
the January, 1993 signing ceremony. CWC, supra note 1, arts. XXI, para. 1, XXIII.
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into force.97 The CWC evokes a substantial new international bureau-
cracy, empowered to collect data, conduct on-site inspections, resolve
disputes, and generally administer a cumbersome, complex system of
international verification-and all of this must be invented from
scratch. 98
Overall, the CWC is widely regarded as a uniquely important ac-
complishment.99 It aims to rid the world-completely and perma-
nently-of a scourge that has claimed many lives and terrorized
societies. It accomplishes actual disarmament, mandating the disposal
of immense quantities of weapons of mass destruction that had
worked their way into the active inventories of several countries. It
eradicates, or at least greatly reduces, a substantial threat to the secur-
ity of the United States, its allies, and others. It will materially aid in
the process of degrading the offensive military capacity of Russia
(where doubts persist about the physical security of weaponry and
about the stability of the reformist civilian control) and of many other
erstwhile threats (including renegade countries and those who sponsor
international terrorism, but who might nonetheless find that the pres-
sure to join the global CWC regime was becoming irresistible). For all
its possible imperfections,1ee the CWC is an enormously valuable con-
97 The CWC establishes an overarching Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weap-
ons (OPCW), which will administer the convention via a Conference of States Parties, an Execu-
tive Council, and a Technical Secretariat. As a provisional matter, a Preparatory Commission
(PrepCom) has convened to initiate operations, even prior to the CWC's entry into force, by
hiring international civil servants, organizing the budget, starting the data collection process, and
developing inspection methodologies. CWC, supra note 1, art. VIII and Text on the Establish-
ment of a Preparatory Commission; U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, FACT
SHEET'. ORGANIZATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (1993); Lois R. Ember,
Chemical Arms Treaty Makes Unprecedented Demands of Industry, CHEMICAL & ENOINEERING
NEWS, June 17, 1993, at 7; Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, The Chemical Weapons Convention and its
Institutions, UNIDIR NEwsL. (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva,
Switzerland), Dec. 1992, at 18; Peter Herby, Building the Chemical Disarmament Regime, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1993, at 14.
98 The PrepCom has been charged with responsibility for some 40 discrete tasks concerning
the entry into force of the CWC and its effective early operation-as well as for resisting the
inevitable pressures to "renegotiate" controversial aspects of the treaty through strained inter-
pretations of it. Peter Herby & Julian P. Robinson, International Organization for Chemical
Disarmament Begins, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BuLL., Mar. 1993, at 1; Counsellor
Shahbaz, A Perspective on the OPCW Preparatory Commission, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVEN-
TION BuLL., Mar. 1993, at 5; CWC, supra note 1, Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory
Commission.
99 Remarks by Secretary of State Eagleburger Upon Signing the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (Jan. 13, 1993), in FOREIGN POL'Y BULL, Jan.-Apr. 1993, at 38; Statement by President
Bush on Chemical Weapons Convention (Jan. 13, 1993), in FOREIGN Poi'Y BULL., Jan-Apr.
1993, at 38; ACDA Occasional Paper: Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance Between Obli-
gations and the Needs of States Parties (Jan. 5, 1993), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DIs-
PATCH, Jan. 18, 1993, at 30.
100 See Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., A Big Hole in That Chemical Weapons Treaty, WASH. PosT,
Sept. 8, 1992, at A21; Kathleen Bailey, Problems with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in
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tribution to world security and international law, one the United
States is appropriately pledged to support. 01
2. Getting Rid of These Things: What the CWC Requires.-The
new treaty contains many important and novel disarmament provi-
sions, several of which are likely to result in major potential impacts
upon the biosphere.102 As a comprehensive regime, the CWC re-
quires, among other things, that each party: (a) eliminate all its ex-
isting CW agents and weapons and promise never to re-acquire
them;10 3 (b) report on its production and consumption of other key
chemicals and "precursors" that could be converted into weapons rel-
atively easily, but that may also have substantial applications in ordi-
nary, peaceful commerce;104 and (c) dismantle its CW-related
production facilities or convert them to peaceful applications. 05
The timetable for accomplishing these eliminations is not lei-
surely. Destruction of the agents, other chemicals, weapons, and in-
stallations is to be initiated within one year of the treaty's entry into
force and is to be completed within ten years;10 6 if a party, in excep-
SHADOWS AND SuBsTANcE: THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 17 (Benoit Morel & Kyle
Olson eds., 1993) [hereinafter SHADOWS AND SUBSTANCE].
101 Gerard Errera, The Chemical Weapons Convention: An Historic Agreement, UNIDIR
NEWSL, Dec. 1992, at 3; Peter H. Oppenheimer, A Chemical Weapons Regime for the 1990s:
Satisfying Seven Critical Criteria, 11 WIs. IN'L LJ. 1 (1993).
102 See generally UNIDIR NEwsL., Dec. 1992. In addition to the treaty provisions analyzed in
this section, the CWC is expected to have other effects on the global environment, as considered
infra text accompanying notes 250-77. For example, one purpose of the CWC is to facilitate
more freely-flowing international commercial traffic in chemicals, equipment, and technology.
CWC, supra note 1, art. XI.2(b). Such an expansion in economic activity would have multiple
ecological impacts, some favorable, others less so.
103 CWC, supra note 1, art. 1.1-2.
104 SMITHSON HANDBOOK, supra note 92, at 22-26. The CWC establishes a series of "sched-
ules" on which regulated chemicals are grouped according to their toxicity, history as weapons,
and suitability for other, civilian purposes. The more dangerous a particular chemical is, the
greater the degree of record-keeping, international reporting, and inspection is required. CWC,
supra note 1, art. VI.3-5. A "precursor" is defined in the treaty as a chemical reactant that takes
part in the production of a toxic chemical. ld. art. H1.3.
105 CWC, supra note 1, arts. I, para. 4, V, para. 13. Each party is permitted to retain a single,
small-scale facility for producing regulated chemical weapon agents for industrial, agricultural,
research, protective, or other permitted peaceful purposes. Id. art. II, para. 8(b)(iii). In addi-
tion, very limited (and tightly monitored) production of chemical weapons agents is permitted at
other locations for specified peaceful purposes. CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part VI
(C), para. 10-12. A party may seek special permission from the Organization to convert an
existing chemical weapons production facility to other, benign purposes, subject to intensive
verification safeguards. Id. Part V, para. D.
106 CWC, supra note 1, Verificatin Annex, Part IV(A), para. C.15-19; V, para. B.30. Destruc-
tion of any CW production facility is to begin within one year after the treaty's entry into force
and be completed within nine years after that. Destruction of CW agents and weaponry is to
begin within two years of entry into force (by which point testing of a party's first destruction
facility is to be completed). At least one percent of the country's CW stockpile is to be de-
stroyed within the first three years after entry into force; at least twenty percent within five
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tional cases, experiences daunting technological, financial, ecological,
or other inhibitions beyond its control, the time frame may be ex-
tended up to five additional years.107
Surrounding these basic treaty obligations is a plethora of verifi-
cation commitments, through which each party incurs the responsibil-
ity for hosting a variety of types of inspections, to be conducted by an
international corps of trained experts. 10 8 Their function is to confirm
the accuracy of parties' required reports about their chemical activi-
ties, to identify any illicit CW-related operations, to document alleged
diversions of percursor or other chemicals into military programs, to
deter covert evasion attempts, and thereby to strengthen confidence
in the constancy of mutual compliance with the underlying bans.10 9
By guarding against the possibility of surprise "breakout" efforts, the
mandatory" 0 inspection apparatus attempts to reinforce the safety of
the CWC, ensuring parties that their potential antagonists are not sus-
taining a one-sided military advantage."' Inspectors are authorized
years; at least forty-five percent within seven years; and all of the chemical weapons are to be
destroyed within ten years. Id
107 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part IV(A), para. C.20-28. A state seeking addi-
tional time to complete the destruction (to extend either the ultimate 10-year period, or any of
the interim deadlines) must submit a request to the Executive Council of the treaty's Organiza-
tion, and permission is granted only by the entire Conference of all parties. The requesting state
must specify the reasons for the proposed extension, provide a detailed plan for conducting the
required eliminations, and accept more frequent monitoring. Id.; Robert Mikulak, Destruction
of Chemical Weapons, UNIDIR NEWSL., Dec. 1992, at 12.
108 Graham H. Cooper, The Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Regime, UNIDIR
NEwsL., Dec. 1992, at 8; SMITHSON HANDBOOK, supra note 92, at 7-10, 26-34. Facilities where
chemical weapons have been produced are subject to "systematic" inspection, including the most
intrusive and continuous verification techniques. Many locations inside a state party to the
CWC will be open for "routine" inspection, under which the inspectors are allowed entry for the
purpose of confirming the accuracy of a facility's reports about its production and consumption
of chemicals. Virtually all other locations in the country will potentially be subject to "chal-
lenge" inspection, designed to resolve doubts about treaty compliance. The Technical Secreta-
riat, an operational arm of the CWC Organization, will be responsible for hiring, training, and
supervising the inspectors. CWC, supra note 1, arts. IV.3, V.3, IX, VIII.D, & Verification
Annex.
109 See John Barrett, Verification of a Chemical Weapons Ban: The On-Site Inspection Burden,
in ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION AND ThE NEW ROLE OF ON-SrIT INSPECTION 139 (Lewis A.
Dunn ed., 1990); DAVID GUALTIERI ET AL., CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION INSPECTIONS OF
PRIVATE FACILITIES-APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL AND SAFETY LAWS 8-
18 (1993).
110 Inspectors are to be accorded "unimpeded access" for most CWC inspection functions,
and "managed access" (under which the host facility is allowed to remove or shroud certain
sensitive materials, providing that other methods or procedures will satisfy the inspectors' mis-
sion) for other inspections. CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part II, para. E.45, Part X,
para. C.46-52.
111 Critics of the CWC have argued that the treaty is imperfectly verifiable, allowing some
countries to sustain a covert CW capability despite the inspection apparatus, while the United




to snoop into a variety of "declared" and "undeclared" facilities 12 (in-
cluding the unprecedented opportunity to inspect virtually any public
or privately owned location anywhere in the United States1 3); to take,
analyze, and remove samples of selected chemical substances encoun-
tered in the inspection;114 and to demand that certain types of chemi-
cal operations be carried out in their presence. 115
As a result of this verification imperative, CWC parties will be
somewhat constrained in their choices about methodologies for ac-
complishing the required eliminations. It is not enough that the for-
mer CW production facilities be destroyed-they must be destroyed
in a fashion amenable to confirmatory international inspections.116
Likewise, merely disposing of the lethal agents, even disposing of
them in a scientifically reliable and comprehensive way that precludes
their reconstitution, is insufficient; for the treaty to "look good" as
well as "be good," the eliminations must be conducted with a fastidi-
ous attention to the established protocols and with exacting opportu-
nities for external corroboration-even if that punctiliousness takes
longer, costs more, and generates independent environmental or
safety hazards.117
The Convention also addresses the importance of secrecy. 118
Since chemical weapons are so intimately connected to legitimate
112 The CWC requires parties to report national aggregate and plant-specific data regarding
the production of scheduled chemicals, but the treaty also permits certain types of on-site inspec-
tion even at locations that are not "declared" for reporting purposes. CWC, supra note 1, Verifi-
cation Annex, Parts VII-IX. Some industry experts estimate that as many as 50,000 sites in the
United States may be subject to inspection on the basis of producing or consuming relevant
chemicals. Olson, supra note 64, at 21; Lois R. Ember, Chemical Weapons Treaty Ratification
Races Clock in Congressional Hearings, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, at 16
(estimating that 5000 sites will be subject to the closest monitoring, but only about 200 inspec-
tions will be conducted per year).
113 A challenge inspection may be initiated for "any facility or location in the territory or in
any other place under the jurisdiction or control" of a state party. CWC, supra note 1, art. IX.8-
10. This scope would permit inspection of privately-held chemical facilities, other private busi-
ness operations, and even individual dwellings, although it is anticipated that challenge inspec-
tion of locations far removed from actual chemical operations would be extremely rare.
114 Inspectors are authorized to take samples (or to have samples collected for them); where
possible, samples are to be analyzed on-site, but they may also be transported for analysis at
outside laboratories selected by the international organization. CWC, supra note 1, Verification
Annex, Part II, para. E.52-58; GUALTmRi ET AL., supra note 109, at 8-18.
115 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part II, para. E.40.
116 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part IV(A), para. C.14.
117 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part IV(A), para. C.13-14. Of course, no treaty
verification apparatus can ever be 100% successful in deterring and detecting possible violations,
but the more robust the treaty's terms (and the more vigorous their implementation), the more
attractive and successful the treaty regime will become. Conversely, where a treaty does not
provide the United States with sufficient and reliable information regarding weapons-related
activities inside Russia or elsewhere, consternation arises. Martin Sieff, Moscow Balks at Verifi-
cation of Scrapped Nukes, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A17.
118 CWC, supra note 1, Annex 3 (Confidentiality Annex).
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commercial chemical activity, any inspections that probe intrusively
into the possible existence of the former may simultaneously jeopard-
ize the hidden trade secrets of the latter.119 Private chemical firms
jealously guard their production processes, their customer and sup-
plier lists, their nonpatented operational innovations, and many other
aspects of their respective enterprises, but the international inspectors
must be given substantially free rein to ensure that only legitimate
business is occurring. 120
Similarly, participating countries' concerns about national secur-
ity secrecy may also be implicated, since chemical weapons operations
are often intimately associated with other sensitive military programs
that are unregulated by the CWC and that ought to be immune from
inspection under it.121 If international visitors, under the guise of a
CWC inspection, could probe unrelated defense activities and release
the acquired data to neighboring countries, security could be lessened,
not strengthened, in the transaction. Therefore, the CWC's stringent
limitations upon access to non-CW related materials, and its injunc-
tion upon the unauthorized release of data, apply equally to national
119 Olson, supra note 64. The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), the leading
American industry group, was an active participant in advising the U.S. government about pri-
vate firms' perspectives concerning the evolving CWC. Foremost among industry's concerns was
the necessity for protecting the privacy of confidential business information, which might be
discovered or observed by the inspectors during an on-site visit and then illicitly shared with
competitors. The CMA and its counterparts in other countries were quite active and successful
in helping to shape the CWC provisions designed to protect those data. Will Carpenter, The
Perspective of the Western Chemical Industry, in SHADOWS AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 100, at
115.
120 In many instances, a chemical company's competitive advantage depends upon small, sub-
tle insights about factors such as variations in temperature or pressure that might drive a chemi-
cal reaction more efficiently. Many of these elusive edges in corporate know-how do not qualify
for patent protection, and only by jealously guarding its research results and production
processes can a company continue to benefit from its secrets. Detlef Mannig, At the Conclusion
of the Chemical Weapons Convention" Some Recent Issues Concerning the Chemical Industry, in
SHADOWS AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 100, at 127, 145-46; E.P. Yesodharan, The Chemical
Weapons Convention A Point of View from Industry, UNIDIR NEwsL., (United Nations Insti-
tute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzerland) Dec. 1992, at 28.
121 Barry Kellman et al., Disarmament and Disclosure-How Arms Control Verification Can
Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business Information (1994) (unpublished paper, on
file with the Northwestern University Law Review). Throughout most of the early CWC negotia-
tions, the United States had rigidly insisted upon developing an "anytime, anyplace" inspection
regime, authorizing unlimited access to all locations inside a state party, as a device for deterring
cheating. Eventually, however, American officials became equally concerned about the poten-
tial loss of U.S. national security information if foreign inspectors were allowed under the aus-
pices of a CWC inspection to peruse at will through sensitive American defense installations.
The result was the negotiation of a regime of "managed access," through which inspectors are
granted substantial-but limited-opportunities to inspect military locations. Paul Lewis, U.S.
Now Prefers Limited Inspection of Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al.
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security classified materials and to private industry's confidential busi-
ness information.122
Finally, it is noteworthy that the financial costs of the CWC struc-
ture will be substantial, with some estimates of the Organization's an-
nual operating budget running as high as $200-300 million.123 The
cumbersome data reporting process will require time and energy;
merely gathering the required information and filling in the official
forms will consume resources. 124 Hosting an inspection will also im-
pose a burden, both upon the specific firm or facility being visited, and
upon the country receiving the visitors.125 Any international bureau-
cracy can grow almost organically to become an expensive proposi-
tion, and the CWC Organization-which is projected to employ some
225 headquarters staff members and 163 inspectors' 26 -augurs to be
no exception.127 Therefore, the sheer cost of completing the CWC's
required reports, verification, and dismantlings-even if the world
122 The Confidentiality Annex prohibits the unauthorized publication or release of informa-
tion and requires the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat to establish a "stringent re-
gime" for ensuring the protection of confidential information. CWC, supra note 1,
Confidentiality Annex, A.2.
123 Olson, supra note 64, at 24. It is difficult to estimate the true cost of implementing the
CWC, since so much about the verification apparatus remains to be worked out, and so many
basic parameters (e.g., how many states will become parties to the convention, how many on-site
inspections will be necessary) remain indeterminate. Ember, supra note 112, at 16. Official esti-
mates of the likely annual budget for the Organization have ranged from $81 million (Dutch) to
$120 million (Canadian) to $160-180 million (American). Oudraat, supra note 97, at 21; Status of
1990 Bilateral Chemical Weapons Agreement and Multilateral Negotiation on Chemical Weapons
Ban, Hearing before Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess., (statement of Walter
Busbee) (1991) [hereinafter Status of 1990 Bilaterals]. The PrepCom approved an operating
budget of $8.8 million for 1993, but the level of funding is expected to rise sharply prior to, and
after, the treaty's entry into force, as hundreds of inspectors are hired, trained, and dispatched.
Id.; Ember, supra note 97, at 7, 11. See also Highlights of the Fourth PreCom Plenary, CWC
CHRON., Oct. 1993, at 1, 2 (PrepCom budget will be approximately $16 million for the period
before the treaty enters into force, and almost $38 million immediately thereafter). But see Amy
E. Smithson, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, SURVIVAL, Spring 1994, at 80
(stating that OPCW will not develop into a bloated, inefficient organization, as some interna-
tional institutions have).
124 Chemical industry spokespersons have concluded that the additional administrative bur-
den imposed by the new CWC reporting obligations will be a relatively minor accretion to the
regulatory burden already inflicted upon the American chemical industry by a plethora of other
environmental, safety, and related laws. In other, less developed, countries, however, the
treaty's new commitments could require a significant increase in governmental and private com-
mitments of administrative resources. Carpenter, supra note 119, at 115, 120-21; Yesodharan,
supra note 120.
125 Olson, supra note 64.
126 U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING
CERE NY OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 2 (1994).
127 However, unlike some international organizations, the OPCW is charged with a starkly
limited-and diminishing-mandate. As the CWC proceeds through its first 10 years, the
world's chemical weapons arsenals will be destroyed and the relevant facilities closed or con-
verted. It is possible that, as fewer items and locations require the closest scrutiny, the OPCW's
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economy were not experiencing a global recession-would come as a
deterring expense, on top of a ledger already burdened with red
ink.128
3. What These Things Are: The Existing CW Arsenal.-The
CWC implicates three basic categories of items to be destroyed, and
each carries its unique challenges: stockpiled weapons, non-stockpile
weapons, and CW production facilities.
a. The active stockpile.-The current United States arsenal
of chemical weaponry is a diverse and far-flung witch's brew of lethal-
ity.'129 The Army has retained, in varying states of readiness, a range
of types of chemical agents, stored in bulk form or in a variety of types
of munitions. There are two major categories of agents: nerve agents
(designated GA or Tabun, GB or Sarin, and VX), which are odorless,
colorless, and tasteless organophosphorus esters that attack the
human nervous system directly, in both liquid and vapor forms;130 and
vesicant or blister agents (including mustard agents designated H,
HD, and HT, as well as small amounts of the arsenical agent Lewisite
or L) which cause damage to exposed skin or through inhalation.131
These agents are contained in some three million chemical weap-
ons or systems' 32 of three basic types, including: (1) various caliber
rockets, land mines, mortars, cartridges, and projectiles, which have
inspection operations will eventually shrink, too-unless the organization then steps up the pace
of its verification inspections of private industry.
128 Mounir Zahran, The Chemical Weapons Convention and Economic and Technological De-
velopment, UNIDIR NEWSL, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva,
Switzerland) Dec. 1992, at 24.
129 See generally Sam A. Carnes & Annetta P. Watson, Disposing of the US Chemical Weap-
ons Stockpile, 262 JAMA 653 (1989); NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE TECHNoL-
OGIES FOR THE DESTRUCrION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MuNTrrIoNs 37-53 (1993) [hereinafter
NRC ALTERNATIVES].
130 PROGRAM MANAGER FOR CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION, CHEMICAL STOCKPILE Dispo-
SAL PROGRAM FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 2.3-2.5 (1988)
[hereinafter PEIS]. Nerve agents, developed nearly simultaneously by both sides during World
War II, act via inhibition of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, leading to blockage of the transmis-
sion of nerve impulses and to convulsions and death (within 10 minutes) through paralysis of the
respiratory system. Of the agents in the American stockpile, VX is the most lethal, the most
resistant to detoxification, and the most environmentally persistent. The United States retains
only small quantities of GB, the first nerve agent developed. Id. App. B.5-68; Michael A. Dunn
& Frederick R. Sidell, Progress in Medical Defense Against Nerve Agents, 262 JAMA 649 (1989).
131 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-5. Agent H contains 30% sulphur impurities, agent HD is a
purified form, and agent HT is a hybrid having a lower freezing point and a longer period of
effectiveness. Blister agents can cause damage to eyes, skin, and other tissues and have a variety
of carcinogenic effects. Id. App. A.3; B.68-157; Carnes & Watson, supra note 129.




"energetic" components such as fuzes, bursters, or propellants; 133 (2)
bombs, which do not include energetics; 134 and (3) bulk storage
drums, principally ton containers and some spray tanks.135
The stockpile is currently housed at eight locations around the
continental United States, plus Johnston Atoll, with the following lo-
cations containing the specified percentages of the total American
stockpile: Tooele Depot, Utah (42.3 percent); Pine. Bluff Arsenal, Ar-
kansas (12 percent); Umatilla Depot, Oregon (11.6 percent); Pueblo
Depot, Colorado (9.9 percent); Anniston Depot, Alabama (7.1 per-
cent); Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (5 percent); Newport
Ammunition Plant, Indiana (3.9 percent); and Lexington Depot, Ken-
tucky (1.6 percent).136 Each location has its own mixture of types of
ordnance. Pueblo, for example, houses only an array of mustard, in
several different configurations, but no nerve agents, while Aberdeen
holds only ton containers of HD and Newport manages only ton con-
tainers of VX. The other locations contain a more diverse array of
agents and munitions. 137
These stocks are all at least twenty-five to forty years old, and are
now in disparate physical condition.138 In virtually all cases, the chem-
ical agent has retained most of its lethality-these resilient chemicals
have proven to possess a remarkably long shelf life.13 9 Many of the
munitions, especially those of more recent vintage, are also still in
good working order. But some categories of weaponry or bulk stor-
age-especially the M55 rockets-are reported to be leaking, as cor-
133 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-7. Many of the chemical munitions exist in multiple types and
come from different production runs; they have also been configured with a variety of types of
agents. For example, there are three families of 155mm projectiles equipped with different types
of nerve and mustard agents. Id. App. A.2-8.
A fuse is the initial mechanical detonation device used to trigger the weapon's main charge.
A burster is the primary explosive component of a projectile, rocket, or mine, used to disperse
agent and metal fragments. The propellant is the fuel material that powers the flight of the
rocket or projectile. Id. App. A.9.
134 The overall quantity of each type of munition and agent, and the exact amount stored at
each location, are classified, but much detail is available nonetheless. PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-
6, App. A.3-14.
135 Id. at 2-6. The ton containers currently store 61% of the total U.S. stockpile of agent. Id.
at 1-5. In addition, some sites house a small quantity of agent, now stored in bulk form, removed
from leaking munitions in the Drill and Transfer System (DATS). DATS is a mobile apparatus
for draining and decontaminating small quantities of CW materiel that are too fragile to trans-
port safely. Id. App. E.3; Rouse, supra note 9, at 42.
136 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-6.
137 Id. at 2-8.
138 Id. at 1-6. The United States has not manufactured any new unitary chemical weapons
since 1968. Id.
139 See Avis Thomas-Lester & Brooke A. Masters, 25 Houses Evacuated as WWI Shells
Found, WASH. PosT, Jan. 7, 1993, at B1 (stating that even very old chemical munitions do not
lose their potency); PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-5 (stating that active mustard is still found in
trench areas of Europe that have been sealed from sun and rain since World War I).
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rosive components deteriorate the packaging and containers.14 The
Army, which had long ago branded most of the CW reserves as practi-
cally worthless, 141 has expressed grave reservations about the fragility,
transportability, and stability of some of the weapons, 142 and even
routine, secure storage has sometimes become problematic.1 43
On the other hand, similar concerns had also surrounded the $73
million project-pressed upon the United States by squeamish Euro-
pean allies-for removing from an American military base near Clau-
sen, Germany some one hundred thousand nerve gas artillery
140 PEIS, supra at 2-9, App. E.3; COMMITrEE ON REvIEw AND EVALUATION OF THE ARMY
CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL PROGRAM, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR THE DISPOSAL OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS 46-51 (1994) [hereinafter
NAS STOCKPILE COMMrIrEE]. The M55 rockets, manufactured during the 1950s, include some
munitions (about two percent of the total production), which were filled with impure GB agent,
resulting in unusual corrosion and a high percentage of "leakers." These munitions are housed
in specially enhanced storage facilities and monitored regularly. PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-4;
Rouse, supra note 9, at 20-22; Department of Defense Appropriations for 1989: Hearings before
Subcomm. on the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
23-24 (1988); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNoLoGY ASSESSMENT, DISPOSAL OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS: ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 7-8 (1992) [hereinafter OTA ALTERNATIVES].
141 The Army has concluded that only 10% of the CW stockpile is now truly "useful," 18% is
of "limited use," 11% is of "no use," and 61% is "not in useful form." Rouse, supra note 9, at
17-18; STOESSEL COMM'N, supra note 75, at 19; Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1989 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the House Armed
Services Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 158, 168 (1988); Disposal of Chemical Munitions, Hear-
ings before Investigations Subcomm. of House Armed Services Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1985) [hereinafter Disposal of Chemical Munitions Hearings]. Several factors have contributed
to this limited utility, including the age and fragility of the ordnance and the fact that some of the
projectiles and other items are the wrong size for current Army weaponry. NAS STOCKPILE
COMMITTEE, supra note 140, at 43-45.
Simply storing and safely maintaining this aging stockpile has become a delicate and expen-
sive undertaking. Annual storage and security costs for the CW were formerly estimated at $64
million, Rouse, supra note 9, at 18, 19; more recent cost estimates have elevated the pricetag to
the $100 million range. NAS STOCKPILE COMMrrTEE, supra note 140, at 32; Status of 1990 Bi-
laterals, supra note 123, at 21; U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL MATERIEL DESTRUCTION AGENCY, AN-
NUAL STATUS REPORT ON THE DISPOSAL OF THE LETHAL CHEMICAL STOCKPILE 20 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT].
142 The questions about the usefulness, reliability and safety of the existing stockpile of chem-
ical weapons became controversial in the context of the early 1980s debates regarding the pro-
duction of modem binary CW arms. Some contended that the Army was deliberately
downplaying the effectiveness of the residual stockpile as a political ploy to gain approval for the
new production. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Congress Questions Binary Weapons Plan, SCIENCE, May
20, 1983, at 802; George G. Weickhardt & James M. Finberg, New Push for Chemical Weapons,
BULL. ATOM. SCIENrSTS, Nov. 1986, at 28; David C. Morrison, Chemical Weapons Rerun, 18
NAT. J. 1778 (1986).
143 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-28. At each of the eight storage bases, chemical munitions are
housed in a special containment area, secure even from the remainder of the military facility.
The individual munitions are contained in boxes, drums, or on pallets, usually inside an "igloo"
magazine constructed of reinforced concrete, covered with dirt. Some bulk containers are stored
in warehouses or in outside yards. Id. at 2.6-2.9.
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projectiles in late 1990.144 Despite fears that the weapons might prove
vulnerable to accidents, terrorism or other mishaps en route, the
United States did safely transport the entire cache via truck, train, and
ship to Johnston Atoll for storage and disposal without incident.145
b. Non-stockpile material.-In addition to the diverse set of
chemical ordnance still counted as part of the active U.S. stockpile,
the CWC requires the dismantling of "non-stockpile" weaponry, as
well. This category includes two important sub-elements: modern "bi-
nary" weapons, and obsolete or abandoned stocks.146
The binaries are the newest category of United States chemical
arms, manufactured at Pine Bluff, Arkansas beginning in December,
1987.147 The original objective of the program was to generate three
entirely new types of advanced CW nerve gas weapons to be safer and
easier to handle than previous sorts. 148 Technical difficulties, how-
144 Marc Fisher, U.S. Starts Pullout of Chemical Arms, WASH. POST, July 27, 1990, at Al; R.
Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Plans Early Removal of Nerve-Gas Shells, WASH. PoST, Oct. 15,1989, at A26;
Ember, supra note 9, at 10.
145 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHEMICAL WARFARE: DOD's SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO
REMOVE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM GERMANY, (1991); U.S. ARMY, RECORD OF DECI-
SION, JOHNSTON ATOLL CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL SYSTEM, SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE STORAGE AND ULTIMATE DISPOSAL OF THE
EUROPEAN CHEMICAL MUNITION STOCKPILE (1990) [hereinafter RECORD OF DECISION];
GREENPEACE, GREENPEACE REvIEw JOHNSTON ATOLL CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL SYSTEM,
FINAL SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Alfred Picardi et al. eds.,
1990) [hereinafter GREENPEACE 9190 REVIEw]; Memorandum from the Federated States of Mi-
cronesia, Memorandum with Regard to the United States Department of the Army's Plan to
Incinerate the European Stockpile of Chemical Weapons on Johnston Island (Apr. 6, 1990) (on
file with the Northwestern University Law Review) [hereinafter Micronesia Memorandum]. It
should be noted that the stockpile removed from Germany included some of the newest, most
modem, and best maintained types of chemical weapons in the American stockpile, presumably
the easiest and safest to transport. Id.; U.S. ARMY, ANNUAL STATUS REPORT ON THE DISPOSAL
OF THE LETHAL CHEMICAL STOCKPILE 4 (1990); Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw.
1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991).
146 The recently-reorganized Army Program Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel
divides the items into five categories, including buried chemical materiel, recovered chemical
materiel, former CW production facilities, binary CW, and miscellaneous CW materiel. Owen
Statement, supra note 4, at 13; Defense Authorization Act of 1993, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (Supp.
1994).
147 R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Ushers In New Era Of Chemical Weapons, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
1989, at Al. A binary chemical weapon is one in which two independent, relatively nontoxic
chemical agents are manufactured, transported, and stored separately; they are combined to
make a lethal mixture only when the bomb or projectile is enroute to its target. By maintaining
the physical separation of the two components, a binary munition is safer and easier to store and
deploy than are existing "unitary" chemical weapons, which are extremely hazardous at all
times. U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL MATERIEL DESTRUCTION AGENCY, SURVEY AND ANALYSIS RE-
PORT ON THE NoN-STocKPILE CHEMICAL MATERIEL PROGRAM 3-1 (1993) [hereinafter NON-
STOCKPILE REPORT]; STOESSEL COMM'N, supra note 75, at 32-36, 45-49.
148 The Multiple Launch Rocket System underwent prototype development, but no full-scale
development or production was undertaken, and the project was mothballed in October 1990.
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ever, plagued two of the systems, and the entire operation was sus-
pended in 1990.149 While the Army has not yet determined what
methodologies to employ for destroying the binary weapons and asso-
ciated materials, there are several promising options.15 0 The fact that
only small quantities are involved, the fact that the items are new and
in relatively good shape, and the fact that the binaries were the first
chemical weapons manufactured with any conscious consideration
given to how they might ultimately be disposed of, should make this
portion of the overall destruction task relatively accessible.
Abandoned or obsolete CW and CW-related materials pose a
larger, more complicated and mysterious challenge. Throughout the
twentieth century, the United States had created-and then forgot-
ten-a wide variety of CW elements, CW identification and test kits,
CW-contaminated wastes, and unexploded weapons. 51 Much of this
materiel was buried, dumped at sea, or simply abandoned, with shock-
ingly poor recordkeeping. 152 A recent attempt by the U.S. Army to
pry open this legacy of neglect has suggested that as many as 215 sites
in thirty-three states may still contain hazardous CW materials or
wastes, and the survey is admittedly incomplete. 153 Thousands of re-
covered CW weapons and materials-some in very unstable condi-
tion, and some with explosive devices still attached-have been
retrieved, destroyed on site, or transported to military bases for stor-
age, but many more of these things still lie out there someplace.154
A recent nonfatal incident, in which several active World War I-
vintage chemical weapons were accidentally unearthed by a construc-
tion crew at a housing site in Northwest Washington, D.C. (near the
campus of American University) highlighted the dangers of this hid-
The Navy's Bigeye Bomb advanced further, with some 200 test weapons being manufactured,
but it, too, was canceled prior to full production. The M687 155mm artillery projectile was the
only binary weapon that reached the full production stage. NoN-STOCKPILE REPORT, supra note
147, §§ 3.1-3.2.
149 Resumption of the production of chemical weapons, after a hiatus since 1969, was extraor-
dinarily controversial. The executive branch, the Congress, and the public were embroiled in
annual pitched battles over the program, resulting in acrimony which intensified when the new
munitions did not seem to perform as well as anticipated. Blaine Harden, The Gassing of Wash-
ington, WASHINGTONIAN, Feb. 1984, at 125; Morrison, supra note 142.
150 NON-STOcKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, at 3-2. The various components of a binary
weapon could be individually incinerated, neutralized, or (since key ingredients include sulphur
and alcohol) resold to the public.
151 Id.
152 Id §§ 2.1-2.6.
153 Id. § 2.6 (stating that Army undertook elaborate efforts to discover government records
that might reveal CW sites, but cannot be confident that all CW-contaminated locations have
been identified).
154 Id. §§ 4.1-5.10. The variety of substances included within the "abandoned" category and
the poor condition of many of them, will make the dismantling task complex and hazardous. Id.
See U.S. GOV'T, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
15 (1994) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEw].
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den arsenal.'55 No one can be certain how much such materiel exists,
where it lurks, or what its condition may be. The CWC imposes cer-
tain obligations to recover, store, or safely dispose of even this immea-
surable danger' 56-and the cognate problem of abandoned CW
outside the continental United States may loom even larger. 5 7
c. CW-related facilities.-Under the CWC, the United
States must eliminate or convert seven major former CW production
facilities.' 58 Many of these facilities involve multiple sites; some in-
clude both relatively new buildings (perhaps worth converting to
other purposes) and decrepit, contaminated structures (posing com-
plex dismantling and cleanup challenges).' 59 Several of these installa-
tions are also locations where existing stockpiles of CW are currently
housed (e.g., Newport, Indiana (where nerve agent VX was manufac-
tured) and Pine Bluff, Arkansas (where the binary weapons were pro-
duced)). 60 Other sites, however, no longer house any active CW
(e.g., Muscle Shoals, Alabama (where GB was produced) and Rocky
Mountain Arsenal, Colorado (where GB was also manufactured)),161
155 NON-STOCKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, at A-129; Martin Weil, Some Staying Put in
Spring Valley, WASH. POST, Jan. 26,1993, at D1; Thomas-Lester & Masters, supra note 139, at B1
(reporting that 131 munitions were retrieved and that 72 homes were evacuated repeatedly dur-
ing the daylight hours to allow crews to search the site safely).
156 The CWC deals with "old" chemical weapons (Le, those produced before 1925 or pro-
duced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such an extent that they can no longer be
used as weapons), CWC, supra note 1, art. 11.5, and imposes limited obligations to destroy them
(Le, generally exempting weapons buried before 1977 or dumped at sea before 1985). Id. art.
111.2, VI.17, Verification Annex, Part IV (B). Under the CWC, the United States is not gener-
ally obligated to excavate and recover the CW that might be buried on its territory. But if the
United States does nonetheless elect to dig up old chemical weapons (during or after the initial
10-year destruction period), the government must declare the munitions, make them available
for international inspection, and destroy them as either chemical weapons or toxic wastes. NON-
STOCKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, at 9-12.
157 U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL MATERIEL DESTRUCTION AGENCY, INTERIM SURVEY AND ANALY-
SIS REPORT ON THE NON-STOCKPILE CHEMICAL MATERIEL PROGRAM (1993) (preliminary ver-
sion of document subsequently issued as the NON-STOCKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, at 12, 16)
(stating that the Army is collecting information about U.S. chemical weapons abandoned over-
seas during World War I and II eras, and about American and other sea burial of chemical
weapons in 1945 and the late 1960s).
158 CWC, supra note 1, art. V. The relevant facilities are located at: Pine Bluff Arsenal, Ar-
kansas; Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana; the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland; Northrup Carolina Corp. (Swannanoa), North Carolina; Marquardt facility,
Van Nuys, California; Phosphate Development Works, Muscle Shoals, Alabama; and Rocky
Mountain Arsenal, Colorado. NON-STOCKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, at 6-1.
159 NON-STOCKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, §§ 6.1-6.9; Robert Mikulak, Destruction of U.S.
Chemical Weapons Production and Filing Facilities, in CHEMICAL WEAPONS: DESTRUCTION AND
CONVERSION 57 (Stockholm International Research Institute ed., 1980).
160 Julian Perry Robinson, Review: World CW Armament, Part I The United States, CHEMi-
CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION Bum., Autumn 1988, at 12, 16; NON-STOCKPILE REPORT, supra
note 147, at 6-3.
161 Robinson, supra note 160, at 16-17.
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but the lingering hazards of CW contamination may be profound.
Another complicating factor is the ownership of the sites: most are
still the property of the U.S. government, but some are now privately
owned, currently used for purposes unrelated to chemical weapons
(but still subject to the terms of the CWC).162 The Army has not yet
developed site-specific plans for dealing with each of these diverse cir-
cumstances, 63 but the process of clean-up, demolition, and site abate-
ment is already underway at some of them.164
In addition, the cost considerations of the CW destruction effort
have become staggering. As noted, the current (and rapidly rising)
estimate for destroying solely the stockpile elements of the total
American CW inventory is $8.6 billion.165 The projections regarding
the non-stockpile components are even more unreliable, due to inade-
quate information about the size and extent of the problem,1' but the
Army currently estimates (on an order-of-magnitude basis) the final
bill at $17.7 billion, with a completion date of 2034.167
Overall, then, the several categories of chemical weaponry, chem-
ical weapons production facilities, and their associated items inher-
ently pose some special problems for CWC dismantling and
verification. The lethal agents can be quite concentrated, and even a
fully weaponized package may be compact, easily portable, and con-
cealable.' 68 The "dual capability" of many chemical substances has
already been noted-the same materials can be transformed relatively
quickly, easily, and covertly into pharmaceuticals or weapons (and
back again). The facilities for manufacturing or storing chemical
weapons may likewise be multi-functional and practically indistin-
guishable from thousands of other light industrial or military build-
162 NON-STOcKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, at 6-6.
163 Id. §§ 6.1-6.9 (describing how some locations may require abatement of other hazards,
such as asbestos, in addition to CW cleanup).
164 Id. at 6-6; ENVIRONMENTAL REvIEw, supra note 154, at 12-13 (describing how selected
facilities at Aberdeen, Maryland, Muscle Shoals, Alabama, and Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colo-
rado are currently undergoing demolition or conversion, independently of the CWC
requirements).
165 See supra note 4.
166 NoN-STocKi.a REPORT, supra note 147, §§ 9.1-9.15.
167 Id at 9-1. The range of cost possibilities is $13-31 billion. ld. at 9-14. The portion of the
non-stockpile mass that would have to be destroyed on an expedited basis in order to comply
with the CWC would cost $1.1 billion, and the Army has concluded that this segment of the job
could be accomplished by January 2005. Id. at 9-1. January 1995 is the earliest possible date
upon which the CWC could enter into force, and if the United States were an original party, the
American CW would have to be dismantled within 10 years after that. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 106-07.
168 BuRcK & FLOWERREE, supra note 69, at 6 (a quart jar of nerve gas would contain one
million lethal doses).
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ings.169 Even the actual use of chemical ordnance on the battlefield
may be hard to establish; conclusive evidence has often proven diffi-
cult to collect.170
All of this means that the inspection powers of the CWC must be
exceptionally intrusive and robust, and that the elimination function
must be thorough. The elusiveness of the chemical weapons, and the
importance for international security of destroying them promptly and
reliably, put unprecedented pressure on the treaty's dismantling
provisions.
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION
The United States and other countries are much more conscious
today about environmental protection' 7' issues and dangers than ever
before, and people have become much more willing (even insistent) to
pay a price, in financial or other terms, in order to pursue ecological
priorities.172 A torrent of domestic environmental statutes and inter-
169 Experts dispute how readily a particular facility could be covertly adapted to illicit CW
production and then quickly and thoroughly cleaned up before international inspectors could
arrive. Id. at 583-611; Gordon M. Burck, Chemical Weapons Production Technology and the
Conversion of Civilian Production, ARMS CONTROL, Sept. 1990, at 122.
170 STORELLA, supra note 69, at 19-23; Lawrence K. Altman, Poiswn Gas Attacks: Why a Di-
agnosis Is So Difficult, N.Y. Tmm, Sept. 18, 1988, at 14; Paul G. Cassell, Note, Establishing
Violations of International Law: "Yellow Rain" and the Treaties Regulating Chemical and Biologi-
cal Warfare, 35 STAN. L. REv. 259 (1983); Hu et al., supra note 82; CWC, supra note 1, Verifica-
tion Annex, Part XI.
171 This Article adopts the broadest sense of the term "environmental protection," embracing
a wide and dynamic range of statutes and other acts that promote and safeguard the biosphere.
The Article, however, concentrates most heavily upon the core areas of environmental impact
analysis and antipollution measures. Cf. John Cruden, Environmental Law and National Secur-
ity, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 1169 (John N. Moore et al. eds., 1990); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460
F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against
Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983); see also Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal
Actions, Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988);
START I LEIS, supra note 47 (analyzing the treaty's possible effect upon air quality, noise,
water resources, soil, cultural resources, visual resources, transportation, biological resources,
human health and safety, and socioeconomics).
172 See Fact Sheet" Global Environmental Issues, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Aug. 1993,
at Supp. 23 ("The environmental challenges confronting the world today are greater than at any
time in recent history. Threats to the global environment-such as climate change, stratospheric
ozone depletion, and the loss of biological diversity and forests-affect all nations, regardless of
their level of development. As a result, the environment is becoming an increasingly important
part of the foreign policy agenda. The United States accords high priority to addressing global
environmental problems and is pursuing a wide-ranging agenda of action to protect the environ-
ment and promote the goal of sustainable development."). See also CHEMICAL MANUFACMUR-
EES ASSOCIATION, U.S. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY STATISTICAL HANDBOOK 117 (1992) (stating that
U.S. chemical industry's capital expenditures for pollution abatement equipment in 1991 totalled
$2.4 billion (12% of the industry's total fixed capital investment that year) and the industry's
gross operating costs for pollution control came to $4.5 billion in 1991, about 1.5% of the indus-
try's value of shipments).
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national treaties 173 has reflected this newfound interest, as wasteful or
polluting practices and attitudes that were commonplace only a few
years ago have suddenly become abhorrent and aberrational. 174 En-
vironmentalism's international perspective, in particular, has emerged
as a salient force, in recognition of the fact that the planet's natural
resources are interconnected, oblivious to human political
boundaries. 175
In institutionalizing the elevated status of domestic and global en-
vironmental concerns, the United States government has promulgated
a series of regulatory provisions that require federal officials to take
the national and/or international ecology into account at the outset of
any major governmental undertaking and to maintain a watchful eye
on that set of priorities throughout the life of the project.176 For ex-
ample, Circular 175,177 the basic State Department guidance for the
initiation and conduct of treaty negotiations,178 now directs diplomats
to consider the environmental aspects of a proposed international
agreement at the beginning of the bargaining and throughout the
evolution of any text.179 Similarly, the internal procedural rules of the
173 Edith B. Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emer-
gence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. LJ. 675 (1993) (noting that nearly nine hundred treaties
are either primarily or partially directed at international environmental issues).
174 For example, prior to the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1401-45, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34 (1988), "placement in the deep ocean was the preferred
method for large-scale disposal of chemical agents and munitions." PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-
85. Today, that practice is widely regarded as inadmissible, and the Army has made no effort to
revive it. Id.; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Waste and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 [hereinafter Basel Convention]; infra text
accompanying notes 374-78.
175 Weiss, supra note 173, at 675 (noting that 20 years ago, there were barely 3 dozen interna-
tional agreements related to environmental law, but today, progress has been so rapid that inter-
national environmental law "is arguably setting the pace for cooperation in the international
community in the development of international law," and that "[t]his proliferation of legal in-
struments is likely to continue"); POTENTIAL UsEs, supra note 58, at 4-5 (noting "the vulnerabil-
ity of different parts of the world to each other's environment").
176 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1993). CEQ regulations are binding upon other federal agen-
cies and impose substantive and procedural obligations upon them. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.2, 1500.3,
1501.1, 1501.2 (1990).
177 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HANDBOOK ON TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS § 720 (1985) (discussing the negotiation and signature of treaties and other international
agreements) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
178 The Circular 175 Procedure is designed "to facilitate the application of orderly and uni-
form measures and procedures for the negotiation, signature, publication, and registration of
treaties and other international agreements of the United States" and to ensure that "the making
of treaties and other international agreements for the United States is carried out within consti-
tutional and other appropriate limits." Id. §§ 711.a, 720.2.a.
179 A request for authorization to begin treaty negotiations or to sign an international agree-
ment takes the form of an "action memorandum" addressed to the Secretary of State under the
Circular 175 Procedure. The rules now provide that "[a]n action memorandum dealing with an
agreement that has a potential for adverse environmental impact should contain a statement
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key bureaucratic elements in the foreign affairs community-State,180
the Department of Defense,' 8 ' and the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agencyl82-each contain elaborately detailed procedures for
ensuring that environmental issues and dangers are not overlooked in
the conduct of national security deliberations.
Arms control is a prototypical field in which the concerns about
environmental protection are finally gaining a firm hold. As surveyed
above, 8 3 the early generations of disarmament pacts were essentially
oblivious to environmental responsibilities' 84-the treaties contained
no provisions related to safeguarding the environment, and the nego-
indicating whether the agreement will significantly affect the quality of the human environment."
Id. § 7223.g.
180 22 C.F.R. § 161 (1993). Notably, Section 161.5 requires the State Department to incorpo-
rate attention to environmental concerns "at the earliest practicable stage" in the evolution of a
project, and Section 161.7(c)(3) provides that normally an environmental assessment will be re-
quired for actions involving "[o]cean dumping, control of toxic substances, disposal and storage
of wastes and radioactive substances." Id.
181 In the Pentagon, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has promulgated department-wide
regulations to ensure adequate attention to environmental concerns. 32 C.F.R. §§ 187-88 (1993).
Each of the three main military services has developed its own substantive and procedural stan-
dards for implementation of the overall directives. 32 C.F.R. § 651 (1993) (Army); 32 C.F.R.
§ 775 (1993) (Navy); 32 C.F.R. § 989 (1993) (Air Force).
The U.S. Army is the acknowledged leader in complying with NEPA and Exec. Order No.
12,114, often forging ahead of the civilian agencies in developing internal environmentally con-
scious procedures. Nicholas Robinson, Environmental Impact Assessment Abroad, in SELECTED
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON NEPA 90, 111 (1989); John S.
Doyle, Jr., The Department of the Army and NEPA, Address to the Conference on the Prepara-
tion and Review of Environmental Impact Statement (Nov. 1987), in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 19, 20 (Nicholas Robinson ed., 1988) (indicating that the Army Civil Works pro-
gram has prepared nearly 4,000 draft, revised, final and supplementary environmental impact
statements).
182 Environmental Impact Statements, 42 Fed. Reg. 5115-17 (1977) (Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency) (outlining internal procedures for evaluating environmental aspects of
agency activities). The agency procedures note, inter alia, that "projects such as the destruction
of weapons in accordance with the provisions of an international arms control agreement would
be the subject of environmental impact statements, if otherwise required, prepared by the De-
partment of Defense, the Department of State, or other lead agency." Id. at 5116.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 10-54 (discussing the early arms control agreements).
184 At least one earlier arms control treaty was partially affected by NEPA procedures. In
1977, the multilateral Environmental Modification Convention (EnMod Convention), see supra
note 22, was concluded, outlawing the application of certain techniques for manipulating the
natural processes of the earth in international conflict. When the U.S. government failed to
provide any official analysis pursuant to the then-new NEPA, the Natural Resources Defense
Council sued the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The settlement of that case
required the agency to prepare a draft and (after responding to public comments) final "environ-
mental assessment" of the EnMod Convention. That document, however, does not technically
conform to the modern requirements of an official "environmental assessment," because it con-
tains neither a "finding of no significant impact" nor a conclusion that a full EIS is necessary.
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE CON-
VENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES (undated document; published in 1978).
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tiators seemingly considered those kinds of issues to be outside the
scope of their mandate. 8 5 More recently, however, an encroachment
has begun, with the national security community at last beginning to
acknowledge the linkage between weaponry and the environment, es-
pecially where dismantling of excess arms is being required. 8 6
The 1991 START I accord was the first arms control instrument
for which something approaching a full-scale environmental impact
statement'87 (EIS) was prepared. 88 Although this tome did not quite
meet the formal requirements expected in other areas, 8 9 it was un-
185 The LTBT, supra note 13, banning nuclear weapons explosions in the atmosphere, in outer
space, or under water, was motivated at least in part by the desire to stem the environmental
hazards associated with above-ground nuclear testing, known to spew radioactive materials
around the globe. In fact, the treaty may have been more successful as an environmental protec-
tion measure than as an arms control tool because it allowed continued testing underground and
because the parties sustained and even accelerated their testing programs in unmitigated pursuit
of additional types of nuclear devices. See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 7, at 37-44
(describing the treaty and the negotiations and activities preceding its signing).
186 Upon the conclusion of the 1987 INF Treaty, see supra note 33, the Army prepared a
partial environmental assessment, evaluating the contemplated elimination of several hundred
U.S. missiles, examining alternative methods and sites for the destruction activities, and finding
that the program would have "no significant impact" on the environment. The document, how-
ever, studied only the weapons destruction aspect of the treaty, overlooking any other potential
(probably more minor) effects. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
FOR THE PROPOSED ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MissILEs
PURSUANT TO THE INF TREATY (1988) [hereinafter INF TREATY ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESS-
MENT]; Corps of Engineers, Dep't of the Army, Pershing Missiles Elimination, Pueblo, Colo., et
al., Finding of No Significant Impact, 53 Fed. Reg. 6189 (1988). See also DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED ELIMINATION OF IN-
TERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES AT PUEBLO ARMY DEPOT Acnvrr PUR-
SUANT To THE INF TREATY (1988).
187 See infra part llI.A (describing NEPA and the EIS requirements).
188 START I LEIS, supra note 47, passim.
189 The document was a "legislative" EIS. Pursuant to CEQ regulations, a legislative EIS
("LEIS") is appropriate when an agency submits a proposal to Congress (other than a budgetary
submission) for a major federal action, including a treaty. The content and format of an LEIS
should be the same as those of a regular EIS, but in recognition of the expedited legislative
timetable, a more streamlined production process is applicable in which the agency may omit the
customary steps of "scoping" (outlining the issues to be addressed in the EIS) and preparing a
revised final EIS pursuant to public comments. An LEIS is to be submitted within 30 days after
the transmittal to Congress of the relevant legislative proposal, including a request for ratifica-
tion of a treaty. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1506.8, 1508.17 (1993). See also KEN LERNER & EDwARD A.
TANZMAN, PRODUCTION OF A LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1992); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) (holding
that no EIS is necessary for appropriations bill).
In the case of the START I LEIS, the document was prepared and submitted on a timely
basis by the Air Force. The LEIS, however, did not quite acknowledge that the executive branch
was legally required by NEPA to provide the document, and it is also not clear whether the LEIS
received the full range of interagency evaluation and clearance that would ordinarily be re-
quired. The Air Force was designated as the "Lead Agency on behalf of the Department of
Defense," and the Department of the Navy was acknowledged as a "cooperating agency," but
there is no showing that the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Arms Control
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doubtedly a serious, substantial effort to supply the type of investiga-
tion, analysis, and disclosure demanded by statute.19° The document
elaborately compared the contemplated environmental impact of the
treaty (especially the provisions requiring the United States to retire
and dismantle hundreds of strategic nuclear systems'91 and the associ-
ated verification arrangements) with the alternative status quo option
and provided an impressive, sensitive discussion of the range of rele-
vant considerations.192 A similar, albeit smaller, document (styled as
a supplemental legislative EIS)193 was prepared in connection with the
1993 START II accord.194
and Disarmament Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, or other potentially affected
agencies participated, too. START I LEIS, supra note 47, title page. The START II Supplemen-
tary LEIS explicitly notes that it is "a DOD document and does not provide detailed analysis of
Department of Energy operations and procedures." DEPARTMENr OF THE AIR FORcE, U.S.
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, START II SUPPLEMENTAL LEGISLATIVE ENVmONMEaNTAL IMPAcr STATE-
MENT cover sheet (1993) [hereinafter START II SLEIS]. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5-6 (1993)
(describing the duties of lead and cooperating agencies); JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0. Mc-
GARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION 112,131-33,137 (2d ed. 1992) (describing
the duty to prepare legislative EIS and the procedures for preparation, including interagency
cooperation and designation of a "lead agency" where applicable).
190 The START I LEIS outlined the dismantling work that would involve the Army and
Navy, as well as the Air Force, and would affect 30 communities in 20 states. The contractors
who drafted the document drew upon 27 people of diverse interdisciplinary expertise to compile
the 200-page document. It assessed the aspects of the environment that might be affected by the
project, including air quality, noise, water resources, soil, cultural resources, and visual resources.
START I LEIS, supra note 47, passim.
191 The treaty limits each side to 1600 strategic nuclear systems, containing a total of 6000
warheads. Id. § 2.1, at 2-1.
192 The LEIS concluded that the "no-action alternative" (a failure to ratify the START I
agreement) was itself a dynamic option under which the United States would undertake a vari-
ety of weapons eliminations, regardless of possible Soviet actions. The treaty would require
more of these eliminations, and at a faster pace, so the comparative impact upon the environ-
ment was evaluated. The document did not evaluate any other possible options, such as renego-
tiating portions of the treaty. Id passim.
It is also noteworthy that the U.S. Senate, in providing its advice and consent to the treaty,
attached to the resolution of ratification an additional proviso that in implementing the treaty,
the United States would initiate deliberations with Russia regarding methods for eliminating
missile silo launchers "in ways that would minimize the impact of such elimination on the envi-
ronment, including the impact on water wells and aquifers." 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138 CONG.
REc. 15955 (1992). See also Paul Hoversten, Treaty's 'Big Risk,' USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 1992, at
3A (discussing fears of farmers near missile sites that silo destruction will affect their water
supply).
193 START II SLEIS, supra note 189, passim. The document is much shorter than the
START I LEIS, reflecting the fact that most of the START II environmental impacts were iden-
tical or cumulative to those already evaluated. The START II accord requires more extensive
dismantlings than did the START I, but the activities, and their likely effects on soil, water, and
air are cognate.
194 The most important potential environmental impact of START II that was not anticipated
in the START I LEIS concerned the new requirements for de-activating the Peacekeeper missile
system at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, so the supplemental LEIS addressed that item in
more detail. Id
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The CWC, however, raises the stakes-and the potential clash
between disarmament and environmentalism-by an order of magni-
tude. The chemical accord implicates such a vast array of ecological
concerns, and the destruction requirements go so directly to the heart
of the transaction, that environmentalism is inextricably implicated.
The two social forces of arms control and environmental protection-
public policy worlds that had previously only barely begun to interact
at all' 9 5-are now drawn into full-fledged confrontation and/or collab-
oration. Interest communities that have previously followed either
one set of issues or the other will now require a crash course in the
opposite discipline, in the hope that the combination of national con-
cerns can be managed in a mutually supportive, rather than an en-
tirely hostile, fashion.' 96
This Article cannot hope to provide a thorough overview of envi-
ronmental protection law and practice.97 Instead, it aims to supply
195 See Theresa Hitchens, Safety Fear Clouds U.S. Nuke Proliferation Plan, DEF. NEWS, Dec.
13-19, 1993, at 8. Most of the significant occasions to date where these two fields collided have
involved military-related activities (such as testing weaponry, training troops, constructing instal-
lations, or fighting wars) in locations that jeopardized sensitive natural ecosystems. See Cruden,
supra note 171, at 1169; POTENTIAL USES, supra note 58, at 5-7. Some of the other previous
intersections between environmentalism and national security have been quixotic, to say the
least. See In Brief. Clean Bombs, BULL ATOM. ScIENTISS, July-Aug. 1993, at 4 (observing that
in response to EPA's plan to ban chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by 1996, Air Force is replacing its
nuclear missile cooling systems with CFC-free models). If one adopts somewhat broader defini-
tions of the concepts of both "environmentalism" and "national security," then a larger set of
overlaps appears, due to the nation's long-run interest in sustainable, fair, and safe activities. See
JOHN HOLDREN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY (1992); Peter H. Gleick,
Environment and Security: The Clear Connections, BuL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1991, at 16
(arguing that certain enviromental concerns are appropriately considered national security inter-
ests); Daniel Deudney, Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking, BULL- ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
Apr. 1991, at 22 (analyzing analogies between enviromental problems and national security
concerns).
196 See generally David C. Morrison, No Easy Out, 23 NAT'L J., 1100-01 (1991) (quoting
Greenpeace spokesperson Sebia A. Hawkins as commenting on CW elimination that "[i]t's not a
matter of 'green versus peace'; you don't have to compromise on either mission. They are not
mutually exclusive"); Susan E. Davis, The Battle Over Johnston Atoll, WASH. POST HEALTH
MAG., Apr. 9, 1991 (quoting Brookings Institution expert Elisa Harris as saying that, "[i]n the
past, arms control people and environmentalists have been on the same side .... With [CW]
incineration, these groups are on opposing sides").
197 Among the growing literature on environmental law are BONINE & McGARITY, supra
note 189, passim; Cruden, supra note 171; ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1992); JAN G. LArros & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1992). On the special subject of the CWC and the
environment, see GUALTIERI ET AL., supra note 109, passim; J. AROESTY ET AL., DOMESTIC
IMPLEMENTATION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY (1989); BARRY KELLMAN ET AL., MAN-
UAL FOR NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 84-98 (1993)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL]; DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CHEMICAL WEAPONS
TREATY OFFICE ET AL., CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT (1991) [hereinafter VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY]; Paul Doty, The Chal-
lenge of Destroying Chemical Weapons, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 1992, at 25.
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only a basic primer, introducing those elements of substantive and
procedural environmental jurisprudence that will carry the greatest
impact (i.e., cause the most potential problems) for timely and effec-
tive implementation of the CWC.
A. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Any survey of American environmental law must begin (both
chronologically and in importance) with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969,198 America's "environmental constitution."1 99 For
our purposes, the most important NEPA provision is the mandate that
a government agency contemplating a "major federal action" must
study the likely environmental impacts; the agency must collect a di-
verse range of data, analyze alternative courses of action, consider
possibilities for avoiding or mitigating untoward environmental ef-
fects, and publish findings for public comment prior to making a final
decision.20 0 NEPA itself is not "substantive" in the sense of establish-
ing standards for permissible levels of emissions or other disruptions,
and it does not require the agency to select the policy option that is
determined to have the least adverse environmental effects.201 But
the statute and the EIS process have nonetheless revolutionized the
field, according environmental issues a much higher visibility than
ever before and forcing agencies, through the glare of publicity (and
litigation), to become more environmentally conscious and re-
sponsible.202
198 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (codifying Pub. L. No. 91-190 et seq.
(1970), as amended). See generally BONINE & McGARIr, supra note 189, ch. 1 (beginning
casebook on environmental law by considering NEPA); JACOB I. BREGMAN & KENNETH M.
MACKENTHUN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS chs. 1, 2 (1992) (beginning consideration
of EISs by discussing NEPA); VERIFnCATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 197, § 4 (beginning anal-
ysis of enviromental impact documents required for the CWC with a consideration of NEPA);
FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 23; LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 197, at 218.
199 David A. Wirth, International Decision Note, Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 87
AM. J. INT'L LAW 626,627 (1993) (citing City of Roswell v. New Mexico Water Quality Control
Comm'n, [1973] 3 ENvrrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,181, 20,183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972)).
200 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). See also FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 47; LArros &
TOMAIN, supra note 197, at 220,235; LERNER & TANzAN, supra note 189, § 2.1 at 1-4 (discuss-
ing NEPA procedures for creating an EIS); Cruden, supra note 171, at 1174-75.
201 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Strycker's Bay Neigh-
borhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam); Cruden, supra note 171, at 1180.
202 BONINE & McGARrry, supra note 189, at 17-27 (noting that NEPA has been called an
"environmental bill of rights"); FiNDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 56; LArros & ToMAIN,
supra note 197, at 218. But see Lance D. Wood, In Preparing, Using, and Defending Environ-
mental Impact Statements, Do Federal Agencies Exalt Form Over Substance, Address to the
Conference on the Preparation and Review of Environmental Impact Statements (Nov. 1987), in
Environmental Impact Assessment, supra note 181, at 196-97 (suggesting that too often an EIS
is a mere "paper exercise" or "post hoc rationalization," not treated as an important component
of an agency's real planning process).
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Several aspects of the international reach of NEPA, however,
have never been completely clear,203 and judicial cases have periodi-
cally tested the extraterritorial application of the statute, its relevance
to treaties, and its role in national security matters.2 04 The D.C. Cir-
cuit, for example, has recently ruled that the National Science Foun-
dation (NSF) must prepare an EIS regarding its intention to emplace
a food waste incinerator at its McMurdo research station in Antarc-
tica.205 The court did not rule that NEPA automatically applies to all
U.S. government activities outside the country, and it focused on the
special jurisprudential status of Antarctica.2 6 However, the court
203 The Supreme Court has established a general presumption against the extraterritorial ap-
plication of ordinary legislation, holding that unless the Congress clearly specifies otherwise, a
statute is to be construed as applying only within the territorial boundaries of the United States.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(calling the presumption "a long-standing principle of American law"). See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATrES § 403 cmt. g (1987).
204 The statutory language of NEPA is extremely broad in outlook, directing that "to the
fullest extent possible," federal agencies shall "recognize the worldwide and long range character
of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States,
lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions and programs designed to maximize interna-
tional cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world
environment ... " 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988). See Environmental Impact Assessment, supra
note 181, at 105-07.
In several cases, courts have insisted upon the production of a suitable EIS even when much
of the studied activity occurs outside the territory of the United States. See BONINE & Mc-
GARITY, supra note 189, at 82; Cruden, supra note 171, at 1213-17; Wirth, supra note 199, at 630-
35; Douglas E. Baker, Note, Anticipating Lamm v. Weinberger II (Romer v. Carlucci): The Polit-
ical Question Doctrine, MX Missiles, and NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement, 21 CREIGH-
TON L. REv. 1245 (1988); see also National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v.
Department of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1232-33 (D.D.C. 1978) (deciding that NEPA applies to
U.S. participation in Mexican government's program to spray paraquat and 2,4-D herbicides
onto marijuana and poppy plants inside Mexico based upon the effects of the spraying in the
United States); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (permit-
ting Canadian environmental groups to intervene in U.S. lawsuit regarding adequacy of EIS for
Trans-Alaska natural gas pipeline where American and Canadian environmentalists had antago-
nistic interests); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975), motion granted, 421 F.
Supp. 63 (1976), vacated sub nom., Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en-
joining U.S. participation in construction of a highway in Panama and Columbia until a satisfac-
tory EIS is prepared); Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973) (holding that NEPA
is applicable to U.S. weapons testing program conducted on Pacific Trust Territory).
205 Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The National
Science Foundation (NSF), a federal government agency that operates the largest American
year-round installation in Antarctica, planned to improve its environmental program at
McMurdo by halting open pit burning of food wastes in favor of a state-of-the-art incinerator.
The Environmental Defense Fund argued that the incinerator might produce toxic pollutants
that the NSF had failed to evaluate. Id. at 529-30.
206 The court stressed that Antarctica is not a "foreign country," nor is it subject to American
or other claims of sovereignty. At the same time, the United States exercises a great deal of
practical control over large portions of the continent, so the usual reasons to avoid extraterrito-
rial application of a statute (such as a desire to avoid interfering with another country's possible
assertion of jurisdiction) do not apply. I&. at 533-34.
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also stressed the fact that, wherever the NSF's actual construction ac-
tivity might eventually occur, the NEPA EIS requirement was princi-
pally addressed to informing the foundation's decision-making
activity, which naturally took place inside the United States at the
agency's headquarters-so there was really no question of extraterri-
toriality in this application of the statute.207 By this logic, virtually all
major federal actions worldwide could be amenable to NEPA cover-
age, but other cases over the years have left unresolved the extent to
which the statute should be applied internationally.208
Supplementing the statutory obligations of NEPA regarding the
international environment is Executive Order 12,114 of 1979.209 It re-
quires an agency to produce appropriate documentation210 prior to
undertaking any major federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment: (1) in the "global commons" 211 or (2)
207 The court concluded that NEPA's "action forcing" strategy required only the evaluation
and deliberation necessary for the preparation of an EIS and that all this activity would be
undertaken inside the United States. The statute itself did not prohibit or limit any government
activity inside Antarctica, so the case was not about extraterritoriality. Id. at 532-33.
208 The U.S. Government considered appealing the ircuit court's decision, but resolved in-
stead to issue a press statement acquiescing in the judgment but attempting to limit it to the
precise facts of the case. Wirth, supra note 199, at 633. See also Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (refusing to require
NRC to prepare an EIS regarding the export of a nuclear reactor to the Philippines where the
environmental consequences would be felt exclusively inside the recipient state); Greenpeace
U.S.A. v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that NEPA is inapplicable to Army program for removing chemical weapons from Ger-
many, and that the Army's Global Commons Environmental Assessment satisfies the NEPA
requirements with respect to the ocean transport of chemical weapons given the transoceanic
shipment's relation to the removal of the weapons from West Germany).
209 Exec. Order No. 12,114,3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988 & Supp.
1994). The purpose of the order is "to enable responsible officials of Federal agencies having
ultimate responsibility for authorizing and approving actions ... to be informed of pertinent
environmental considerations and to take such considerations into account, with other pertinent
considerations of national policy, in making decisions ... ." Id. § 1-1. Each relevant federal
agency is required to create its own internal procedures to implement the order. Id § 2-1. See
e.g., 32 C.F.R. §§ 187-88 (1993) (regulations of the Office of the Secretary of Defense); see also
Robinson, supra note 181, at 107-08 (critiquing the executive order for stifling agency creativity
in approaching international environmental problems).
210 The executive order identifies three distinct types of environmental documents appropri-
ate for different circumstances: the usual EIS; a bilateral or multilateral environmental study,
undertaken jointly by the United States and one or more foreign countries or an international
organization; and a "concise review" of environmental issues, such as an environmental assess-
ment or a summary environmental analysis. Exec. Order No. 12,114 § 2-4, 3 C.F.R. § 356.
211 The global commons is the area outside the national jurisdiction of any country, such as
Antarctica or the high seas. A major federal action affecting the global commons requires prep-
aration of a full EIS. Exec. Order No. 12;114 §§ 2-3(a), 2-4(b)(1), 3 C.F.RI § 356. See RECORD
OF DECISION, supra note 145, at 2 (describing the Army's Global Commons Environmental As-
sessment examining the potential consequences of ocean shipment of chemical weapons from
Germany to Johnston Atoll).
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under specified circumstances, inside a foreign country.212 The execu-
tive order provides a number of categorical exemptions and other lim-
itations, several of which relate to national security matters, but none
of which is directly relevant to the CWC.213 Importantly, however,
unlike NEPA, the executive order does not provide for judicial review
of agency noncompliance. 214
The most recent major international NEPA-related controversy
concerns the legislation's applicability to treaties. The statute,215 com-
bined with CEQ regulations,216 presumptively requires the submission
of a legislative environmental impact statement to accompany the
transmittal to Congress of an international agreement,217 and the ex-
ecutive branch has sometimes conformed to this expectation.218 How-
ever, regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),2 1 9 a monumental tariff-reducing and trade-enhancing ar-
rangement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico,220 the
212 The executive order distinguishes two situations in which a major United States action
may affect the environment of a foreign country in a manner that ought to be studied: first,
where the foreign country is not participating or otherwise involved with the American action;
and second, where the U.S. action provides to the foreign country a toxic product (or a project
that produces such a product) that is strictly controlled under U.S. law because of environmental
risks. Exec. Order No. 12,114 § 2-3(b) to (c), 3 C.F.R. § 356. Under either situation, the execu-
tive order requires the U.S. government to prepare either a bilateral or multilateral environmen-
tal study or a "concise review" of environmental consequences. Id § 2-4(b)(ii) to (iii).
213 The executive order excludes, inter alia, actions undertaken by the president, intelligence
activities, and arms transfers. Id. § 2-5(a). It also allows agencies to modify the required envi-
ronmental documents in order to "ensure appropriate reflection" of diplomatic factors and na-
tional security considerations. Id § 2-5(b).
214 The executive order states that its requirements are "solely for the purpose of establishing
internal procedures for Federal agencies.., and nothing in [the] Order shall be construed to
create a cause of action." Id. § 3-1. See Enviromental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528,
530 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
215 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988) (requiring an environmental impact statement for major
environment-related legislative proposals).
216 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.17 & 1508.18(b)(1) (1993) (including international treaties among the
legislative proposals for which an EIS is appropriate). See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1993); Exec. Or-
der No. 11,991 § 2(q), 3 C.F.R. 123 (1993) (CEQ regulations are binding on all federal agencies);
see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347,358 (1979) (stating that CEQ regulations are "enti-
tled to substantial deference" in interpreting NEPA).
217 LERNER & TANZMAN, supra note 189, § 2.3 at 2-3.
218 See Brief for Appellees at 22-24, Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 970 F.2d
916 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing numerous instances in which the Department of State and other
foreign affairs agencies prepared EIS documentation to accompany the submission to Congress
of an international agreement) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees]; LERNmR & TANZMAN, supra
note 189, § 2.3 at 3 (citing LEISs prepared for Panama Canal Treaty and other international
agreements).
219 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 [here-
inafter NAFTA].
220 NAFTA will create the largest international tariff-free zone in the world, embracing 360
million people and $6 trillion in annual output. It builds upon both the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, integrating the economies of the
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American government has produced voluminous publications and en-
vironment-related argumentation, but no EIS documentation.221
When sued over the failure to study and advise adequately about the
manifest, complex environmental effects, the government asserted a
number of alternative defenses in court.2m Some of these arguments
were NAFTA-specific, and largely irrelevant to the CWC context, 2 3
but others presented a more general challenge. To some extent, the
executive branch seemed to be asserting that NEPA was not intended
to apply to treaties at all; alternatively, it asserted that even if the
statute does attempt to reach international agreements, the presi-
dent's foreign affairs powers under the Constitution preclude the leg-
islature from imposing any such preconditions upon the conclusion
and submission to Congress of an international bargain.2 4
three already-close trading partners. See generally David S. Cloud, Sound and Fury Over
NAFTA Overshadows the Debate, CONG. Q. WKLY. EDITION, Oct. 16, 1993, at 2791 (describing
the general effects of the treaty on tariffs, investment, health and the environment, industry
safeguards, services, and intellectual property to counteract the confusions created by the "be-
"wildering array of pseudo-facts, figures, classes, and countercharges" issued by NAFTA propo-
nents and their opponents).
221 The three negotiating countries supplemented the main NAFTA text with "side agree-
ments" on safety and environmental issues. Public debate in the United States focused on the
possibility that lax Mexican enforcement of environmental protection laws and incentives for
American businesses to locate in the low-wage areas south of the border would generate envi-
ronmental decay. The executive branch-while resisting any requirement to prepare a full EIS
studying the problem-produced a "review" of the issue and began compiling another "volun-
tary" assessment. U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA Supplementak Agreement on Environmen-
tal Cooperation and Summary of the Agreement on Enviromental Cooperation, reprinted in 4
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATcH 34,590,594 (1993); U.S. Gov'T, REvIEw OF U.S.-MExico Eri--
RONMENTAL IssuEs (1992); Brief for Appellants at 10-12, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Rep., 822
F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants]; Brief
for Appellees, supra note 218, at 7-8. See also Keith Schneider, Environmental Groups Are Split
on Support For Free-Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16,1993, at Al; Keith Bradsher, Court Ruling
Lets Trade Agreement Move to Congress, N.Y. TrMEs, Sept. 25, 1993, § 2, at 1.
222 There were two separate court challenges. In Public Citizen v. Office of U.S. Trade Rep.,
970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir.), aff'g, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992), the circuit court dismissed the
challenge as premature, since the complete text of the NAFrA had not yet been concluded, so
there was no "final" action requiring an EIS. In the second case, Public Citizen v. Office of U.S.
Trade Rep. (NAFTA case), 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994), brought after the agreement had been signed, but before it was
transmitted to the Congress, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs, ordering that the executive
branch prepare an EIS "forthwith." The Circuit Court, however, reversed, Public Citizen v.
Office of U.S. Trade Rep. (NAFTA case), 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685
(1994).
223 For example, the government challenged the plaintiffs' standing to sue under the applica-
ble definition of a cognizable "injury," Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 34-40, asserted
that the trade legislation establishing the NAFTA negotiations constituted a de facto exemption
from NEPA, id. at 45-49, and argued that the full environmental consequences of a treaty as
massive and complex as NAFTA were too remote and speculative to be the subject of an EIS.
224 NEPA itself does not provide for judicial review of EIS documentation, so any claim must
be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988), which applies
only to the "final" act of an "agency," and explicitly exempts the president from coverage.
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The district judge ruled for the plaintiffs, ordering the federal
government to prepare a prompt EIS, but in September 1993, the
D.C. Circuit reversed. In so doing, the court still seemed to not quite
have accepted the widest versions of the government's case, and the
court denied that it was sounding the "death knell of the legislative
EIS."2 25 But the court reasoned that the only "final action" in the
case had been the President's decision to transmit the treaty to the
Congress, which was not the action of an "agency" and was therefore
unreviewable under NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act.
Whether under this logic there is still any scope for litigation to com-
pel the production of an EIS for a future treaty such as the CWC
remains unsettled.2 6
In any event, the executive branch has not produced (or even be-
gun work toward) a full legislative EIS22 7 for the CWC.22 8 Various
parts of the bureaucracy have, however, undertaken intensive projects
NAFIA case, 5 F.3d at 551. In the NAFrA case, the government asserted that: (1) the president
had undertaken so much personal negotiation regarding the treaty that it was a final action of
the White House; (2) even if the U.S. Trade Representative had played a key role in the negotia-
tions, the Trade Representative was located "within the executive office of the president," and
was therefore not an "agency" for NEPA purposes; and (3) even if the Trade Representative was
an agency, its work on the treaty was completed when it submitted the document to the presi-
dent, and it was the president who decided to take the "final action" of transmitting it to the
Congress. Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 19-26.
Under the third alternative argument, virtually all international agreements would be ex-
empt from NEPA since the negotiating agency's release of the signed document is not truly
"final" because the president could still order additional negotiations or simply decline to ad-
vance the agreed text. Thus, the only action that is ever "final" regarding a treaty is the presi-
dent's transmittal of the completed text to the Congress, an event to which NEPA does not
apply. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992) (holding that an agency's comple-
tion of a statutorily-required report is not subject to judicial review, where the report is initially
submitted to the White House, and the President transmits it to Congress).
225 NAFTA case, 5 F.3d at 552. The concurring opinion by Judge Randolph goes still further
in casting doubt upon the continued viability of the NEPA legislative EIS, noting that any propo-
sal for ordinary legislation is not truly "final," because the agency cannot ensure passage (or
even introduction) of the bill in the form it proposes. He adds that "the nub of the problem" is
that judicial review requires a "final agency action," while the statutory duty to begin to prepare
an EIS arises at an earlier point. lId at 554.
226 One irony of this result would be that sometimes a less important international agree-
ments would receive closer scrutiny, in the form of a full legislative environmental impact state-
ment, than would a more significant, formal international document. A formal treaty concluded
by the President and transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent would require no LEIS
under the NAFTA precedent. But a smaller, less significant accord, such as an executive agree-
ment concluded on the sole authority of the chief executive (and therefore requiring no Con-
gressional approval) or an executive agreement signed in implementation of a prior treaty (and
therefore not triggering any additional legislative participation), might be deemed a final action
of the State Department, especially if it were signed by the Secretary or some lower-ranking
official instead of by the President and would require an LEIS.
227 The executive branch has voluntarily prepared a brief "Environmental Review" to accom-
pany the submission to Congress of the CWC. This document, however, is essentially a survey of
the existing literature regarding the environmental effects of the treaty; it does not contain any
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that provide at least partial substitutes for the analysis-or that could
readily be incorporated by reference in a subsequent umbrella
document. 2 9
For example, the largest single environmental impact of the CWC
will undoubtedly be the actual dismantling of stockpiled chemical
weapons. However this elimination is ultimately accomplished, the
operation of the destruction facilities will have enormous and diverse
potential environmental consequences, it will likely produce a wide
range of routine and nonroutine emissions and residues (as well as
stimulating a new risk of accidents), 23 0 and it is therefore precisely the
type of major federal action that demands concerted study.23 ' Fortu-
nately, work on just that sort of investigation and documentation is
already well under way. By statute,232 the Army was ordered in De-
original investigation or analysis as required for a full LEIS. ENVIRONMENTAL REvIEw, supra
note 154, passim.
228 The remedy for violation of NEPA's EIS requirements can be an injunction, temporarily
arresting the agency's proposed action pending the completion of the mandatory environmental
documentation. Cruden, supra note 171, at 1181; FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 19;
Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983); People Against Nuclear Energy v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983). In the
NAFTA case, however, the district court merely ordered the U.S. government to prepare an
LEIS "forthwith," and did not explicitly prohibit the submission of the treaty prior to the com-
pletion of a satisfactory LEIS. NAFTA case, 822 F. Supp at 31.
229 CEQ regulations favor "tiering" of environmental documents (L., preparation of one
over-arching "programmatic" EIS to assess the nationwide impact of a broad program, to be
augmented by localized "site-specific" studies), 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(i), 1502.20 (1993), and incor-
poration by reference of existing documents, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21 (1993), to save time and space
in the EIS.
230 See LERNER & TANZMAN, supra note 189, § 3.2.
231 Even if a major federal facility is committed to operating entirely within the constraints
imposed by all applicable federal and state substantive anti-pollution laws, an EIS is still re-
quired; conformity with another agency's permitting standards does not excuse the NEPA evalu-
ation requirements. BONINE & McGARITY, supra note 189, at 181-82; Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122-27 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
232 Defense Authorization Act of 1986,50 U.S.C. § 1521 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (codifying Pub.
L. No. 99-145). This legislation effectuated a delicate political compromise under which the
existing U.S. stockpile of older unitary chemical weapons was to be destroyed by 1994 and a new
arsenal of modern binary chemical weapons was to be produced. The statute identifies the pro-
gram's dismantling goals as: (1) protecting the environment, the public, and workers; (2) provid-
ing adequate and safe facilities for the sole function of destroying the CW stockpile; and (3)
cleaning up the sites and destroying the equipment when the stockpiles are eliminated. Carnes
& Watson, supra note 129, at 653. In fact, however, the binary CW production program was
aborted shortly thereafter, supra note 148-49, and the timetable for dismantling the unitary
weapons has repeatedly slipped. Owen Statement, supra note 4; THm COMMrrrEE FOR NA-
TIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC TRUST AND TECHNOLOGY: CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (1993) (discussing destructions delay and increased costs with Dr. Mark
Brown) [hereinafter PUBLIC TRUST AND TECHNOLOGY]; Pub. L. No. 100-456 § 118(a)(5), 102
Stat. 1918, 1943 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1521 (Supp. 1994)); Pub. L. No. 102-190
§ 151(a), 105 Stat. 1290, 1313 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1521 (Supp. 1994)); Pub. L.
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cember, 1985 to begin disposal of the entire existing American CW
stockpile-independent of any treaty obligation to do so-and the
service dutifully began making plans, including the preparation of'a
nest of EISs.23 3 To date, a "programmatic" EIS (studying the nation-
wide dismantling operation as a whole) 23 4 and some of the follow-up
"site specific" EISs (addressing the local options and impacts at the
particular locations where incinerators are to be constructed)235 have
been crafted. 23 6 These documents could be incorporated by reference
(and updated, where necessary, by a brief supplement) to constitute
the heart of an effective EIS for the treaty.
But the environmental documentation prepared to date is funda-
mentally defective in two crucial respects. First, the existing EISs fully
discuss only the location of the proposed elimination facilities, not the
technology selected to perform the destruction. The Army has studied
(on a programmatic basis) whether to build eight, two, or one inciner-
ators and (on a site specific basis) exactly where, within a specified
base or local plant site, to emplace each particular structure.2 7 And
No. 102-484 § 171, 106 Stat. 2315, 2341 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1521 (Supp. 1994)) (moving
deadline for the destruction of older weapons to 2004).
233 Rouse, supra note 9, at 30-34. This statutory dismantling obligation was conceptually just
a major expansion of the pre-existing Army program for dismantling obsolete or leaking weap-
onry. Id.
234 PEIS, supra note 130, at 1-7. A "programmatic" EIS is designed to assess the general or
nationwide environmental impact of a broad government program; it may be supplemented by
"site specific" EISs which delve into the particular circumstances, problems, and options avail-
able at an individual locale. LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 197, at 230; Army's Chemical Demili-
tarization Record of Decision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-28 (1988) (statement of Brig. Gen. David
Nydam, Project Manager for Chemical Demilitarization Program, Dep't of the Army).
235 PROGRAM MANAGER FOR CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, Dispo-
SAL OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS STORED AT ToOELE ARMY DEPOT, TOOELE, UTAH,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1989); PROGRAM MANAGER FOR CHEMICAL DE-
MILITARIZATION, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, DISPOSAL OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MuNrnoNs
STORED AT UMATILLA DEPOT AcTivry, HERMISTON, OREGON, FINAL PHASE I ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1990); PROGRAM MANAGER FOR CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION,
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, DISPOSAL OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS STORED AT ANNISTON
ARMY DEPOT, ANNISTON, ALABAMA, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr STATEMENT (1991); REC-
ORD OF DECISION, supra note 145, at 24. The process of "tiering" environmental impact state-
ments via the production of programmatic and site-specific EISs in this fashion has become
routine. See BONINE & MCGARITY, supra note 189, at 128 (noting that several cases required
agencies to prepare tiered EISs).
236 A site-specific EIS for the CW dismantling program is prepared in two phases. The Phase
I report collects local data to confirm the applicability of the programmatic EIS to the specific
locality. The Phase II report is a full site-specific EIS. Phase I reports have been compiled for
most of the eight intended locations; Phase II has been completed only for Tooele, Utah and
Anniston, Alabama. Owen Statement, supra note 4.
237 The programmatic EIS was intended to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of: (1)
continued storage of the CW at their current locations (the "no-action" alternative); (2) on-site
disposal of the stocks at their current locations (the option ultimately selected); (3) relocation of
the stockpile to two regional destruction facilities (at Tooele, Utah, and Anniston, Alabama); (4)
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in this regard, the EISs do seem quite thorough and deliberative. But
the Army has not, in these documents or elsewhere, adequately ad-
dressed the underlying determination that incineration, rather than
any of the other candidate technologies (such as neutralization, bi-
oremediation, and cryofracture),2 38 should be the mode of choice.23 9
By merely assuming that burning is the sole relevant option for ac-
complishing the destruction, the Army has evaded a central function
of the NEPA exercise. 40 This omission is all the more crucial because
recently, additional information and analysis have independently sur-
faced241 that: (1) challenge the Army's conclusions about the safety,
reliability, and effectiveness of the incineration process242 and (2) sug-
gest that other candidate technologies may be more promising (and
closer to fruition) than the Army had previously determined.243
It may still be possible, however, to rescue the adequacy of the
Army's existing dismantling EISs on the basis that other documents,
integral to the Army's ongoing analytical and decision-making
processes, could be incorporated by reference to bolster the studies
relocation to a single national facility at Tooele; and (5) a variety of other partial relocation
schemes. PEIS, supra note 130, at 1-1, 1-3, 2-1.
238 See infra part V (discussing possible technologies for chemical weapons disarmament).
239 The PEIS notes that it was not intended to evaluate in detail the technologies that could
be applied to the destruction process, but it does briefly consider some alternatives to the base-
line incineration approach. PEIS, supra note 130, at 1-3, 2-73-86. Essentially, the Army was
resting upon earlier National Academy of Sciences and other assessments that supported incin-
eration and was assuming that those studies remained valid.
240 An EIS must consider the full range of reasonably available alternatives, not solely the
agency's preferred outcome. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); New York v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 741-46
(2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984); BoNINE & McGAIrrv, supra note 189, at 146-
59.
241 An agency is obligated to prepare a supplemental EIS when "[t]here are significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed
action or its impacts." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(ii) (1993). See LArros & ToMArN, supra note 197,
at 241; BoNiNE & McGAgrrY, supra note 189, at 182-84; GREENPEACE 9/90 RE IEW, supra note
145,passim; Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360,370-85 (1989); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991-97 (5th Cir. 1981); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 714 F.
Supp. 539, 565-72, amended, 744 F. Supp. 352 (D. Me. 1989).
242 See infra text accompanying notes 425-34 (evaluating JACADS and argument that inciner-
ation is more polluting than Army has indicated); PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-88 (evaluating
environmental impact of baseline incineration technology); PAT COSTNER, CHEMICAL WEAPo NS
DEMILITARIZATION AND DISPOSAL 4 (May 12, 1993) (unpublished paper on file with author)
(indicating that when the Army first selected incineration as the method of choice for CW dispo-
sal, there was a dearth of information regarding furnace performance and safety, but addi-
tional-mostly negative-data has since become available); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE,
CHEMICAL WEAPONS: STOCKPILE DEsTRUcnoiN COST GROWTH AND SCHEDULE SLIPPAGES
ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE 21 (1991) (indicating that "factors have changed" since the Army's
decision to rely upon incineration) [hereinafter LIKELY TO CONTINUE].
243 See infra text accompanying notes 464-87 (discussing alternative technologies).
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already published.244 Foremost among these is a series of reports on
CW destruction methodologies prepared by the National Academy of
Sciences' National Research Council (NRC), widely recognized as an
independent, authoritative source of expertise on CW stockpile is-
sues.245 In fact, it was largely a 1984 NRC report that drove the Army
to favor incineration in the first place.246 More recently, two in-
dependent NRC committees have prepared detailed monographs (in
June 1993247 and February 1994248) analyzing alternative technologies
that the Army could graft onto the existing incineration plan or adopt
to displace it.249
Even beyond that important defect, however, the existing EIS li-
brary is insufficient in a second key respect to support the CWC as a
whole because it fails to consider all of the treaty's potential environ-
mental impacts. For example, as noted above, the United States will
be required to dismantle not only the existing stockpile of active
weapons, but also the non-stockpile materiel (including a small quan-
tity of modem binary munitions and equipment, and a much larger,
more diverse, and deteriorating mass of older and obsolete arms and
other CW-related items), as well as the 'former CW production facili-
244 The CWC Environmental Review notes that it is based upon some 62 published studies,
totaling 17,000 pages, of the potential environmental impact of the treaty. ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW, supra note 154, at 1. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21 (1993) (stating that CEQ regulations
favor the practice of making an EIS more concise by incorporating by reference, rather than
recapitulating, other relevant documents).
245 The National Research Council (the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences,
the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine) has established two promi-
nent committees relevant to chemical weapons matters. The Committee on Review and Evalua-
tion of the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (the Stockpile Committee) has been
operating since 1987 to provide the Army with technical advice regarding the disposal of CW
agents and munitions. The Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies
(Alternatives Committee) was created in 1992 for the sole purpose of drafting a report on alter-
natives to the existing JACADS-style "baseline" incineration methodology. NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PRESS RELEASE FOR ALTERNATIVE
TECHNOLOGIES PUBLIC FORUM OF JUNE 30 (1993) [hereinafter PRESS RELEASE]. See also PEIS,
supra note 130, at 1-6 (describing impact of 1984 NAS study).
246 PEIS, supra note 130, at 1-23.
247 NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129.
248 NAS STOCKPILE COMMrrrEE, supra note 140. The NRC's Stockpile Committee was origi-
nally scheduled to issue its report (building upon the June 1993 Alternatives Committee report)
in November 1993, PRESS RELEASE, supra note 245, at 2, but the process was delayed.
249 Pursuant to the 1993 Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, the Army was to
report to the Congress "on the potential alternatives to the use of the Army's baseline disassem-
bly and incineration process for the disposal of lethal chemical agents and munitions" by Decem-
ber 31, 1993. Pub. L. No. 102-484 § 173(a), 106 Stat. 2315, 2342-43. The Army report also
includes its official reactions to the reports of the NRC Alternatives Committee and the NRC
Stockpile Committee. PRESS RELEASE, supra note 245, at 2; PROGRAM MANAGER FOR CHEMI-
CAL DEMILITARIZATION, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY's ALTERNATIVE DEMILITARIZATION
TECHNOLOGY REPORT FOR CONGRESS (1994) [hereinafter ARMY ALTERNATIVES].
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ties.25 0 Because the 1985 statute dealt exclusively with disposal of the
active stockpile, the Army's original EIS mandate did not address the
non-stockpile arms, which have become relevant only upon the con-
clusion of the CWC. The Army has recently prepared an initial report
concerning the location and status of the non-stockpile items,251 but
has only barely begun a true analysis of the alternative disposal meth-
ods and their environmental effects. 5 2
Moreover, the CWC will have other diverse environmental con-
sequences of the sort that should be studied in an EIS or equivalent
document.253 For example, under the treaty and contemplated Amer-
ican implementation of it, numerous types of imposing structures may
be built, adapted, and/or demolished. Foremost among these, of
course, will be the incinerators themselves (or any other buildings and
equipment that will be required by alternative destruction methodolo-
gies); the Army's programmatic EIS concludes that the impact of con-
structing and later decommissioning the incinerators will be minor,
but admits that the issue has not yet been studied in detail.254 Simi-
larly, a number of former CW production facilities will be eliminated
or converted and recycled. 255 This activity will involve the decontami-
nation or destruction of medium- to large-scale industrial plants, but
again, the Army has not yet studied the problem in detail-although
perhaps other government programs have taken an initial look at
some of the locations.25 6 In addition, the treaty permits the United
States to establish a "single small scale facility" for producing CW-
related agents for permitted peaceful purposes, as well as certain
other very limited types of CW-related installations. The eventual
250 See supra text accompanying notes 146-57 (discussing non-stockpile items).
251 NON-STOCKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, passim.
252 See id at iv. This document is not likely to be available in time to be relevant to the
Congress's consideration of the CWC; Army regulations contemplate that 270-550 days are ordi-
narily required to prepare a full EIS. 32 C.F.R. § 651.12(3) ig. 2 (1993).
253 See LERNER & TANZMAN, supra note 189, § 3.3.2 (suggesting that environmental impact
could be studied in other official documents and cross-referenced in an LEIS).
254 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-95, 4-16. The Army's projections of the costs for dismantling
the planned incinerators and closing out the dismantling program have risen from $53 million in
1991 to $324 million in 1992. GENERAL ACCoUNTING OFFICE, CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRuc.
TION: ISsUEs AFFECrING PROGRAM COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE 15 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter IssuEs A7EcnrNG].
255 See supra text accompanying notes 158-64 (discussing the elimination of former CW pro-
duction facilities).
256 Some of the former CW production sites (in particular, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colo-
rado) are already included on the National Priorities List for clean-up under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, see infra text accompanying notes
314-318, a process that involves a substantial amount of descriptive analysis of the site prior to
remediation. Some of that investigation could be adapted for a CWC EIS. LERNER &
TANZMAN, supra note 189, § 3.3.2; Stephen Gascoyne, Slipcovering a Superfund Site, BuLL.
ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept. 1993, at 33; LENNY SIEGEL, CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISPOSAL 18-19
(1991).
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consequences of the construction and operation of any of these types
of facilities would have to be studied independently and carefully. 25 7
The anticipated conduct of the verification inspections under the
CWC also raises environmental concerns that have not yet been fully
evaluated in any official document.25 8 These activities would not in-
volve the handling of large quantities of agent or other toxins, but
they will occur on such a widespread, repeated basis that their cumu-
lative potential environmental impacts may be substantial. 25 9 For ex-
ample, in visits to privately owned chemical factories,260 the
Organization's inspectors will generally be permitted to observe activ-
ities throughout the entire plant;261 to take, analyze, and transport
samples;262 and to require that specified operations be conducted in
their presence.263 Each of these activities, together with the enhanced
danger of ordinary industrial accidents (which could also have envi-
ronmental implications) caused by the sheer presence of additional
personnel, equipment, and operations, could be assessed and dis-
played to the public via an EIS.
Next, the CWC will have a potentially significant environmental
impact to the extent that it achieves its anticipated objective of en-
hancing peaceful international commerce in civilian chemicals and re-
lated equipment.264 Freedom from existing individual or collective
257 See supra text accompanying note 105 (considering single small-scale facility and other
peaceful purposes facilities that parties are permitted under the CWC).
258 GuAuTmm ET AL., supra note 109, and IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, supra note 197, are
the most thorough explications of the environmental and safety consequences of the CWC's
verification procedures.
259 See LERNER & TANZMAN, supra note 189, § 3.3.3.
260 The same analysis applies to inspections of government facilities (which are likely to be
more frequent than visits to private chemical industry locations) and to challenge inspections of
private businesses and dwellings unrelated to the chemical industry (which are expected to be
quite rare).
261 CwC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part II, para. E.45 (stating how, in general, in-
spectors "have the right to unimpeded access to the inspection site. The items to be inspected
will be chosen by the inspectors").
262 See supra text accompanying note 114 (samples). The procedures provided for by the
treaty for collecting and analyzing samples will not be identical to the routine sampling that a
chemical factory undertakes for its own quality-control purposes, and different types of environ-
mental dangers might arise where the CWC inspectors seek samples from unusual parts of the
facility, at different times and in different quantities from those permitted under existing state
environmental standards. See GUALTIERI Er AL., supra note 109, § 3.7.1. But see Amy E. Smith-
son, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention: Counsel from Industry, HENRY L. SmNr-
SON CENTER REPORT, Jan. 1994, at 16-17 (warning that regardless of treaty requirements, plant
managers will refuse to allow sampling where the process might disrupt plant operations or in-
terfere with health and safety precautions).
263 See supra text accompanying note 115 (requiring chemical operations).
264 The treaty's preamble describes the parties as "[d]esiring to promote free trade in chemi-
cals as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in
the field of chemical activities... in order to enhance the economic and technological develop-
ment of all States Parties." CWC, supra note 1, at 804, pmbl. para. 9 (underline omitted). See
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national programs of export controls, such as the restrictions main-
tained by the current "Australia Group" of chemical supplying coun-
tries,265 has long been a key desideratum of the developing countries
participating in the CWC deliberations, and the treaty commits its
par ties to encouraging the fullest possible civilian exchange.266 While
no EIS could foresee exactly how much increase in American and
global chemical traffic will actually be realized under the treaty, a doc-
ument could make some educated guesses about the probable levels
of augmented chemical imports and exports and about their antici-
pated environmental consequences upon the United States and upon
the "global commons," such as ocean shipping lanes.267
The CWC will also have a multiplicity of miscellaneous effects
upon the American and global environment. The treaty provides, for
example, that its parties are prohibited from producing, testing, pos-
sessing, or using chemical weapons;268 from aiding others in doing
so;269 and from making any preparations for engaging in offensive
Mounir Zahran, The Chemical Weapons Convention and Economic and Technological Develop-
ment, UNIDIR NEwsL (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzer-
land), Dec. 1992, at 24, 26.
265 The Australia Group is an informal cartel among the leading chemical exporting countries
that has met regularly since 1985, but is not based upon a treaty. Participants undertake to align
their individual national export control policies to prohibit the export of suspicious, weapons-
related substances and to pool their intelligence-gathering activities in resistance to the
threatened proliferation of chemical weapons. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMEN r
AGENCY, FACT SHEET. AUSTRALIA GROUP EXPORT CONTROLS ON MATERIALS USED IN THE
MANUFACTURE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (1993); Brad Roberts, Controlling
Chemical Weapons, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 444 (1992); Jones & Wagner,
supra note 69, at 604-06. See also BERNAUER, supra note 69, at 41 (the Leipzig Group of East-
ern European countries also imposed comparable export controls on chemical weapons-related
items). The Australia Group and its export control regime will not dissolve under the CWC, but
the treaty is likely to result in substantial changes in members' behavior regarding proposed
exports. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DIARMAMENT AGENCY, OCCASIONAL PAPER: THE Aus-
TRALIA GROUP (1993); EFFORTS TO BAN, supra note 62, at 8-10,15-16; The Australia Group and
the Chemical Weapons Convention, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION Bu.., Sept. 1993, at 5;
Robert J. Mathews, A Comparison of the Australia Group List of Chemical Weapon Precursors
and the CWC Schedules of Chemicals, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Sept. 1993, at 1
(arguing that there is a need to harmonize the export controls of the Australia Group and the
CWC).
266 See supra text accompanying note 264 (describing CWC as committing parties to full com-
mercial exchanges of chemicals).
267 An EIS need not address potential environmental effects that are unknown or unpredict-
able; speculation is not the basis for the analysis. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1993); Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,354-56 (1989) (holding that a worst case analysis
is not necessary where CEQ regulations no longer require it); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957,
970-71 (5th Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539,562 (D. Me. 1989); North Dakota
v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 255 (D.N.D. 1980); BoaNiE & McGARITY, supra note 189, at 85-86
(discussing the "reasonable foreseeability" test of Andrus); LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 197,
at 238.
268 CWC, supra note 1, art. 1.1.
269 ld. art. Ll(d).
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chemical warfare. 270 While most of these activities are steps that the
United States has not recently undertaken anyway-and has no cur-
rent intention of resuming-the acceptance of a legal impediment
against changing our national policy has some identifiable (positive)271
effect on the environment that could be discussed in a suitable EIS.
For that matter, the main object and purpose of the treaty, the aboli-
tion of chemical weapons and chemical warfare, is of profound benefit
to the natural environment, as well as to the human inhabitants.
Prompt elimination of CW arsenals will reduce the likelihood of disas-
trous accidents with the stockpile and of cataclysmic intentional uses
of the poisons. 272
Finally, the CWC, as a United States-led agreement with foreign
sovereigns, will also have foreseeable international consequences for
the quality of the global environment. At a minimum, the United
States will continue to press other countries diplomatically to adhere
to the treaty regime, and many will undoubtedly do so. Their own
conduct of the dismantling functions, as well as their participation in
the Organization's verification operations, the enhanced opportunities
for international chemical commerce, and the rest of the activities sur-
veyed above will also affect the biosphere.273 In the case of Russia, in
fact, where the existing arsenal of chemical weaponry and other
materials to be cleaned up is even larger than in the United States, the
probable environmental effects will be especially substantial.274 While
most of the countries will complete their CWC-required actions en-
tirely autonomously (or with the assistance of the treaty's Organiza-
tion),275  it is also possible that direct American financial,
technological, or other assistance276 may also be forthcoming, again
demonstrating a significant nexus to NEPA's core concerns. 277
270 Id. art. I.l(c).
271 NEPA requires the agency to examine in detail all aspects of a program's environmental
impacts, even those which may be unambiguously beneficial to the environment. Environmental
Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 993 (5th Cir. 1981); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1992).
272 ENVIRONMENTAL RVIEw, supra note 154, at 21, 31.
273 Other countries have increasingly crafted their own environmental protection legislation,
frequently adapting the United States' NEPA standards and procedures. Robinson, supra note
181, at 93, 97 (citing 15 countries that now employ some version of official environmental impact
analysis).
274 See infra text accompanying notes 493-520 (discussing the dismantling of Russian
weapons).
275 The CwC Organization is authorized to assist parties in resisting chemical aggression by
providing advice, equipment, and other resources. CWC, supra note 1, art. X. In some circum-
stances, the Organization and individual parties may also assist needy states in the recovery and
destruction of abandoned CW. Id. Verification Annex Part IV(B), para. C.16.
276 See infra text accompanying notes 506-12 (discussing the use of Nunn-Lugar funds for CW
dismantling in Russia).
277 A major federal action may fall within NEPA's requirements even if the government
merely authorizes or finances actions primarily conducted by other parties or other countries.
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088-89 (D.C. Cir.
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B. Clean Air Act (CAA)
The Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended,278 is a second major
piece of federal legislation affecting the implementation of the CWC.
The statute establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme for limit-
ing and monitoring discharges into the atmosphere.279 It directs the
designation of primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, 28 0 fixing ceilings on the emission of specified pollutants281
in order to protect human health with "an adequate margin of safety"
and to guard the public welfare more generally by focusing on "any
known or anticipated adverse effects." Uniform national standards
are intended to deal with the diversity of air pollution sources: vehi-
cles, new or modified stationary structures, and existing facilities, tak-
ing into account each local area's conformity to federal air quality
standards. 28 3 New stationary sources of air discharges such as hazard-
ous waste incinerators, in particular, are held to the most stringent
pollution abatement standards, requiring the adoption of the most ef-
fective (even if the most costly) available control technologies.28 4
Under the 1990 amendments, each state is to establish a permit
system, and every stationary source of air pollution is required to
seek, and conform its discharges to, such a permit-as well as to in-
1973); Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973); National Org. for the Repeal of Marijuana
Laws v. Department of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978) (per curiam); BoNINE & Mc-
GAry, supra note 189, at 39, 52-53; LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 197, at 225-26.
278 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7651-7671 (West Supp. 1994) (containing
1990 amendments). See generally FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 97-132; VERIiCAriON
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 197, at 30-35.
279 See GUALTnERI Er AL, supra note 109, at 19-23.
280 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1993). In establishing these standards, the exclu-
sive concern is to be for protecting and promoting health; financial constraints such as cost or
technological feasibility may not be considered. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); FINDLEY & FAR-
BER, supra note 197, at 107; LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 197, at 154.
281 NAAQSs exist for six "criteria pollutants": sulfur dioxide, particulates, carbon monoxide,
ozone, nitrogen oxide, and lead. 40 C.F.RL § 50 (1993).
282 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988).
283 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7411(d), (f) (West Supp. 1994) (discussing standards for new and existing
structures); 42 U.S.C.A. Parts C and D (West Supp. 1994) (discussing standards applicable to
geographic areas that have, and have not, already achieved compliance with applicable air qual-
ity criteria); BONWE & MCGARrrY, supra note 189, at 417 (indicating that federal government
establishes national criteria, subject to state augmentation).
284 42 U.S.C.A. 7411 (West Supp. 1994); 40 C.F.R. 60 (1993). New Source Performance Stan-
dards (NSPSs) also apply to existing sources that are "modified" in substantial ways. BONINE &
MCGARITY, supra note 189, at 477-80.
In addition, new sources must comply immediately with the "maximum achievable control
technology" standard, applicable to the discharge of 189 specified "hazardous air pollutants"
under the 1990 amendments. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7661 (West Supp. 1994); FINDLEY & FARBER, supra
note 197, at 104-22; LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 197, at 159-66.
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stall devices that control and measure the exhaust.28 5 A facility's
emission of different types or quantities of pollutants is a violation of
its permit and must be avoided, reported, and abated. There is also a
mechanism allowing expedited modification of a permit for temporary
aberrations.28 6
The biggest impact of the CAA on the CWC concerns the con-
struction and operation of the incinerators or other equipment
designed to destroy the chemical weapons.28 7 Although the Army's
current prototype is designed to operate with a minimum of air dis-
charges (and the National Research Council committees have recom-
mended modifications that could reduce the dangers still further),28 8
the permitting process for each installation requires a detailed, labori-
ous series of analyses.28 9 Each state is allowed to establish its own
procedures and criteria for issuance of permits, 290 and-especially in
the case of hazardous waste incinerators-local opposition to new
pollution sources has made the permitting process exceptionally
lengthy and convoluted.291 The Army's original schedule for ob-
taining the relevant permits has already slipped far behind the estab-
lished benchmarks, and local political opposition suggests little
prospect for more rapid approvals.292
In addition, the CWC's verification procedures may implicate the
CAA in another way. That is, when the Organization's inspectors visit
285 BONINE & MCGARITY, supra note 189, at 573-75.
286 Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975). See 40 C.F.R.
§ 70.7(e)(2) (1993); 57 Fed. Reg. 32307 (1992); FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 115;
GUALTIERI ET AL., supra note 109, at 21.
287 Rouse, supra note 9, at 81-84.
288 See infra text accompanying note 435-40 (discussing NRC suggestions for modifying
JACADS).
289 The Army's process for obtaining the necessary state permits (related to the Clean Air
Act and other statutes) has been criticized for inefficiency and delay. The Army has conceded
that the management of the permitting process should be improved, but contends that tardy
state procedures, rather than Army missteps, are the main impediments to acceleration. Owen
Statement, supra note 4, at 7; IssuEs AFFECnNG, supra note 254, at 13-14. See also MITRE,
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF THE JOHNSTON ATOLL CHEMICAL AoENT DISPOSAL SYSTEM: OPER-
ATIONAL VERIFICATION TESTING 3-8 (1993) [hereinafter MITRE] (recommending expedited
Army procedures for seeking relevant permits for construction and operation of CW
incinerators).
290 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7412(d)(1), 7661a(d) (West Supp. 1994).
291 Even ordinary municipal waste incinerators have become controversial, with the East Liv-
erpool, Ohio facility becoming a focus of national attention. Keith Schneider, For Crusader
Against Waste Incinerator, A Bittersweet Victory, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1993, at A14; Keith
Schneider, Incinerator Tial Is Blocked, Leading to Test of New Administration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 1993, at A15. The Army has contended that its CW incinerators will be far safer and cleaner
than municipal facilities, but those assurances have not quieted the opponents. Army Moves
Ahead with Plan to Burn Chemical Weapons, WASH. TIMES, July 12, 1993, at A6.
292 See infra text accompanying note 452-55 (discussing the fact that several state laws have
become so restrictive that some doubt whether the Army will ever be able to surmount local
opposition and obtain the necessary permits for constructing and operating the incinerators).
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a chemical facility for routine or challenge inspection and demand the
taking of samples or the execution of specified chemical operations,
those disruptions in the plant's ordinary operations could lead to un-
anticipated discharges, not covered by the applicable permit. Only if
the host facility knows in advance about the inspection and about the
inspectors' particular search algorithm could it even seek a temporary
variance in the applicable permit; otherwise, any resulting discharge
could be a violation of the facility's authority.293
Finally, any facility that houses any of one hundred specified haz-
ardous substances must prepare a risk management plan to detect,
prevent, and respond to any unplanned releases. Even if the facility
does not ordinarily emit any of those chemicals (and no CAA permit
is therefore mandatory), an emergency preparedness plan is nonethe-
less required where CWC inspections might cause an accidental
discharge. 294
C. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976295 estab-
lishes a comprehensive "cradle to grave" system for controlling the
generation, transportation, and disposal or treatment of hazardous
wastes.296 The act applies to a broad definition297 of "solid" wastes
that are "discarded" (i.e., not part of an ongoing industrial process).298
RCRA will thus presumptively apply to the elimination of most CW
agents; CW munitions, delivery systems, and other paraphernalia; and
samples taken by CWC inspectors during visits to American facilities.
The process of obtaining a RCRA permit for any of these items or
activities is a major undertaking-the application for the Tooele,
Utah, CW incineration facility, for example, included some fourteen
volumes of required data.299
293 See 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(g)(1) (1993); 57 Fed. Reg, 32306 (1992) (providing criteria for re-
sponse to "emergency" unplanned emissions); GUALTmERI ET AL., supra note 109, at 22 & n.145.
Some plant managers would reportedly be prepared to resist the inspectors' requests for sam-
pling if the procedure would violate accepted safety or other standards. Smithson, supra note
262, at 16-17.
294 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r) (West Supp. 1994); GUALTIERI ET AL., supra note 109, at 22.
295 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991i (West 1983 & Supp. 1994). See LArros & TOMAIN, supra note
197, at 193-202; FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 231-39.
296 See generally, AROESTY Er AL, supra note 197, at 26; BONINE & McGARrry, supra note
197, at 722-82; VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 197, at 36-41.
297 For RCRA purposes, solid waste can include liquids and gases, as well as ordinary solids.
42 U.S.C. § 6903 (27) (1988). To be designated as "hazardous," a substance must be identified
by the EPA as being toxic, carcinogenic, or otherwise dangerous. 40 C.F.R. § 261 (1993).
298 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1993). RCRA applies to materials that are discarded or abandoned or
that will not be used, reused, reclaimed, or recycled, and are being held only for future disposal.
Id.
299 IssuEs AFFECrMING, supra note 254, at 12.
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As with other federal pollution control laws, enforcement of
RCRA is partially delegated to the individual states, which may de-
velop their own hazardous waste programs, provided that the stan-
dards are at least as stringent as Congress's.30 Even federal facilities
are covered by RCRA state standards and are subject to substantive
standards, fines, and criminal penalties for noncompliance.30
Under an ongoing permit system, anyone who generates hazard-
ous wastes must keep detailed records, use and label appropriate con-
tainers, and either process the material on-site according to the best
available technology, or suitably prepare it for off-site transporta-
tion.302 Those who transport the wastes must comply with a rigid sy§-
tern of manifests, to ensure delivery only to permissible locations.
Facilities that treat, store, or dispose of the wastes are also bound by
detailed safety and containment regulations.
In the CWC context, the mandatory elimination of the stockpile,
the non-stockpile materials, and the various CW-related facilities will
immediately qualify a huge inventory of items for RCRA coverage. 303
Federal and state permits will thus be required for the handling, in-
cluding destruction, of the items, an elaborate undertaking. Any
transportation or even temporary holding of chemicals or CW-con-
taminated materials will require approval by various tiers of govern-
mental authorities.304
Moreover, since most proposals for the destruction of the inven-
tory-including even the JACADS incineration system-contemplate
the creation of a substantial quantity of irreducible solid wastes,305
eventual permanent storage at a suitable waste management location
will be required and will also be governed by RCRA.
RCRA also constrains the operation of the projected incinerators
in other important ways. That is, the physical construction activity re-
lated to any new hazardous waste management facility cannot be initi-
300 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1991); ENSCO v.
Dumas, 807 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986); BoNiNE & McGARrrY, supra note 189, at 769-80.
301 42 U.S.C.A. § 6961 (West Supp. 1994); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990);
Ohio v. Department of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Maine v. Department of
Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322 (D. Me. 1988); BONNE & McGAR1TY, supra note 189, at 779-80.
302 Somewhat relaxed standards apply to facilities that produce only small quantities of waste
products. BONINE & McGARTY, supra note 189, at 736-37.
303 The Army has begun working on the question of precisely when the CW materials to be
destroyed will be designated as RCRA hazardous wastes. 58 Fed. Reg. 25,045 (Apr. 26, 1993)
(containing projected rule; final action expected Sept. 1994); GUALTmRi Er AL, supra note 109,
at 1, n.2; Rouse, supra note 9, at 84-89.
304 NON-STOCKPILE REPoRT, supra note 147, at ii, 8.1-8.3.
305 Irreducible wastes include ash, salts derived from the chemicals, and possibly some par-
tially decontaminated metal parts from the munitions. See infra text accompanying notes 409-
414 (discussing types of wastes produced by baseline incineration).
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ated without a RCRA permit.30 6 In addition, before any CW
incinerator may lawfully be operated to destroy munitions in a routine
process, it must pass a RCRA "trial burn," and the federal "destruc-
tion removal efficiency" (DRE) standard requires the successful erad-
ication of at least 99.99 percent of the input agent.307 Some states
have further heightened this standard, requiring a DRE of 99.9999
percent.308 Reportedly, the JACADS facility regularly achieved (or,
in one case, almost achieved) these levels of operation,309 and the
Tooele, Utah unit is now undergoing trial bum certification.310
In addition, the inspection functions of the CWC may also trigger
RCRA concerns, where the inspectors elect to collect samples, wipes,
or other substances from the production process. If these are assem-
bled, analyzed, and disposed of at the inspected facility, then the facil-
ity itself becomes the "generator" of the resulting waste products and
is responsible for disposal of them, presumably as part of its regular
(permitted) waste stream.31' If the inspectors decide, however, to re-
306 IssuEs AFFEcro, supra note 254, at 11-13. The process for obtaining an RCRA permit
includes: submitting an application to the appropriate state agency, responding to the agency's
sequential notification of deficiencies in the application, submitting the state-approved applica-
tion to the federal EPA, incorporating EPA comments; providing a 45-day period for public
comments and a public hearing, and allowing possible public appeal of the state decision to issue
a permit. The entire process can take 16-36 months. Id See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, GAOINSIAD-90-155, OBSTACLES TO THE ARMY'S PLAN TO Da Roy OBSOLETE U.S.
STOCKILE 22-23 (May 1990) [hereinafter OBSTACLES TO TE PLAN]; Department of Defense's
Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Hearing Before Environmen Energy, and Natural Re-
sources Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1992)
(testimony of Jeffrey D. Denit) [hereinafter Government Operations Hearings].
307 MITRE, supra note 289, at C.6-7; Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 296; RECORD OF
DECISION, supra note 145, at 14. There are also RCRA standards for various non-agent smoke-
stack emissions. MITRE, supra note 289, at 3-4. See also PAT CoS'TNE & JOE THORNTON,
PLAYING wrrH FIRE 9 (1990) (critiquing the concept of using destruction removal efficiency as
the key criterion of incinerator effectiveness).
308 MITRE, supra note 289, at C-7. Kentucky and Indiana have established an agent DRE
standard of 99.9999%, and Utah has an agent DRE of 99.9999% for the liquid incinerator (see
infra text accompanying notes 398-406 for a discussion of the different JACADS incinerators),
and 99.999% for the other incinerators.
309 Id. at 3-4, 3-11, C.6-7 (reporting that JACADS achieved 99.9999% DRE or better in most
tests; the metal parts furnace achieved 99.9996% DRE, due to inadequate sensors and a low rate
of agent input).
310 Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 297 ("systemization" of Tooele facility-involving inte-
gration of different components of the plant, training the operating crews, etc.-started in Aug.
1993 and will last 18 months; toxic operations are scheduled to begin in Feb. 1995); Tooele Sys-
temization Effort Only 4 Months Away, CHEMICAL DEmILTrrARIzATON UPDATE, Apr. 1993, at 1
[hereinafter Tooele]; What About TOCDF?, CHEMICAL DEmLrrARIZATION UPDATE, July 1993,
at 4 [hereinafter TOCDF].
311 The handling of a different type of waste product may require a modification of the facil-
ity's existing RCRA permit. GAULTEi ET AL., supra note 109, at 30-32.
As with the Clean Air Act, there are procedures for temporary or emergency modifications
of the RCRA permits, and if the inspected facility has sufficient advance notice, these may be
applicable. However, in the case of short-notice challenge inspections, and where the inspectors
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move the samples from the facility for analysis in an independent lab-
oratory, then the receiving laboratory may be the location where the
chemical is ultimately converted into "waste." In that scenario, the
laboratory, as the generator, would be responsible for RCRA
compliance.312
Under RCRA, the EPA or any private citizen may commence a
civil action against a party whose hazardous waste activities constitute
an "imminent hazard"; even a risk of harm, as distinguished from ac-
tual damage, is sufficient, and a strict liability standard has been
applied.313
D. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980,3 14 as revised by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986,315 provides requirements, mecha-
nisms, and funding for the cleanup of old hazardous waste disposal
sites.316 In general, the parties who created the leaking mess are fi-
nancially responsible for stabilizing and remediating it; if they are not
available to do so, the statute creates a federal trust account (the
elect not to provide advance warning of their intention to collect particular samples, the host
facility may have difficulty staying within its RCRA permit or meeting the time standards for a
modification. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.42 (1993).
The Army did receive important RCRA variances from the regional and national EPA of-
fices, easing the standards for the test operation of the JACADS facility and also allowing site
preparation for construction at the Anniston, Alabama location to proceed more promptly than
would ordinarily be allowed. GAO auditors, however, have cautioned that the Army should not
count upon being able to obtain similar procedural or substantive RCRA modifications in the
future. Government Operations Hearings, supra note 306, at 15-18 (testimony of Richard Davis);
IssuEs AFFECrING, supra note 254, at 30-31. The regional EPA may also have granted JACADS
a novel interpretation of allowable "exceedances" beyond the RCRA permit in the operation of
the incinerators during the testing process, approving emissions that would not likely be toler-
ated at facilities inside the mainland United States. Government Operations Hearings, supra
note 306, at 133 (testimony of Walter L. Busbee); CosTNER, supra note 242, at 12.
312 See GtJALTIERI ET AL., supra note 109, at 26, 28-30.
313 United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
848 (1987); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1982); Dague v. City of Burlington, 733
F. Supp. 23 (D. Vt. 1990); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark.
1980).
314 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). See generally BONINE & McGARrrY,
supra note 189, at 907-1028; FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 240-59; AROESTY ET AL.,
supra note 197, at 27.
315 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); AROETY ET AL., supra note 197, at
28.
316 CERCLA applies more broadly than RCRA, and covers any concentration of broadly-
defined "hazardous substances," even some that might not meet the RCRA definition. B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89 (D. Conn. 1988); LArros & ToMAiN, supra note 197, at
202-03.
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"superfund") to bear the expense. The act may be enforced through
litigation brought by the EPA, a state, or a citizen.
The primary applicability of CERCLA to the CWC concerns the
disposal of former CW production facilities and the identification and
neutralization of locations where non-stockpile CW items have long
been buried or abandoned. The treaty imposes obligations to elimi-
nate these items promptly and under international inspection; the stat-
ute creates some impediments (but also some facilitating measures)
that might affect the destruction process. CERCLA also applies in
creating an obligation to clean up hazardous wastes after spills or
other accidents, such as a CW agent leak or a transportation mis-
hap,317 and it also covers the disposal of old and obsolete CW-related
materials, even those no longer suitable for weapons applications.318
E. Clean Water Act (CWA)
The Clean Water Act of 1972, as amended, articulates the goals of
eliminating the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters and of
generally preserving the purity of America's water supply.319 Struc-
tured similarly to the Clean Air Act, the CWA authorizes the EPA to
establish effluent limits and instructs the states to define ambient
water quality objectives. Dischargers must hold a permit, satisfying
both sets of standards. 320
The Army's current incineration-based model for destroying the
CW arsenal does not generate any liquid wastes that would be gov-
erned by CWA standards.321 Therefore, under the current plans, the
greatest intersection between CWA and the treaty would, once again,
concern the operation of the verification functions. If, as above, an
inspection resulted in the discharge of liquids directly or indirectly
into a river or groundwater, and if the release were not authorized by
a permit, there would be a violation. As with other pollution abate-
ment systems, there is a procedure for temporary and exigent vari-
ances in a permit.322 If some novel methodology other than
incineration is eventually adopted for destruction of portions of the
317 BONINE & MCGARITY, supra note 189, at 742-44; NoN-STocKPItE REPORT, supra note
147, at 8.1-83.
318 ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 154, at 14.
319 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). See generally FINDLEY & FARBER,
supra note 197, at 132-52; VEmIICATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 197, at 42-45.
320 See BONINE & MCGARITY, supra note 189, at 258-60; LArros & TGMAIN, supra note 197,
at 170-83.
321 UNITED STATES ARMY CHEMICAL MATERIEL DESTRUCTION AGENCY, SAFELY DESTROY-
ING AMERICA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 13 (explaining that the only
water discharge from the JACADS-style facility is from the sanitary sewer system, which does
not come into contact with chemical agents).
322 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.5, .62 (1993). See GUALTIERI ET AL, supra note 109, at 25; LArros &
TOMAIN, supra note 197, at 176.
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CW arsenal, and if that alternative technology involves a quantity of
liquid discharges, then the CWA restrictions could play a major role in
shaping the implementation of the operations. 323
F. Other Environmental Laws Relevant to the CWC
Depending upon the exact technology or combination of technol-
ogies that are ultimately selected to conduct the CW eliminations re-
quired by the treaty, a variety of other environmental laws might be
implicated. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1973
(TSCA)324 regulates the production and marketing of some one hun-
dred thousand chemicals, 325 including several CW precursors. 326 If
any of the elimination methodologies produces new hazardous chemi-
cal substances as an intermediate stage or by generating recycled
chemicals for commercial availability, this legislation would be di-
rectly applicable. Moreover, TSCA regulates the burning of hazard-
ous substances such as PCBs (some of which are embedded in the
fiberglass shipping and firing tubes for the M55 CW rockets) 327 and,
like RCRA, it establishes percentage removal criteria for incinera-
tors.328 Similarly, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act 329 would become applicable to the production and handling of
any chemicals with pesticide uses.
In more extended circumstances, implementers of the CWC
may brush up against diverse other statutes, including the Noise
Control Act of 1972,33 0 the National Historic Preservation Act of
323 See generally BoINE & MCGARTY, supra note 189, at 255-375; LArros & TOMAiN, supra
note 197, at 168-89.
324 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2692 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). See AROES'rY Er AL, supra note
197, at 23-24; BONmNE & McGARrry, supra note 189, at 707-21; VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 197, at 15-16.
325 Kyle Olson, Domestic Regulation of the U.S. Chemical Industry and Its Application to a
Chemical Weapons Ban, in NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FuTuRE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVE-ION 102-03 (Thomas Stock & Ronald Sutherland eds., 1990). Roughly 1000 new chem-
icals are added to the TSCA coverage each year. Id.
326 Chemical weapons themselves may be exempted from TSCA under the waiver provisions
of 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (1988).
327 PEIS, supra note 130, at 1-19. PCBs are polychlorinated biphenyls, found to be carcino-
genic. Id. Not all of the projected eight incinerators in the continental United States will handle
the M55 rockets, so this aspect of TSCA will not be relevant everywhere. Rouse, supra note 9, at
40.
328 TSCA's DRE standard for PCBs requires 99.9999% removal. During the JACADS trial
burn, the monitors were not sufficiently sensitive to confirm the achievement of this level of
destruction, but the Army concluded that comparisons with commercial incinerators revealed
JACADS to perform far better, and the Department of Health and Human Services reported
that any PCB emissions were not a health hazard. PEIS, supra note 130, supp. D.11. Critics,
however, contest those conclusions. See infra text accompanying notes 425-34.
329 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1994). See AROESTY Er AL., supra note 197,
at 25; BONINE & McGARrrY, supra note 189, at 671-86.
330 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1988).
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1966,331 the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974,332 and others.333 While
none of these provisions is likely to impact upon the chemical weap-
ons disarmament operations in a major way, the CWC will spawn a
large volume of construction, demolition, and other environment-af-
fecting actions, especially at the eight current storage locations, and
these events could have diverse consequences implicating a host of
statutory regimes.
Of special note is the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act,3 34
which regulates the interstate movement of dangerous substances.
The Army's current plan-to destroy the CW stockpile in situ, by con-
structing incineration facilities at each of the eight locations where
munitions are currently housed-largely avoids this topic.3 35 But if, as
some have proposed, the sites having the smallest concentration of
weaponry were treated differently-and, in any event, as non-stock-
pile materials are delicately transported to disposal locations-the na-
tional and local regulations regarding interstate shipments will
become more important335 The transport of even very small samples
collected by the inspectors would be problematic under this Act,3 3 7
and the difficulties would multiply if the CWC's implementing Organ-
ization sought to ship hazardous samples internationally.338
331 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470-470x(6) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
332 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(f)-3000)(26).
333 See generally PEIS, supra note 130, at 1-21, supp. F3.
334 49 U.S.C.A. 1801-1819 (West 1976 & 1994 Supp.); 49 C.F.R. 171-80 (1992). The statute
requires that the Army consult closely with the Department of Transportation, the Department
of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency regarding any ship-
ments of CW hazardous materials. PEIS, supra note 130, at 1-18, 1-21, supp. G.3-23. In addi-
tion, the Center for Environmental Health and Injury Control, a constituent of the National
Center for Disease Control, has statutory responsibility for review and oversight of any Defense
Department plans to transport or dispose of CW, under 50 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (West 1991) (con-
taining Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization of 1970), Carnes & Watson, supra note 129,
at 658. See generally VEumchAroN TacnooGy, supra note 197, at 46-54; GUALTIERI ET AL.,
supra note 109, at 42-43; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 6923 (West Supp. 1994) (containing RCRA
provisions regarding transport of hazardous materials); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (West 1991) (restrict-
ing transportation of CW and BW agents between military installations).
335 In fact, Congress has by statute prohibited the Army even from further study of relocation
options, so no additional evaluation of the methodologies for safely transporting CW away from
any of the eight continental locations has been undertaken since the PEIS. 1992 Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-139 § 8075A(a); S. Rep. No. 154, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); H.R. Rep. No. 328, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (containing amendment 167).
336 The statute and regulations provide that these types of hazardous materials may not be
transported on aircraft or on passenger-carrying trains and must be wrapped in special protec-
tive packaging. GUALTIERI ET AL, supra note 109, at 42-43.
337 States as well as the federal government regulate the carriage of hazardous substances, but
the Department of Transportation may override any contrary state regulations. National Tank
Thuck Carriers v. Burke, 535 F. Supp. 509 (D.RI. 1982); BoNrNE & McGAPrMY, supra note 189,
at 778 n.j.
338 BomNE & McGARrTY, supra note 189, at 742; GUALTMIm Er AL-, supra note 109, at 43;
IMPLEM-rNATION MANUAL, supra note 197, at 89, 96. Regulations pursuant to RCRA also gov-
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G. Other Relevant Legislation
Largely beyond the scope of this Article, but important nonethe-
less to the effective implementation of the CWC, are a range of other
social laws that may circumscribe certain treaty operations.33 9 For ex-
ample, the statutory and regulatory network established under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act340 will affect the conduct of ver-
ification inspections and the operation of CW disposal facilities. In-
spectors and their equipment cannot be allowed to jeopardize the
safety of the workers in the facilities being inspected, and designated
prudential standards must be followed. In the same vein, the design
and functioning of the CW destruction installations will have to pro-
ceed with OSHA requirements in mind, lest the federal government
run afoul of its own regulations.3 41
In addition, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act342 has acknowledged the importance-especially for facili-
ties that deal with selected dangerous materials-of adequate emer-
gency preparedness and response. Under this law, the operators of
covered facilities housing "extremely hazardous substances" 343 must
divulge relevant information, and states are empowered to ensure that
em exports of hazardous wastes, 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50-57 (1993), and there is a growing interna-
tional law restricting transport of those products. Basel Convention, supra note 174; GENERAL
ACCOUNTMNG OFFICE, supra note 145, at 11-15 (explaining that most of the containers that the
Army had intended to use for transporting the CW stockpile from Germany to Johnston Atoll in
1990 could not meet the standards established by the International Maritime Organization's ap-
plicable codes for the shipment of dangerous goods); VERIFnCATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note
197, at 51-54. See also id. at 62-64 for the more general U.S. laws restricting exports of weap-
ons-related items and materials.
339 Data reporting and control have been key issues in many U.S. environmental laws, as
statutes require chemical or other industries to submit to the federal government detailed ac-
counts of their production processes, statistics, and safeguards. At the same time, these regula-
tory regimes provide stringent protections against the unauthorized release of this confidential
business information to competitors or others. The CwC, too, will mandate the submission of
detailed, voluminous-and commercially sensitive-information, and one of industry's key con-
cerns about the treaty was the importance of ensuring that adequate controls would be in place
to prevent the release of proprietary data that could compromise a firm's competitive advan-
tages. The treaty negotiations exhausted considerable time and attention on this issue, produc-
ing a detailed "Confidentiality Annex" to the treaty to specify the procedures for safeguarding
the reports, but some industry spokespersons remain skeptical about the stringency of the re-
gime in operation. CWC, supra note 1, Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information;
Olson, supra note 325, at 106; Olson, supra note 64 at 21-25. See supra text accompanying notes
118-22 (regarding protection of secrecy).
340 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-673 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1993); ARoESTY ET
AL., supra note 197, at 25-26; VERIFICATON TECHNOLOY, supra note 197, at 17-21.
341 GUALTIERI ET AL, supra note 109, at 38-42; VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 197,
at 19; Exec. Order No. 12,196, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,769 (1980); 29 C.F.R. § 1960.16 (1993).
342 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988); BREGMAN & MAcaENrrnTml, supra note 198, at 151-54;
VERFCATION TEcHNoLooY, supra note 197, at 55-61 (discussing several federal and state laws
relevant to notification and cleanup of accidents involving hazardous materials).
343 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a) (1988).
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procedures exist, and that people are trained, to recognize potentially
dangerous situations, to react to them, and to inform the neighbors
about the hazards.344 Again, the chemical weapons disposal opera-
tions under the CWC are not any type of a special case under this
statute, but the generally applicable standards will be relevant during
the process of disposing of CW materials and during the conduct of
CWC inspections.345
IV. RESOLVING LEGAL CoNFLIcTs: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The conjunction of the Chemical Weapons Convention with the
pre-existing corpus of American environmental jurisprudence poses
two separate areas of potential doctrinal conflict: treaty vs. statute
and federal vs. state. This section of the Article briefly analyzes both
these legal antagonisms, under the rubric of the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause 3 46
A. Treaties and Statutes
It is now well settled that international agreements and congres-
sional enactments are instruments of equivalent legal dignity beneath
the Constitution.347 Therefore, the newer pronouncement-the later
document in time-will prevail.348 In this instance, the CWC will pro-
vide the lex posterior (at least for now),349 and in the event of an in-
tractable conflict, any prior United States environmental protection
statutes would recede.350
American courts confronted with this type of conflict, however,
have been reluctant to invalidate either category of instrument and
have strained mightily to weave a construction of the sequential docu-
344 The Army has increased from $114 million in 1988 to $337 million in 1991 its estimate of
the costs for adequate emergency preparedness programs at the CW destruction sites. The funds
will provide improved communication, protection and warning equipment, and will support bi-
ennial emergency response exercises at the sites. LiKELY TO CONTINUE, supra note 242, at 14-
15; OBSTACLES TO TnE PLAN, supra note 306, at 29-32.
345 GUALTIERI ET AL., supra note 109, at 33-37; PEIS, supra note 130, at supp. L.3-29.
346 U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
347 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 203, §§ 115, 302(2).
348 A subsequent statute will supersede a prior treaty for purposes of domestic U.S. law, but
does not invalidate the treaty on the international plane or constitute a valid excuse for breech.
Id. § 115.
349 The instability of the last-in-time rule suggests that there could, in principle, be a rotating
cycle of recency, especially if a statute were periodically re-enacted and if a treaty were amended
or supplanted by a newer agreement.
350 The subsequent treaty does not quite "amend" or "repeal" the inconsistent prior statute; it
simply displaces it as the binding source of internal U.S. law. Therefore, if the treaty were for
some reason deemed inapplicable (eg., if it were suspended or terminated), the prior statute
would automatically re-emerge as the binding provision.
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ments that would allow both to be effectuated simultaneously.35'
Rather than supersede wholesale the provisions of existing United
States environmental law, therefore, courts reviewing the CWC would
be more likely to find or create a sufficient harmony of interests such
that all the relevant bodies of law could be accommodated.
Regarding the CWC, that accommodation should not be too diffi-
cult to find, at least in many instances. The CWC, in fact, contains
explicit references requiring its parties to comply with their applicable
national environmental protection requirements, including obtaining
the relevant permits, in the conduct of verification inspections-a
seeming submission to the concerns of state and local governments.352
On the other hand, the treaty also does require that the dismantlings
and inspections actually be conducted as specified-local environ-
mental impediments would not provide a valid excuse for bovine
nonperformance.353
For their part, United States environmental protection laws are
not intended to stand up rigidly against overriding foreign affairs im-
peratives, and they generally do not purport to make environmental-
ism any kind of absolute national priority.354 On the other hand,
NEPA and its progeny also do not automatically defer to ordinary
foreign relations considerations, even when national security values
are said to be implicated. 355 The statutory language of NEPA, for ex-
ample, does not carve out any explicit or automatic exemptions for
foreign affairs or national security concerns.356 Occasionally, another
351 United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); REsTATE-
MENT, supra note 203, § 114.
352 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Parts II.B.11(d), II.E.43, IV.(A).C.32, VI.C.7.
353 In fact, the United States has a fundamental interest in ensuring that a party's domestic
laws-even its important environmental protection statutes-do not provide an easy "escape
clause," permitting the country to evade full compliance with all the details of the CWC's verifi-
cation apparatus. The United States will be concerned to find a way to effectuate both its do-
mestic environmental laws and its international obligations under the treaty, so it can credibly
insist upon holding other countries to an equally high standard.
354 McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971) (finding that NEPA does not create
jurisdiction to challenge continued storage of chemical weapons at Rocky Mountain arsenal).
355 Catholic Action of Hawaii v. Weinberger, 643 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 139
(1981) (holding that EIS would have to be prepared if the Navy proposes to store nuclear weap-
ons in Hawaii); Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that EIS is required for
decisions regarding deployment of MX missiles); Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555
F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that Navy must comply with NEPA in making
decisions regarding constructing a base for Trident nuclear submarines); Scientists' Inst. v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748
F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
movement of chemical weapons from Germany only limited requires NEPA documentation);
Cruden, supra note 171, at 1192-1213.
356 Congress drafted NEPA with sweeping language, not inserting any explicit exemptions
directly relevant to a national security operation such as CW destruction, beyond the general
commitment to pursue environmentalism "where consistent with the foreign policy of the United
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subsequent statute has created an ad hoc exemption for a particular
project, such as the Trans-Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline, when the leg-
islature judged that compliance with the usual EIS procedures would
be unduly burdensome or time-consuming.3 7 Occasionally, too, the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has authorized individual
waivers of the ordinary NEPA processes, as for accelerated military
emergency activities in 1990 and 1991 in conjunction with Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.358 But in general, full EIS documen-
tation and compliance with all the other trappings of American envi-
ronmental law are required, even when that conformity threatens to
delay, disrupt, or effectively preclude a commercially important enter-
States." 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(F) (West 1988). Nevertheless, courts have tended to read some types
of self-restraint into the statute when paramount international relations considerations are at
stake. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1366 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Commission for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding
that no EIS is necessary for decision to conduct nuclear test, where delay in detonation would
jeopardize national security); Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1974) (limiting
NEPA coverage of proposed submarine communications system).
In addition, agency regulations implementing NEPA reserve the right to modify the usual
EIS requirements (such as by providing the documents on a delayed timetable, or by excerpting
classified material or placing it into a nonpublic annex) when necessary to serve security func-
tions. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(C) (1993); 42 Fed. Reg. 5115-16 (1977) (ACDA regulations); Cruden,
supra note 171, at 1179.
357 See 15 U.S.C. § 719f (1988); Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that
statute limits the scope of EIS required for MX missile program, excluding certain factors from
consideration); Friends of the Earth v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dis-
missed, 725 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Colon v. Carter, 633 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1980); Earth Re-
sources Co. of Alaska v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 617 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Cruden, supra note 171, at 1196-97; Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 28-29; see also De-
fense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 10 U.S.C.A. § 2687 note (West 1994) (largely
exempting defense base modifications from NEPA coverage); Department of Defense Appropri-
ations Act of 1983, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (West 1994) (making NEPA less relevant to decisions
regarding deployment of the MX missile).
A statute's exemption from NEPA must be explicit; courts have not favored the argument
that ordinary legislation constitutes an implied waiver of the EIS requirements, unless a "clear
and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists .. " Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers
Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776,788-91 (1976). See also Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346,367
(D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); 40 C.F.R. 1500.6 (1993).
Among the most recent proposals to waive NEPA by statute in favor of a military program
is the pending bill which would allow the Navy to transport, store, and handle spent nuclear fuel
in Idaho and elsewhere without first preparing an EIS. Keith Schneider, Bill Would Exempt
Navy From Environment Law, N.Y. Timrs, July 22, 1993, at A19. Among the most recent ad-
ministrative waivers was the decision to allow the import of spent nuclear fuel from Belgium
without an EIS as an emergency measure to prevent Belgium and Britain from reprocessing the
material. R. Jeffrey Smith, Energy Dept Waives Rules to Import Spent Nuclear Fuel, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 27, 1993, at A15.
358 Pentagon & CEQ Report (National Public Radio Broadcast, Morning Edition, Feb. 19,
1991) (transcription on file with author) (discussing that Pentagon and CEQ waived NEPA com-
pliance on two occasions: to allow additional takeoffs of transport aircraft from Westover Air
Force Base in Massachusetts, and to test airborne equipment for clearing land mines).
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prise or a project for which the federal government has a major re-
sponsibility and investment.
In a similar vein, CEQ and other agency regulations specify that
no EIS documentation will be necessary where the agency's contem-
plated action is "mandatory," as where an international agreement
imposes nondiscretionary obligations upon the United States and de-
prives the executive branch of any legal alternatives for executing
those commitments.35 9 The language of those escape clauses, how-
ever, suggests little relief in the case of the CWC. That is, although
the United States will be legally bound to destroy the CW stockpile,
and accorded no options about effectuating that policy, the treaty does
not specify any particular methodology for accomplishing the elimina-
tions. Therefore, the government may still logically be required under
domestic law to prepare environmental impact statements regarding
the specific dismantling technologies and locations that it has volunta-
rily selected.
Some of the environmental statutes surveyed above also contain
explicit waiver provisions of other sorts, allowing the government to
escape full compliance if specified overriding policies are at stake. For
example, under RCRA,
The President may exempt any solid waste management facility of any
department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from
compliance with such a requirement if he determines it to be in the para-
mount interest of the United States to do so.... Any exemption shall be
for a period not in excess of one year, but additional exemptions may be
granted for periods not to exceed one year upon the President's making
a new determination. 360
While these variances may be useful to implementers of the
CWC, they were surely not crafted for precisely that type of eventual-
359 42 Fed. Reg. 5115-16 (1977) (ACDA regulations distinguishing "mandatory" actions re-
quired by an international agreement, for which no EIS would be prepared, from other treaty
obligations, which still leave the United States a choice about alternative implementation proce-
dures, for which an EIS would be appropriate).
360 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988); RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 145, at 30.
Cognate waiver provisions are included in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (1988) &
42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(i)(4) (West Supp. 1994), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1323(a) (West Supp. 1994), and other statutes. Those two statutes contain, in addi-
tion, another waiver provision applicable to "weaponry," granting the President authority to
grant more extended exemptions.
Exec. Order No. 12,088,3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,580, Jan. 23,
1987, reprinted following 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (1994), requires that federal agencies conform to
the same federal and state environmental protection standards that are applicable to private
persons. It also provides authority for the President to waive that compliance when necessary
"in the interest of national security" or otherwise "in the paramount interests of the United
States." d § 7.
See Cruden, supra note 171, at 1185, 1191 (indicating that the only occasion when this
waiver authority has been exercised was to relieve Fort Allen, Puerto Rico, from compliance
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ity, and they are at least partially inapt for it. The waivers were not
designed to be triggered by important (but soon-to-bhe-commonplace)
international events such as routine or challenge inspection of a wide
range of public and private United States chemical facilities, and they
do not seem to contemplate the type of widely occurring short notice
and short duration exemptions that might soon become necessary.3 61
B. The States and the CWC
No state government would have a special interest in frustrating
the effective implementation of the CWC, per se, but it is quite possi-
ble that a local community might weigh the balance between treaty
compliance and environmental protection differently from the na-
tional leadership. Under the Constitution, national and international
standards of the sort under consideration here would trump any con-
trary state and municipal provisions,362 and the national government is
empowered to pre-empt an entire topic, by explicitly excluding state
legislation, or by occupying the field with comprehensive federal
law.363
In fact, however, the strategy of much United States environmen-
tal law has been precisely the opposite: to establish minimum federal
standards and procedures applicable nationwide, but also to allow the
states to graft, on their own, more stringent provisions.364 Under the
Clean Air, Clean Water, RCRA and other programs, private or gov-
ernmental entities that wish to engage in the regulated behaviors are
required to conform to both the federal and the state constraints.3 65
While it may seem odd for the national government to have ceded
with the water, air, noise, and solid waste pollution abatement standards at-the time of the 1980
Cuban-Haitian refugee operations).
361 Cruden, supra note 171, at 1188 (describing that in signing Executive Order 12,088 (re-
quiring that federal facilities comply with federal, state, and local environmental protection re-
quirements to the same extent as private persons), President Carter declared that he would
personally review all requests for federal agency exemptions from environmental laws, and
would approve waivers only when paramount national interests were at stake).
362 Longstanding case law powerfully excludes U.S. states from disrupting (and, in many re-
spects, from participating at all in) the international life of the country. United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("In respect of. , . our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear. As to such purposes the State... does not exist."); Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
432 (1968) (barring "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitu-
tion entrusts to the President and the Congress").
363 The federal government may displace state actions via statute, treaty, regulation, or simply
a comprehensive statement of national policy; even if the state's putative lawmaking is not truly
"inconsistent" with the federal government's international activities, the state involvement may
be precluded under the concept of preemption. RE TATEMENT, supra note 203, § 1 reporters'
note 5, § 115 cmt. e; FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 59-85; Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151 (1978).
364 BONINE & McGARrrY, supra note 189, at 382 n.e; Cruden, supra note 171, at 1184.
365 BONINE & McGARry, supra note 189, at 417-19.
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such authority to the states, as it is inconsistent with the notion that
ecological effects are interconnected nationally and internationally,
and are not matters of strictly local concern, that type of delegation
has been the recurrent pattern. The national government, of course, is
empowered to alter that balance of power-to retrieve more decision-
making authority for itself via ordinary legislation or regulation366 -
but that type of re-assertion of power ordinarily carries a political
price, too.
Even more striking, the federal government itself has submitted
to the jurisdiction and control of the state environmental agencies, 367
reversing the usual federalist presumption that state governments can-
not hamstring the national leadership.3 68 Via statute369 and executive
order,3 70 the federal government is constrained to adhere to state sub-
stantive anti-pollution requirements to the same extent as a private
person, across a wide range of activities, presumptively including facil-
ities such as the Army's proposed CW incinerators. 371 Again, the na-
tional government would be constitutionally empowered to shuck off
those restrictions, but has not yet found it expedient to do so.
Thus, under existing law, the governors, state environmental pro-
tection agencies, and even local administrators are empowered to set
the pace and to create the conditions and impediments for the Army's
construction, dismantling, and inspection functions required under the
CWC.
V. OPTIONS FOR DISMANTLING CHEMICAL WEAPONS
A. Failed Alternatives
For many years, the United States and other countries have exer-
cised, or at least contemplated, a variety of CW disposal methods that
are now widely viewed as foolish, impractical, or environmentally un-
366 Id. at 778 n.j, 779.
367 Id. 189, at 866-67; Cruden, supra note 171, at 1184.
368 Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988); Department of Energy v.
Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992). See also Navy Air Station Hit with Fme Under New Federal Law
Provisions, [May 1993-Apr. 1994] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 190 (May 28, 1993) (explaining
that Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992 waives federal sovereign immunity defense in
actions brought by a state or the EPA).
369 42 U.S.C.A. § 7418 (West Supp. 1993) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1323 (West 1986)
(Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6961 (West Supp. 1993) (RCRA).
370 Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4,247 (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg.
26,967 (1977); Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (1978); Exec. Order 12,580, 52 Fed.
Reg. 2,923 (1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993). See also BREGMAN
& MACKENTHUN, supra note 198, at 18.
371 PEIS, supra note 130, at 1-19. Army regulations require that all the necessary permits be
obtained prior to the start of construction. Id.
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acceptable.372 As noted above, substantial quantities of abandoned
chemical munitions were simply buried, often in ordinary public or
military landfills, with shockingly poor procedures for posting a haz-
ard warning or permanently recording the activity.373 Ocean dumping
has also been a popular expedient, especially for disposing of captured
Nazi stockpiles immediately following World War ,374 and was pur-
sued through the following decades, off the coasts of Alaska, Califor-
nia, and Florida.375 Too often, these lethal weapons were scuttled in
shallow, turbulent waters such as the North Sea and the Baltic Sea,
and ordnance still occasionally percolates to the surface in an unlucky
fishing vessel's nets. 376 Congress finally forbade United States ocean
dumping of chemicals in 1972,377 and the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency has recently commissioned a report concerning the loca-
tion and current status of ocean-dumped CW.378 Open pit burning of
chemicals was also conducted as recently as twenty years ago, appar-
ently oblivious to the hazards of the smoke plume and residuals.379
More prudent methods of disposing of unwanted CW have in-
cluded attempts to chemically neutralize the agents by forcing them
372 Rouse, supra note 9, at 35, reports that the "Army has evaluated over 300 destruction
concepts over the past several years in an attempt to find the safest, most practical method to
dispose of these [chemical] agents and munitions."
373 See supra text accompanying notes 151-57 (discussing NoN-SToCxPILE REPORT).
374 Allied forces disposed of some 250,000 tons of German chemical munitions by sea burial
in 1945. U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL MATERIEL DEsTUCrnoN AGENCY, INTERIM SURVEY AND
ANALYSiS REPORT ON NON-STOcKPILE CHEMICAL MATERIEL PROGRAM 16 (1993) [hereinafter
DRAFr NON-STocpiuLE REPORT]. See Fredrik Laurin, Scandanavia's Underwater Tune Bomb,
BULL. ATOM. ScxENTnsrs, Mar. 1991, at 11.
375 SIEGEL, supra note 256, at 12. From the 1940s through the 1960s, the U.S. program, de-
nominated Operation CHASE (an acronym for "Cut Holes And Sink 'Ema"), proceeded by load-
ing excess chemical weaponry onto obsolete Liberty ships, towing them out to sea, and scuttling
them into ocean trenches of the continental shelf. Satchell, supra note 4; Silton, supra note 9, at
18.
376 Laurin, supra note 374; Phillip Knightley, Dumps of Death, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON)
MAG., Apr. 5, 1992, at 26; Axel W. Krohn, The Challenge of Dumped Chemical Ammunition in
the Baltic Sea, 25 SECURITY DIALOGUE 93 (1994).
377 The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86
Stat. 1052; Pub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.A.); 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1431-39 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994). The statute was sparked by a
report of the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council, which concluded that
the environmental effects of ocean dumping were unknown and should be avoided. PEIS, supra
note 130, at 2-85. More recently, the related practice of "ocean incineration" (i.e., burning toxic
wastes on a sea-based platform or vessel) has been outlawed, too. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,058 (1974)
(interpreting Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-688; 33 U.S.C.A. 1414b);
Seaburn Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 712 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1989); Micronesia
Memorandum, supra note 145, at 10.
378 See DRAFr NON-STocKPILE REPORT, supra note 374, at 16.
379 Rouse, supra note 9, at 34-35; William F. Zorzi, Jr., Army Is Learning to Destroy Chemical
Weapons, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 1, 1989, at K5; Morrison, supra note 196.
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through a series of chemical reactions that denature the toxins.380 The
United States successfully destroyed armaments loaded with the nerve
agent GB at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado during the middle
1970s in this way381 and more recently the United States has experi-
mented with advanced neutralization programs at the Chemical Agent
Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) at Tooele, Utah.3 82 A total of
over eight million pounds of chemical agent has been eliminated via
this process.383 However, many experts have concluded that chemical
neutralization (at least when attempted through the prior generations
of chemical technology) was defective, in being slow, possibly revers-
ible, incompletely successful in destroying all the active agent, and
producing substantial quantities of toxic waste products which-while
not suitable for weaponry applications-still required expensive and
environmentally problematic further treatment or storage.384 None-
theless, the concept of relying upon some form of chemical neutraliza-
tion process to assist with the dismantling of chemical weapons is far
from extinct.385
More exotic disposal mechanisms have also been propounded.
For example, it might be thought possible to place chemical weapons
into a large, solid cavern deep underground and then detonate a nu-
clear weapon in their midst, vaporizing the CW stockpile with an ap-
pealing "use a weapon to eliminate a weapon" irony.386 Some have
380 NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 54-62. The term "neutralization" is used in a
generic sense to encompass all chemical reactions that counteract the toxicity of the agent, re-
sulting in relatively innocuous products. Some of these are true "neutralizations," in which the
resulting materials are inert salts. PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-85 to 2-86, supp. D.3-8.
381 A wide variety of chemical munitions was eliminated at Rocky Mountain Arsenal during
two operations spanning Oct. 1973-Nov. 1976. In each case, the liquid GB was drained from the
weapon or container, poured into a reaction vat, and mixed with a caustic solution of sodium
hvdroxide. The resulting brine was dried, and the salts were disposed of in a land fill. In some
phases of the operation, an incinerator was also used to decontaminate metal parts and destroy
scrap. PEIS, supra note 130, at supp. D.5-6.
382 Between Sept. 1979 and July 1982, almost 14,000 M55 rockets and almost 13,000 155mm
and 105mm CW projectiles were demilitarized at Tooele, using procedures adapted from those
developed at Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Id. supp. D.6-7; OTA ALTERNATIVES, supra note 140,
at 31-33.
383 PEIS, supra note 130, supp. D.4.
384 Id. at 2.85-86; OTA ALTERNATIvES, supra note 140, at 31-33; Rouse, supra note 9, at 35-
36. Neutralization produced five pounds of waste products for each pound of agent destroyed
(as compared to 1.5 pounds of waste products generated by comparable incineration programs).
PEIS, supra note 130. The Army has concluded that any neutralization methodology should be
measured against four key criteria, including destruction of virtually all the input agent, and the
inability of the resulting chemicals to be themselves used for CW purposes. ARmY ALTERNA-
TIRVES, supra note 249, at 13.
385 NoN-STocKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, at 9-7; OTA ALTERNATIVES, supra note 140;
NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129; NAS STOCKPILE COMMrIrEE, supra note 140, at 109, 159,
1226.
386 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-86. The Army has rejected this proposal as infeasible. Id. In
addition, a 1992 statute restricts the types of nuclear explosions that the United States may con-
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even pondered the concept of loading the unwanted munitions onto a
rocket and firing it into space.3 87
B. The Army's Current Stockpile Destruction Program
In contrast to the above scenarios, the U.S. Army currently pro-
poses to destroy the existing American CW stockpile via a state-of-
the-art incineration process388 This process builds upon the Army's
experience in furnace use gained at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colo-
rado since 1972389 and at CAMDS in Tooele, Utah since 1979.390
These programs have been the basis for the design of the first full-
scale, fully-integrated prototype incineration facility, the $240 mil-
lion391 Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS)
duct, excluding this type of event, and President Clinton has additionally declared a moratorium
on all nuclear explosions for any purposes. White House, Background Information: U.S. Policy
on Nuclear Testing and a Comprehensive Test Ban (July 3, 1993). However, some inside Russia
have become very interested in the possibility of selling nuclear explosion services, including
adapting them for the purpose of eliminating nuclear weapons. Tariq Rauf, Cleaning Up with a
Bang, BULL ATOM. ScIENTISTS, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 9, 47.
387 NRC ALTERNATIVwES, supra note 129, at 33. The incalculable dangers of a rocket misfire
or accident would rule out this option. The Army and others have also investigated other "novel
concepts," but found none appealing. PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-86; NRC ALTERNATIvES, supra
note 129.
388 See generally, PEIS, supra note 130, supp. C (describing the design of the demilitarization
plant); Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 7-8.
389 PEIS, supra note 130, supp. D.8-10. Over six million pounds of mustard agents, mostly
from ton containers, were destroyed at Rocky Mountain Arsenal between July 1972 and March
1974. Id. See also Government Operations Hearings, supra note 306, at 94 (statement of Walter
L. Busbee) (indicating that a total of 7000 tons of CW agents have been destroyed-half by
incineration and half by neutralization-over the past two decades).
390 PEIS, supra note 130, supp. D.10-14. Nerve agents GB and VX from rockets and ton
containers, were destroyed in CAMDS experiments between March 1981 and August 1986. Id.
See also id. supp. D.18-21; Vicki Kemper, Deadly Debris, COMMON CAUSE MAG., July-Aug.
1990, at 20 (experience with accidental releases of agent at CAMDS). CAMDS (which is ap-
proximately one-third the size of the facilities that the Army seeks to build at the eight current
storage sites, Rouse, supra note 9, at 37) is still operational and is an important part of the
Army's overall CW destruction program, as the location for cryofracture and other experiments.
UNITED STATES ARMY CHEMICAL MATERIEL DESTRUCrION AGENCY, ANNUAL STATUS RE-
PORT ON THE DISPOSAL OF THE LETHAL CHEMICAL STOCKPILE 14-15 (1992); CAMDS Testing
Resumes, CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION UPDATE, Oct. 1992, at 3.
391 The true cost of a project such as JACADS is difficult to estimate, since analysts will
disagree about which of the research, development, and operation costs ought to be allocated to
the prototype and which should be charged to other aspects of the overall program-and since
all the relevant costs have continuously escalated. See Ember, supra note 9, at 12; Morrison,
supra note 196, at 1101 (asserting that JACADS will now cost $550 million to build and operate
for five years); Status of 1990 Bilaterals. supra note 123, at 10 (testimony of Brig. Gen. Walter L.
Busbee) (explaining that JACADS cost $170 million to build and equip, and its annual operating
cost is $88 million).
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on Johnston Island392 in the Pacific Ocean, approximately eight hun-
dred miles southwest of Hawaii.393 Construction at JACADS was
completed in 1988, 394 and the facility has-undergone extensive "opera-
tional verification testing," in four "campaigns" between July 1990
and March 1993 to assess the ability to demilitarize various types of
agents and munitions.3 95 The Army's current plan is to replicate the
JACADS concept at all eight facilities in the continental United States
where the CW stockpile is currently housed.3 96 The Army has con-
cluded that on-site incineration is safe and efficient and carries envi-
ronmental consequences that are "quite limited in scope and
significance.'397
JACADS consists of four distinct incineration systems, in which
the separate elements of a chemical weapon are treated indepen-
dently.3 98 At the outset, a "reverse assembly" process occurs, in which
any explosive component (fuse, burster, or propellant) is removed
from the weapon. 399 Next, the wall of the munition is pierced, and the
392 Johnston Island (also known as Kalama Island) is the largest island in the group identified
as Johnston Atoll. The cluster of islands has no permanent population other than U.S. military
personnel. See Silton, supra note 9, at 24 n.8.
393 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-23 to 2-27; Ember, supra note 9, at 12. In addition, the Army
constructed a specialized incineration system at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, to destroy the
incapacitating hallucinogenic agent BZ. Under current plans, this facility would be converted
into a full JACADS-style system to eliminate the lethal CW arsenal now stored at Pine Bluff.
PEIS supra note 130, at 2-25 to 2-26.
394 OBSTACLES TO THE PLAN, supra note 306, at 11-12.
395 Operational Verification Testing (OVT) is the method for assessing the ability of JACADS
to perform its elimination functions according to design specifications. Successful OVT was a
statutory precondition for proceeding with systematization and operation of the incineration
facilities inside the continental United States. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1521(k) (West 1991). The MITRE
Company conducted an evaluation of the OVT, producing detailed analyses of each campaign
and an overall summary. MITRE, supra note 289. The OVT was designed to assess JACADS's
ability to deal with a representative range of agents (GB, VX, and mustard) and of munitions
(rockets, projectiles, and ton containers). Id. at 1-4.
396 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-23,2-131. Some local variations among the eight sites would be
likely, to respond to differences in the particular stockpiles (e.g., facilities that house only ton
containers of agent would not need the specialized equipment to deal with destruction of rockets
or bombs). Il at 2.34-35, supp. C.3.
397 Id. at 4-1; ARMY ALTERNATivEs, supra note 249, at 6-3; United States Army Chemical
Materiel Destruction Agency, supra note 321. The PEIS analyzes a wide range of likely impacts,
including: construction activity, "normal" operations, plausible accident scenarios or other upset
conditions, handling of waste products and other residues, and decommissioning the facilities. It
also compares the on-site operations to the alternatives of transporting the chemical agents to
central destruction locations. PEIS, supra note 130, passim.
398 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-23 to 2-27; MITRE, supra note 289, app. A; United States
Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency, supra note 321.
399 Weapons containing energetics are handled inside an Explosive Containment Room, sepa-
rated from the rest of the facility by blast doors. PEIS, supra note 130, supp. C.9.
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liquid agent is drained off. 40 Then the materials-handled by re-
mote-controlled and automated machinery 401-are separated into
four streams: the deactivation furnace destroys the explosive compo-
nents with a rotary kiln and an afterburner;402 the liquid incinerator
consumes the chemical agent at approximately 2700 degrees Fahren-
heit;40 3 the metal parts furnace decontaminates casings and containers,
allowing them to be recycled;404 and the dunnage incinerator destroys
miscellaneous packaging materials and other waste products.405 Each
of the four incinerators consists of two separate combustion cham-
bers,40 6 and each is equipped with a Pollution Abatement System
(PAS) to cool and scrub the exhaust gases and chemically neutralize
remaining acids.407 The facility is also equipped with an extensive
monitoring system in order to sense the escape of any agent or other
fugitive products. 40 8
The JACADS facility normally produces four types of waste
products. Decontaminated metal parts that can be certified agent-free
may be sold publicly as scrap.4°9 The PAS and some of the furnaces
produce a liquid brine that is dried and transported to approved land-
ffils. 4 1° Third, there is some solid residue from the dunnage and deac-
tivation furnaces (including ash, fiberglass, etc.) that is also conveyed
400 Each type of munition requires its own preparatory handling to drain the agent. Rockets,
for example, are punched, drained, and then sheared into five sections. For different types of
munitions, the wall that must be pierced is of varying thickness. Id. supp. C.11-12.
401 Id supp. C.11-12; MITRE, supra note 289, at A-7.
402 The rotary kiln operates at temperatures of 1000-1800 degrees Fahrenheit; the afterburner
operates at 2200 degrees Fahrenheit. PEIS, supra note 130, supp. C.18, 21. The deactivation
furnace is also used to destroy spent decontamination solution and other fluids. Id. supp. C.18.
403 Id. supp. C.13. Natural gas or propane is used as fuel for the liquid incinerator. Id.
404 Metal parts (principally drained munition bodies and ton containers) and casings may be
"surface decontaminated" to the "3X" level, meaning that the item is safe to handle, but cannot
be released from government control. Alternatively, those materials may be decontaminated to
the "5X" level (via thermal treatment at 1000 degrees Fahrenheit for 15 minutes), meaning that
the item may be sold without restriction as commercial scrap. Id. at 2-78 to 2-80, supp. C-13, 18;
MITRE, supra note 289, at C-16.
405 Dunnage includes wooden pallets, protective clothing, charcoal filters, polystyrene pack-
ing, and other materials, some of which have been contaminated by a chemical agent. PEIS,
supra note 130, supp. A.9, C.21.
406 PEIS, supra note 130, supp. C.13-21.
407 For three of the incinerators, the PAS includes a quench tower and a variety of filters and
scrubbers. The dunnage incinerator uses a somewhat different system. Id. supp. C.24-25.
408 MITRE, supra note 289, app. C. At JACADS, the agent monitoring system included 91
sampling stations inside the facility and 12 perimeter sampling stations outside its boundary. Id.
supp. C-5.
409 PEIS, supra note 130, at 4-13.
410 The brine is analyzed to be sure it is agent-free then dried via evaporation. The operation
of a typical CW elimination facility in the United States is expected to generate on the order of
10,000 tons of salt (50,000 tons for Tooele). Id at 4-14, supp. C.26. See also MITRE, supra note
289, at 3-6 (discussing inadequacies of brine reduction and treatment program during JACADS
OVT).
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to a landfill.411 Finally, the smokestack will emit carbon dioxide and
water vapor, as well as much smaller quantities of sulfur dioxide, ni-
trogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and particulates.412
Whether the facility will also discharge into the air quantities of
other unacceptable chemicals, including furans and dioxins,413 as well
as minute concentrations of unburned chemical agent, remains contro-
versial. There is no water discharge from the JACADS facility, except
for sanitary sewerage products which do not come into contact with
chemical agents.414
The MITRE Corporation conducted detailed evaluations of the
four-part 1990-93 Operational Verification Testing ("OVT") 415 of the
JACADS facility.416 MITRE concluded that the Army was essentially
able to meet designated goals concerning the safety417 and environ-
411 Each of the 8 projected incinerators is expected to generate 40 to 190 tons of ash and
other residues. PEIS, supra note 130, at 4-14. The PEIS notes that the total solid wastes of the
stockpile incineration program (including ash, brine, metal, etc.) would be approximately
115,000 metric tons, which would amount to 0.01% of the total hazardous waste managed in the
entire country annually under RCRA and about 0.35% of the hazardous waste that is delivered
to commercial landfills. The Army further noted that there are approximately 60 operating per-
mitted commercial landfills in the United States (at least one in, or adjacent to, each state where
there would be a CW incinerator), and that, at current fill rates, there is sufficient capacity for 10
to 15 years of additional deposits. Id. at 4-13. See also Craig Williams, Making Waste, BuLL.
ATOM. ScIENTIsTS, July-Aug. 1993, at 54 (letter to the editor noting that the quantity of toxic
wastes produced by JACADS was actually greater by weight than the quantity of weaponry
incinerated).
412 MITRE, supra note 289, at C.8-13.
413 All incinerators generate some quantity of "products of incomplete combustion" (PICs),
such as dioxins and furans, substances known to be extremely hazardous and bioaccumulative.
COSTNER & THORNTON, supra note 307, at 26-29, 36-39. Supporters of JACADS argue that the
furnaces will produce only minute quantities of PICs at such low concentrations as to be un-
problematic and that some types of chemical agents (e.g., nerve gases) do not contain the chlo-
rine necessary for dioxin and furan production. Fimdlay, supra note 9, at 14; Silton, supra note 9,
at 18-19; NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 85-86.
414 United States Army Materiel Destruction Agency, supra note 321, at 13.
415 OVT is a process, driven by the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989,
Pub. L. No. 100-456, 100 Stat. 1918, through which the army was required to demonstrate that
the JACADS facility could demilitarize chemical munitions effectively and consistently with the
program's safety and environmental protection standards.
416 MITRE, supra note 289. The report notes that there are significant differences between
the OVT and the systematic operation of the eight planned facilities inside the United States.
For example, JACADS operated only 8 to 12 hours per day, while the U.S. plants are intended to
function 24 hours per day. In addition, the remote location of Johnston Atoll complicated the
logistics and support operations. Id. at 1.7-9.
The National Academy of Sciences, in turn, reviewed the MITm evaluation of the OVT,
reaching similar conclusions. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, COMMITTEE ON REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE ARMY CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL
PROGRAM, EVALUATION OF THE JOHNSTON ATOLL CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL SYSTEM OPER-
ATIONAL VERIFICATION TESTING: PART II (1994) [hereinafter NRC OVT].
417 Regarding worker safety, there were no injuries resulting from the processing of the muni-
tions or agent, and other routine industrial injuries were within the range expected of other
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mental performance 418 of the system. Meeting the process perform-
ance objectives, however, was more complex: JACADS was unable to
operate as consistently and as long as anticipated, and the system ex-
perienced accidents, faults, and excessive down time, resulting in fail-
ure to dispose of munitions as quickly as projected.419 Many of the
difficulties were corrected during or between the four campaigns, and
by the end of the OVT, JACADS was approaching at least the short-
term through-put goals.420 Overall, the thirty-two months of testing
destroyed some forty thousand munitions, including a representative
industrial processes employed in comparable tasks. MITRE, supra note 289, at 2.1. Regarding
public safety, there was one occasion during the OVT when a shutdown of the liquid incinerator
resulted in a very small amount of unburned agent escaping from the smokestack for about an
hour in a concentration so small as to be beneath the legal notification requirement and report-
edly posing insignificant risk to the public. I& at 2-6. See also PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-88 to 2-
112 (evaluating potential risks of facility accidents and failures). But see CosTNER, supra note
242, at 24 (explaining that during the GB destruction campaign at JACADS, 500 hours of incin-
eration activity were accompanied by 1944 hours of work force lost time due to accidents; there
were no OSHA inspections at JACADS, but comparable inspections at other hazardous waste
incinerators have identified large numbers of serious safety violations).
418 MITRE, supra note 289, § 3. See also Lydia Thomas & Douglas Medville, Dismantlement
and Destruction of U.S. Chemical Weapons, in 1993 SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURrrY
ANTHoLoGY: TRENDs AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL, PROLIFERATION, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURrrY IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENviRONMENT 441, 445 (Elizabeth J. Kirk et al.
eds., 1993). MITRE concluded that JACADS's OVT performance was in conformity with the
substantive standards for agent air emissions, non-agent air emissions, and liquid and solid
wastes. The facility was not in complete compliance with all the procedural and administrative
requirements for environmental permits. Some of these aberrations did result in minor dis-
charges of hazardous materials, but without major adverse environmental effects. Id. at 3.1. See
also Status of 1990 Bilaterals, supra note 123, at 24-25 (providing technical specifications for
OVT emissions). But see Silton, supra note 9, at 19 (asserting that there were six accidental
releases of agent into the atmosphere at JACADS, which the Army admitted only after workers
leaked the information to the public).
419 MITRE, supra note 289, § 4, app. D; IssuEs AFFECriNG, supra note 254, at 17-25. The
OVT established a variety of short-term and long-term benchmarks for system performance, and
JACADS was generally unable to achieve the goals. A number of equipment failures and acci-
dents (including, notably, an incident when an explosion in the deactivation furnace blew a 2x8
inch hole in the kiln wall) contributed to the delays. MITRE, supra note 289, at 4-8. Observers
disagree about whether this shortfall was normal for a "shakedown" operation, constituting the
type of "de-bugging" that the experimental facility was intended to undertake, or whether it was
evidence of a more profound disability in the equipment and concept. Status of 1990 Bilaterals,
supra note 123, at 10 (statement of Walter L. Busbee) ("We have experienced some technical
difficulties with that facility [JACADS], though none that I would characterize as unique or
different for a first of a kind prototype facility."). See also News Briefs: Explosion Shuts Down
Chemical Destruction Plant, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 31 (reporting on a sec-
ond substantial explosion, within the explosive containment area of the facility).
420 The routine operation of the eight planned facilities will impose more severe, consistent
demands upon the JACADS model, but those facilities will presumably benefit from the "lessons
learned" by the Army through the OVT. MITRE, supra note 289, at 1.7-9,4.27-5.7; Government
Operations Hearings, supra note 306, at 107, 110 (statement of Walter L. Busbee); NRC OVT,
supra note 416, at 29.
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variety of types of agents and weaponry. 421 The official Army posture
maintains that any glitches encountered during the OVT were merely
the usual, expected anomalies inherent in testing any cutting-edge
technology, and that, overall, the JACADS methodology is proceed-
ing as scheduled.422
The next stage in the Army's dismantling program-the creation
and operation of the first full stateside incineration facility, at Tooele,
Utah-is now proceeding. Construction activity has been completed
at a cost of $347 million,423 and "systemization" testing is underway,
with an eye toward initiation of operational CW burning in February
1995.424
At the same time, JACADS and the OVT in particular have come
under critical scrutiny on a variety of points. The leading outside
monitoring group, Greenpeace International, has prepared a detailed
commentary challenging MITRE's (and the Army's) optimistic im-
pressions of the facility's operations, 425 and other outside evalu-
ators426 have also asserted objections. Allegations include the charges
that: (1) any JACADS-style facility-by accident or permissible de-
sign-will inevitably emit into the atmosphere at least small quantities
of unburned agent, heavy metals, toxic combustion products, and
other dangerous pollutants;427 (2) especially regarding input materials
421 MITRE, supra note 289, at 5-6; Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 8-9.
422 Brig. Gen. Walter L. Busbee, Letter to the Editor, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 1990, at
30-31; ARMY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 249, at 6-3; NRC OVT, supra note 416, at 14.
423 TOCDF, supra note 310, at 4 (indicating that construction costs were $153 million; equip-
ment and installation costs were $194 million). The original contract for the Tooele facility had
been $212 million. U.S. Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Tooele Chemi-
cal Disposal Facility.
424 Tooele, supra note 310, at 1; TOCDF, supra note 310, at 4; Tooele Ribbon Cutting Cere-
mony, CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION UPDATE, Nov. 1993, at 1.
425 COSTNER, supra note 242. See also GREENPEACE 9/90 REVIEw, supra note 145; ALFRED
PICARDI ET AL., ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE DETOXIFICATION OF CHEMICAL WEAP-
ONs 1-19 (1991) [hereinafter GREENPEACE ALTERNATIVES]; Sebia Hawkins, Letter to the Editor,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 1990, at 30.
426 Silton, supra note 9; SIEGEL, supra note 256, at 5-8. For information on various aspects of
the CW program, see all GAO reports, supra notes 242, 245, 306; Wylie, supra note 9, at 14-15.
427 MITRE, supra note 289, at 3-4, 3-5, c-17. Any incineration facility relying upon a smoke-
stack is not a "closed system" and will inevitably release into the atmosphere at least some
minute quantity of hazardous materials-and the danger of accidents or operational anomalies
raises the specter of more substantial "agent excursions," as occurred with some frequency dur-
ing the JACADS OVT. Id.; COSTNER & THORNTON, supra note 307, passim; COSTNER, supra
note 242, at 6; Silton, supra note 9. In addition, JACADS's plan to rely upon waste storage
facilities as a final repository for the ash, brine, and other solid residuals poses another (some
would say inevitable) danger of leakage. I& at 19 (quoting William Ruckelshaus, former direc-
tor of the EPA, "of course all landfills will leak"). But see Greenpeace Report on Incineration
Called Erroneous, Outdated by Industry, [May 1993-Apr. 1994] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 327
(June 18, 1993) (critiquing COSTNER & THORNTON, supra note 307); NRC OVT, supra note 416,
at 32 (indicating that only one agent emission occurred at JACADS; other incidents turned out
to be false alarms).
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in which the chemical agent is originally present in very low concen-
trations, such as the items to be burned in the dunnage and metal
parts furnaces, incineration is inadequate to achieve a very high level
of agent destruction;428 (3) existing technology is not adequate to de-
tect and to measure accurately the exact quantities of some of these
likely emissions; 429 (4) the biological effects of smokestack exhausts
are incompletely known, and even very low doses of unburned agent
or other pollutants can have important consequences for delicate eco-
systems such as the surface microlayer of the ocean, a key ingredient
in the entire aquatic food chain;430 and (5) the baseline incineration
technology inevitably produces a large quantity of hazardous waste
products that require further treatment or storage.43'
In a nutshell, many critics assert that any incineration process is
inherently an "open system," in which the smokestack and other re-
lease points will rely upon the natural environment (such as the wind
or ocean currents) to dilute and dissipate the pollutants.432 They ar-
gue that even small quantities of these lethal products (such as
unburned agent and other incinerator-produced toxins) are unaccept-
428 CoS-NER, supra note 242, at 2, 5.
429 Ld. at 2. See also Silton, supra note 9, at 19 (indicating that when JACADS was burning
GB nerve gas, fugitive agent was detected on 32 occasions in the facility's corridors, on 15 occa-
sions in the life support air systems, and on 5 occasions at the perimeter, although these may
have been "false positive" alerts caused by sensors that were unable to distinguish minute quan-
tities of agent from other atmospheric particles); COSTNER, supra note 242, at 20 (indicating that
the analysis is comparable for the VX OVT campaign). One key NAS recommendation would
require the Army to upgrade the sensitivity and accuracy of the monitoring system operating at
JACADS before the baseline technology is replicated inside the continental United States in
order to avoid excessive false positives in the alarm system and to assure the neighboring com-
munities that dangerous situations will be promptly identified. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF Sci-
ENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMIFrEE ON REviEw AND EVALUATION OF THE
ARMY CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL PROGRAM, REviEw OF MONITORING AcrnvrrEs
WrrIHIN THE ARMY CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL PROGRAM (1994).
430 Ember, supra note 9, at 16. Dioxins and furans, among the most lethal potential atmos-
pheric pollutants, cannot be formed in the absence of chloride, which is a component of mustard
gas but not of a nerve agent. Greenpeace has hypothesized that the pollution abatement system
itself could be a source of chloride, but the Army has posited that the temperatures at that part
of the operation would be too low to allow the dangerous chemicals to form. Neither side,
however, seems to have an adequate empirical basis for firm conclusions. ICE; Plaintiff's Decla-
rations in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Greenpeace USA v. Stone,
748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990) (No. 90-00588 DAE) (containing the declaration of Dr. John T.
Hardy); Hawkins, supra note 425; Findlay, supra note 9, at 15; ENviRoNmENTAL REVIEw, supra
note 154, at 22-23.
431 COSTNER, supra note 242, at 8 (explaining that the JACADS VX campaign destroyed
134,961 pounds of agent but created some 1.2 million pounds of slag, brine, salt, ash, and residue
(9.5 pounds of wastes for every pound of agent incinerated), all of which is classified as hazard-
ous); SIEGEL, supra note 256, at 7.
432 COSTNER & THORNTON, supra note 307; SIEGEL, supra note 256, at 18; Government Oper-
ations Hearings, supra note 306, at 47 (statement of Craig Williams).
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able,433 and that in the event of an accident or even a more routine
"upset condition" in an incinerator, the consequences could be
catastrophic.434
The National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council
(NRC) has also waded into this fray, issuing two reports on alternative
technologies for accomplishing the CW dismantling function.435 The
first of these, released in June 1993, included recommendations re-
garding three relatively accessible modifications of the JACADS oper-
ation, which might substantially abate lingering concerns about air
pollution.436 The report suggested: (1) grafting onto the PAS an en-
closed system for temporarily "holding" all exhaust gases, so they
could be tested and any contaminants measured and removed prior to
emission;437 (2) installing a system of activated carbon (charcoal) ab-
sorbers into the smokestack as an additional cleansing safeguard;438
and (3) using pure oxygen, instead of ordinary nitrogen-diluted air, in
the incineration process in order to reduce the volume of waste gases
produced.439 The second NRC report also endorsed the baseline in-
cineration technology, but concurred in the notion that additional in-
vestigation of alternatives was warranted." o
The Army, in its response to these National Academy of Sci-
ences' studies, has accepted many of the NRC analyses and conclu-
sions.441 In particular, the Army promises to install the recommended
charcoal filters in the pollution abatement system,44 2 to monitor and
support additional research inquiries into alternative destruction tech-
433 COSTNER, supra note 242, at 5 (calculating that even if JACADS were able to achieve a
destruction removal efficiency of 99.9999%, at least 3.5 grams of active agent GB was released
from the liquid incinerator during the OVT; this would constitute a lethal dose for 24,000
people).
434 Id at 9,22; COsTNER & THORNTON, supra note 307. See also NRC OVT, supra note 416,
at 45.
435 See supra note 245 (describing NAS committee structure and documents).
436 NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL PRESS RELEASE OF
JUNE 10, MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES STUDIED FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISPOSAL (1993).
437 NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 88-89 (indicating that exhaust gases could be
stored for one to eight hours for assessment and certification that they are free of agent and
pollutants before being released through the smokestack). This type of gas storage is not typi-
caly undertaken for ordinary incinerators, where the quantity of exhaust gas is much larger, but
it could be suitable for incinerators that are the size of the projected CW facilities.
438 lId at 106-08, 194-95 (explaining that charcoal filters-as are used in gas masks--can be
extremely successful at removing pollutants from the exhaust stream); NAS STocKPILE COMMIT-
TEE, supra note 140, at 148; Carbon Filters Eliminate Risk of Toxic Emissions, CHEMICAL DEmn-
rrARIZATION UPDATE, Apr. 1994, at 5.
439 NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 102-03 (use of pure oxygen would greatly reduce
the volume of gaseous wastes in incineration and many other technologies).
4 4 0 NAS STOCKPILE COMMITTEE, supra note 140, at 126.
441 ARMY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 249, passim.
442 Id. at 2-4, 3-14, app. E.
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nologies,443 and to explore the possibility of chemical neutralization as
a CW elimination avenue with particular vigor.44 But the Army has
also made clear its profound interest in prompt action-it does not
want to delay the CW destruction campaign in the elusive search for a
still-better technology,445 and it doubts that any alternative methods
can be found or developed to complete the required eliminations in a
timely fashion.446
Controversy over the cleanliness of the JACADS mechanism will
doubtless continue, however, with partisans on one side contending
that the environmentalists are unreasonably insisting upon an impossi-
bly and unnecessarily high standard of purity for the emissions,44 7
while others rejoin that the Army has systematically displayed insuffi-
cient attention to the ecological and safety hazards of the operation.448
Both sides, it would seem, are trapped between powerful oppos-
ing political and social forces. It is an inescapable fact that a huge
quantity of American CW now exists in dispersed locations and in
deteriorating condition. It must be disposed of-pursuant to statute,
to the CWC, and to sound public policy-and the sooner the better.
Just as there are environmental dangers in destroying the CW via in-
cineration, there are offsetting risks in retaining the stocks in their
current configuration, and the dangers associated with the status quo
will only rise over time.449
443 Id at 3-30, app. F.
444 ld at 1-13, 2-5, app. C.
445 Id at 3-83.
446 ld at 3-73.
447 See Trevor Findlay, Green vs. Peace, PAC. REs., May 1990, at 1; Ember, supra note 9, at 10.
JACADS supporters cite the OVT ability to achieve a destruction removal efficiency of
99.9999% of the input chemical agent for the liquid incinerator and 99.9996% for the metal parts
furnace. Similarly, non-agent air emissions were controlled by achieving (or almost achieving) a
99.9999% removal efficiency for most important hazardous substances. MITRE, supra note 289,
at 3.4-5. Proponents assert that this level of safety exceeds federal and state regulatory limits
and is sufficiently safe for the public and the environment.
448 Hawkins, supra note 425; Silton, supra note 9. See also SlEGEL, supra note 256, at 18
(indicating that Army has been reluctant to consider alternatives to incineration since the origi-
nal decision to commit to the JACADS-style baseline technology); Government Operations
Hearings, supra note 306, at 7, 36, 41-45 (indicating that Army has received special exemptions
which allowed the JACADS activities to proceed, but which also somewhat undercut the value
of the OVT as a model for the planned stateside installations).
449 Some analysts have concluded that the most risky option, in terms of long-term threat to
public safety and the environment, would be continued storage of the chemical arsenal in its
current locations, where it remains vulnerable to hazards such as earthquakes, airplane crashes,
terrorist attacks, etc. See PEIS, supra note 130, at 4-54, 4-152 to 4-53, 4-161, supp. H, supp. K;
NAS STOCKPILE COMMrrrEE, supra note 140, at 61-77; see also Keir Lieber, U.S. Chemical
Weapons Destruction Program, CWC CHRONICLE, July 1993, at 3, 5 (reporting the conclusion
that the risk from leakage or other problems with the existing stockpile is fifty times greater than
the risk associated with the baseline incineration technology); Centers for Disease Control, Final
Recommendations for Protecting the Health and Safety Against Potential Adverse Effects of
Long-Term Exposure to Low Doses of Agents: GA, GB, VX, Mustard Agent (H, HD, T) and
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The ubiquitous political concerns of NIMBY ("Not In My Back
Yard") have raised obstacles impeding any attempt to deal rationally
with the stockpile. Most communities simultaneously: (1) do not
want the CW to continue to be stored nearby; (2) do not want to host
any on-site CW disposal operations; and (3) do not want CW to be
transported through their locale enroute to some other recipient for
destruction. Anything touching chemical weapons has become so po-
litically reactive that the Army is now left with few viable options.
In fact, political factors, perhaps even more than technical or eco-
nomic considerations, may have been responsible for the Army's deci-
sion to destroy all the CW on site, rather than transport it to one or
two central locations.450 Under the current plan, only eight "back
yards" (and therefore only eight congressional districts) will be an-
gered; any plan to transport the toxic dangers to regional or national
collection points would surely traverse, and therefore aggravate, many
more communities. 451
In any event, the Army's eight-site plan has struck several barri-
ers. First, the process of securing the necessary state permits and
licenses has been extraordinarily extended.452 State legislatures have
erected new-and possibly insurmountable-impediments against
CW furnaces;453 local environmental protection agencies have scruti-
Lewisite (L), 53 Fed. Reg. 8504-07 (1988); OTA ALTERNATIVES, supra note 140, at 28 (explain-
ing that continued storage could be made safer by removing explosive components, repacking
agents).
450 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-113 to 2-131 (describing Army's process and criteria for com-
paring the available options and selecting on-site destruction). Currently, the Army is forbidden
by statute from further consideration of the relocation options and modalities. Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8075A(a), 107 Stat. 1457-58 (1993);
S. REP. No. 54, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 358-59 (1991); H.R. Cor'N. RaP. No. 328, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 201 (1991) (Amendment 167).
451 Keith Schneider, U.S. Plan to Burn Chemical Weapons Stirs Public Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 1991, at Al. The Army's contemplated route for rail relocation of the entire continental
United States CW stockpile to a national destruction center in Tooele, Utah would cross 20
states. PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-64.
452 The anticipated schedule for destroying the U.S. CW arsenal has slipped several times.
The original 1985 timetable called for the Army to complete the destruction of the entire stock-
pile by 1994 (independent of any international obligation to do so); shortly after this self-selected
deadline was written into law, the Army petitioned the Congress to extend the deadline to 1997.
Similarly, the original deadline contemplated in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral agreement was 2002
for completion of the entire destruction process; this target, too, has slipped to coincide largely
with that of the CWC. In 1991, the destruction program was extended to adopt an anticipated
end date of 1999; currently the Army is aiming to complete the job by December 31, 2004.
David C. Morrison, Chemical Arms Aren't Easy to Destroy, 24 NAT'L J. 2068 (1992); Ember,
supra note 9, at 11; Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 2; Government Operations Hearings, supra
note 306, at 95, 102 (containing Army rationales for the continuing delays).
453 Most of the eight states for which incinerators are planned have re-evaluated their appli-
cable environmental protection statutes. Kentucky and Indiana have passed new laws, regarded
by the Army as "prohibitively restrictive environmental standards," which "are so restrictive that
a chemical demilitarization facility may be delayed or not be built." Maryland is contemplating
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nized Army submissions with deliberate care, resulting in severe set-
backs for the original schedules and in substantial increases in the
projected budget.454 Construction at the first of the eight planned fa-
cilities in the continental United States-at Tooele, Utah, where the
largest share of the existing stockpile is held-was completed only in
July 1993, with a further eighteen months of detailed testing required
before it can be declared operational.455 The other seven sites lag far
behind.
Second, the project has run into severe local community opposi-
tion, especially at the sites that have the smallest CW stockpiles pres-
ent, the largest population centers nearby, and the most vigorous
grass-roots organizations. 456 Indigenous coalitions near the Lexing-
ton, Kentucky and Aberdeen, Maryland facilities have been particu-
larly active, catalyzing community groups concerned about the
proposed demolitions.457
One special aspect of the political tension is suggested by the fact
that the Army is currently committed to dismantling the eight destruc-
tion facilities as soon as each unit's local CW disposal is completed. In
an even stiffer enactment, and Alabama and Colorado have slowed their work on issuing the
necessary environmental permits that would allow Army construction activities to continue
apace. Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 6-7; Bruce Reid, Bill Could Derail Plans to Incinerate
Mustard Agent, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 24,1993; CoMMTrrrEFE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC
TRUST AND TECHNOLOGY: CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION IN THE U.S. 7 (1992). The Ken-
tucky statute prohibits CW incineration unless the Army can establish that no alternative tech-
nology "is likely to exist or could be developed" before the stockpile becomes too unstable to
store, and it requires epidemiological studies (which could take up to 30 years to complete)
evaluating the health effects on the local population, before burning operations may commence.
OTA ALTERNAT vES, supra note 140, at 4-5; Government Operations Hearings, supra note 306,
at 113-15; Silton, supra note 9, at 21; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.50-130 (Baldwin 1993).
454 IssUEs AFFECTING, supra note 254, at 12, 26; LIKELY To CONTINUE, supra note 242; OB-
STACLES TO THE PLAN, supra note 306.
455 Tooele Systemization Effort Only 4 Months Away, CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION UP-
DATE, Apr. 1993, at 1; Tooele Ribbon Cutting Ceremony, CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION UP-
DATE, Nov. 1993, at 1.
456 Silton, supra note 9, at 20-21 (indicating that activists from all eight U.S. sites, Russia, and
elsewhere met in 1991 to draft an International Citizens' Accord on Chemical Weapons Dispo-
sal, calling for a halt to CW incineration); Government Operations Hearings, supra note 306, at
63 (discussing text of the international accord); Jim Yardley, Living Next to Nerve Gas: Alabama
County Weighs Risks of Incineration Plan, ATarrA J. & CONST., July 26, 1992, at A3. In other
locales, however, the community leadership has strongly supported the Army's incineration
plan, and there appears to be little local agitation against the Army's program. Morrison, supra
note 196, at 1103.
457 Eugene L. Meyer, Army Disposal Plan Alarms Kent County, WASH. PoST, Apr. 28, 1992,
at B1; Disposal of Chemical Munitions Hearings, supra note 141, at 47; Army Disposal of Chemi-
cal Weapons: Hearing Before the Investigations Subcomm. of the House Armed Servs. Comm.,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), passim [hereinafter Army Disposal of Chemical Weapons Hearings];
Government Operations Hearings, supra note 306, at 77 (statement of John E. Nunn, III) (noting
that official documents estimate as many as 42,000 fatalities in the Aberdeen, Maryland area in
the event of a catastrophic accident at the CW facility).
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that way, nearby residents need not fear that the CW furnaces will be
adapted for subsequent military or civilian incineration purposes,
locking the community into a permanent future as a hazardous waste
disposal site.458 Nevertheless, some communities-or some elements
within each community-distrust those assurances and continue to
fear long term retention of the incinerator capacity.459 On the other
hand, some residents may ultimately come to favor that option, seeing
it as an environmentally tolerable source of income and jobs.46°
Third, Congress has recently gotten cold feet over some aspects
of the project. Responding to increasing local opposition and scien-
tific uncertainties, Congress has suspended construction and other
CW-related operations at the three lowest-quantity sites: Lexington,
Kentucky; Aberdeen, Maryland; and Newport, Indiana.461 As the
General Accounting Office and others continue to release critical ap-
praisals of certain details of the JACADS operation and other aspects
of the Army's overall demilitarization efforts-and as the program's
458 The original statute, Pub. L. No. 99-145, had required that the Army destroy the eight
incinerators as soon as each had completed its assigned mission, and the Army undertook plans
to do so (at a cost estimated at $324 million), Government Operations Hearings, supra note 306,
at 115. A later enactment, however, (confirming fears of some residents) mandated that the
Army instead study the feasibility and desirability of converting the incinerators after the CW is
eliminated, to adapt them to other hazardous waste disposal operations. See Silton, supra note 9,
at 20; OBSTACLES TO THE PLAN, supra note 306, at 33-35 (citing Congressional committee report
for Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-172, 105 Stat. 1150, and
other studies recommending conversion of the incinerators). The latest twist in the saga-heart-
ening to many local activists-came when the results of that mandated evaluation suggested that
the small size of the incinerators makes conversion of them less appealing, especially when the
market for incineration services is in some turmoil. SIEGEL, supra note 256, at 19-20.
459 See GREENPEACE 9190 REVIEW, supra note 145, at 4; Satchell, supra note 4; Silton, supra
note 9.
460 Ronald Smothers, Plan to Destroy Toxic Weapons Polarizes a City, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1992, at A14.
461 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 suspended the Army's de-
velopment of environmental impact statements and necessary state permit applications at the
three "low volume sites," and the Army has essentially frozen development of the environmen-
tal impact documents at the other sites, pending the investigation of alternative destruction
methodologies. The Act also requires the use of technologies other than high-temperature incin-
eration, if they prove to be significantly safer, equally cost-effective, and timely. Pub. L. No. 102-
484, 106 Stat. 2315. The Military Construction Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-380,
106 Stat. 1366, deleted all funding for the Anniston facility, until Congress reviews the Army's
response to the NRC alternative technologies reports. Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 7, 12.
Only the Utah site (which was nearing completion) and the Colorado site (which is testing an
alternative technology, cryofracture) received full funding. Silton, supra note 9, at 23. In effect,
therefore, activities are currently frozen at six of the eight intended locations. Thomas &
Medville, supra note 418, at 452.
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costs continue to escalate462-continued high levels of funding and
general support must now be in doubt.463
C. Alternative Technologies for Destroying CW
Incineration is manifestly not the only conceivable method for
eliminating the American CW stockpile; other technologies have been
proposed and explored for some time, and now with increasing
vigor.464 But it may be the only candidate that could be available for
full-scale operation within the time frames established by law. And
there is, of course, no guaranty that other hypothetical techniques will
prove more environmentally or economically sound, once they are ex-
posed to the same light of detailed critique that has shaken the JA-
CADS incinerators.
For example, one set of proposals has focused upon a possible
"cryofracture" technique, through which an entire munition would be
quickly frozen in a bath of negative 320 degrees Fahrenheit liquid ni-
trogen, fractured into manageable pieces, and then destroyed. 465 Ad-
vocates postulate that the freezing would make the CW easier to
handle and safer to dispose of.46 6 However, critics argue that a cry-
462 Congressional attention to the inexorable increases in the Army's destruction budget has
grown, too, over the years. Skepticism over the validity and reliability of the projected pricetags
has proven warranted, as the total cost has leapt up to over four times the original estimates. See
Army Disposal of Chemical Weapons Heariangs, supra note 457, at 46-47; OTA ALTERNATIvES,
supra note 140, at 20; Government Operations Hearings, supra note 306, at 148.
463 The General Accounting Office has kept a close eye on the Army's CW destruction pro-
grams, responding to (and perhaps further stoking) Congressional interest in the program. Is-
SUES APFECTING, supra note 254; LIKELY TO CONTINUE, supra note 242; OBSTACLES TO THE
PLAN, supra note 306; GENERAL ACCOUNTING O ITcE, CHEMICAL WEAPONS: STOCKPILE DE-
STRUCTION DELAYED AT THE ARMY'S PROTOTYPE DISPOSAL FACILITY (July 1990).
464 See NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129; GREENPEACE ALTERNATIVES, supra note 425;
OTA ALTERNATIVES, supra note 140; see also James Borg, Tending the Dragon's Fire: Shall We
Dump, Crush or Cryofracture Our Obsolete Chemical Weapons?, 15 APF REP. 12 (1992).
465 Thomas & Medville, supra note 418, at 449-51. Cryofracture concepts involve immersing
the entire weapon or other item in the liquid nitrogen, shattering it in a mechanical press, and
feeding the pieces into a single incinerator for destruction. It is not applicable to bulk contain-
ers. The technology has been tested in a prototype application at CAMDS and elsewhere.
PEIS, supra note 130, at 2.75-77. Recently, the Army has been experimenting with transforming
the Pueblo, Colorado facility from the "baseline" (i.e, JACADS-style) incinerator into a cry-
ofracture unit. Some initial testing has been completed, and the program is now being evalu-
ated. Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 17; Government Operations Hearings, supra note 306, at
116; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 13.
466 Under the baseline technology, chemical weapons and associated materials must be segre-
gated into four separate streams for feeding into the appropriate incinerator. Cryofracture, on
the other hand, would process everything through a single system, eliminating some of the time-
consuming and hazardous preparatory handling. Ember, supra note 9, at 13; Kemper, supra note
390, at 25. By building only one incinerator instead of four, the cryofracture system may also be
appreciably cheaper. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989 and
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the House Armed Services Comm., supra
note 141, at 37, 49-52.
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ofracture system will also, ultimately, rely upon some sort of incinera-
tion mechanism for eliminating the frozen particles, and that
JACADS' four specially-designed furnaces are more efficient and
safe.467
Similarly, there has been a surge of interest in "molten metal"
processes, in which the CW is destroyed through immersion in a
three-thousand degree Fahrenheit bath of copper, iron, or cobalt.468
The high temperatures break down the agent molecules and dissolve
the inorganic components into a slag that rises to the top of the steel
processing vessel and is skimmed off.46 9 Potential corporate vendors
have claimed that the intense thermal processing prevents the produc-
tion of furans and dioxins, and that the system fosters the "harvesting"
of recyclable materials from the CW inputs.470 However, opponents
can again contend that the system will still generate hazardous waste
gases that must be cleansed and eliminated, that the proposed tech-
nology is unproven (at least on the scale that the CW dismantling pro-
gram would need to establish), that it is expensive, and that it involves
creation of a facility that could actually be much more hazardous than
an ordinary incinerator in the event of a catastrophic failure.471
A third noteworthy alternative would be some system of biologi-
cal remediation.472 Researchers have suggested reliance upon some
relatively familiar enzymes and bacteria-or alternatively, some ge-
netically-modified variants-comparable to those that naturally break
down pesticides in soil, or that have long been used to treat municipal
467 A cryofracture system, in which all sorts of different CW-related materials are fed into a
single furnace, may be more vulnerable to explosions in the furnace than is the JACADS base-
line technology, in which the explosives, agents, metal parts, and other materials are handled
independently. Ember, supra note 9, at 13; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 13. By
incinerating all the weapon elements in a single furnace, moreover, cryofracture may also pro-
mote the formation of dioxins, furans, and other hazardous byproducts of complex combustion.
SIEGEL, supra note 256, at 14. Finally, some components of chemical weapons (notably, the
aluminum and fiberglass parts) do not become sufficiently brittle for optimum cryofracture.
Doty, supra note 132, at 27.
468 NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 152-56.
469 Id. at 157.
470 Id. The two leading corporate sponsors, Molten Metal Technology and Elkem Technol-
ogy, have developed a system that is capable of accepting a wide variety of types of inputs,
including all CW agents and munitions. The proposed unit generates heat by passing an electri-
cal current between electrodes in the bottom of the containment vessel, not via flame. Id.
471 Id at 153-56. To some extent, the molten metals technology is comparable to that long
used in steel production, so the basic properties are well known, and experiments have pro-
ceeded with a variety of specialized applications. However, before the molten metals approach
could be adapted for CW destruction, much additional development would be required-proba-
bly beginning with a pilot plant, then a demonstration unit, and only later, a facility of opera-
tional scale. Id at 156.
472 Id. at 126-36; NAS STocKPiLE COMMrIrEE, supra note 140, at 176.
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and industrial wastes and sewerage.473 Critics of this approach con-
cede that certain biological processes seem to work well on dilute so-
lutions of hazardous materials, but they argue that the technique is
still at an early stage of development and that it is currently simply too
slow to accomplish a task of this magnitude within the allowable
time.4 74
Numerous other possible CW destruction techniques-both ex-
otic and pedestrian-have also been explored or at least identified.475
The NRC Alternatives Committee analyzed no fewer than seventeen
concepts, ranging from the use of ultraviolet light to plasma arc pyrol-
ysis to wet air oxidation.476 An earlier Greenpeace study evaluated
thirty variations upon seven basic technological themes, again without
making recommendations.477 The Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment reported on ten different proposals, describing four of the
leading alternatives in greater depth.478 And this is surely an area
where scientific inquiry is evolving rapidly-additional suggestions
may well be forthcoming in the next few years, especially if federal
funds are allocated to support the research endeavors 479 and particu-
larly if the Army promotes the investigations with true scientific
zeal.480
473 GREENPEACE ALTERNATIVES, supra note 425, at 20-39; Eric Nalder, Enzymes Could
Chomp Down on Nerve Poison, SEA-rLE TMEms, Feb. 18, 1991, at A8; Plaintiff's Declarations in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F.
Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990) (No. 90-00588 DAE) (containing the declaration of Dr. Wayne Lan-
dis). The biological methods currently seem more promising for eradicating nerve agents; mus-
tard is less amenable to this approach. GREENPEACE ALTERNATrvES, supra note 425, at 24.
474 NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 126-27.
475 Evaluation of the technical merits of any of the alternative technologies is well beyond the
scope of this Article, but any reviewer must be impressed by the wide variety of the potential
approaches identified in the literature, the creativity of the researchers-and, unfortunately, in
most cases, the early stage of development.
476 Id. The Alternatives Committee grouped the potential approaches into several broad cat-
egories: high-temperature, low-pressure oxidation (e.g., baseline incineration); high-tempera-
ture, low-pressure pyrolysis (eg., molten metals); moderate-temperature, high-pressure
oxidation (&g., burning diluted solutions at medium temperatures); low-temperature, low-pres-
sure detoxification or oxidation (eg., biological processes). NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
PRESS RELEASE OF JuNE 10, MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES STUDIED FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS Dis-
POSAL (1993).
477 GREE zAcE ALTERNATIVES, supra note 425.
478 OTA ALTERNATrVES, supra note 140.
479 See id. at 9-10 (discussing other programs for promoting research into hazardous waste
disposal technologies).
480 Some critics have contended that the Army-despite its apparent exploration of a wide
variety of technological alternatives-has become so wedded to the baseline incineration tech-
nology that it is now incapable of sincerely re-evaluating that fundamental approach. The Army
initially selected incineration years ago when little was understood about the hazards of combus-
tion and still less was known about potential alternatives. Now that so much time and money
has been invested in the JACADS-style mechanisms, it would be extremely difficult for the
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On the other hand, none of these technologies can credibly prom-
ise to produce a "magic bullet": a method for eliminating chemical
weapons that is simultaneously economical, safe, environmentally se-
cure, high-speed, capable of accepting a wide variety of inputs, and
sufficiently mature to be able to accomplish the task within a decade.
Regardless of which method or combination of methods is eventually
implemented, hard choices will have to be made to resolve competing
public values, especially given the enormously long lead times ordina-
rily required to develop a new technology, construct and -prove out a
prototype, and finally build and use one or more operational
facilities.481
It is important to recall that even the "no action" alternative in
this scenario carries profound environmental and other risks: contin-
ued storage of the aging chemical stockpile in its current configuration
simply prolongs the actuarial danger of leakage, human error, natural
accidents, or other dangerous mishaps.482 Although existing Army
safety and security procedures are adequate to minimize the likeli-
hood of a catastrophic failure,4 83 no alternative is truly risk-free.8 4
NEPA and the substantive antipollution statutes surveyed above
are sometimes referred to as being controversially "action forcing" or
"technology forcing,"48 s meaning that the legislative or administrative
standards compel industry to implement the "best available" or "most
Army to start the technology review process anew. SIEGEL, supra note 256, at 18; GREENPEACE
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 425, at 5-7; LIKELY TO CONTINUE, supra note 242, at 21.
481 RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 145, at 28. The NAS Alternatives Committee estimated
that for the technologies it considered, proceeding from the stage of laboratory data develop-
ment through the stage of demonstration would require nine to twelve years, with a further five
years required to design, construct, and systemize an operational facility. NRC ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 129, 89-90. The Army projects that no acceptable alternative could be successful in
destroying the existing CW, even if used only for the three "low volume" sites, before 2010.
ARMY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 249, at 6-9. The second National Academy of Sciences com-
mittee was a bit more optimistic that the timetable could be foreshortened somewhat. NAS
STOCKPILE COMMrITEE, supra note 140, at 119.
482 Morrison, supra note 196, at 1103 (indicating that Army officials have concluded that
earthquakes or plane crashes are the most important dangers of continued storage, "so we can't
sit and wait for the best technology to emerge"). See also Recommendations for Protecting
Human Health Against Potential Adverse Effects of Long-Term Exposure to Low Doses of Chem-
ical Warfare Agents, 259 JAMA 1453 (1988).
483 PUBLIC TRusr AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 232, at 6.
484 See NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 27-29 (describing different types of risks in-
volved in storing, transporting, and destroying CW).
485 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1993) ("The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is
to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in the Act are
infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government"). See also Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 870 F.2d 177, modified, 885 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.
1989); BoNINE & MCGARITY, supra note 189, at 216; LArros & ToMAmn, supra note 197, at 172-




suitable" technology for achieving lowered emissions standards, re-
gardless of-or putting strikingly low weight upon-economic feasi-
bility or internal cost-benefit calculations.48 6 This approach carries
both advantages and disadvantages in coping with traditional corpo-
rate values and business incentives, but the problem of CW disman-
tling introduces yet a higher level of complexity. The applicable
standards-both domestic United States law and the nascent Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention-suddenly impose an external clock: the
agent elimination process is to begin within two years of the treaty's
entry into force and is to be completed within eight years after that.487
Whether we intend to force technology, to finance it, or to simply
adapt what we already have developed, there is not very much time
available.
VI. INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
Each of these political machinations and technological options
would be sufficiently difficult to resolve, even if the United States
could proceed unilaterally with its CW elimination efforts inside a
global vacuum. In fact, however, our CW-related choices and what
we say about them will strongly influence and be influenced by events
in other parts of the rapidly changing, politically malleable world com-
munity. This section considers some of the likely international factors
that will interact with American policies about CW destruction and
environmental protection.
The first important reality is that if the United States is unable to
comply in a timely fashion with the disarmament obligations of the
CWC, then the treaty itself will be profoundly jeopardized. 488 Other
countries will, understandably, be reluctant to submit to the expensive
and cumbersome verification and confidence-building functions unless
it is clear that the United States and Russia will continue the rapid
486 See BONIE & McGARrrY, supra note 189, at 215-16; FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197,
at 143-52; LArros & ToMAti, supra note 197, at 172-73 (discussing environmental laws that
either- (1) focus on the desired level of quality or purity in the particular medium (eg., air,
water), without overtly considering technological or economic feasibility at all; or (2) set a par-
ticular standard requiring industry to adopt the "best available" (or "best practicable" or "best
conventional") technology, the "lowest achievable emissions rate," etc.).
487 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part IV (A).C.17.
488 Herby, supra note 97, at 14. When, during a crucial stage of the CWC negotiations, the
United States and France each proposed that the existing CW-possessing states should be al-
lowed to retain a small "security stockpile" of chemical weapons, pending universal adherence to
the treaty, the other negotiating parties strongly resisted. They demanded-and the treaty ulti-
mately reflected-that all parties' CW must be destroyed in a timely fashion for the treaty re-
gime to be meaningful. Kemper, supra note 390, at 23; Jones & Wagner, supra note 69, at 593-
94; BERNAUER, supra note 90, at 31-32.
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movement toward elimination of their CW arsenals.489 American
leadership is a sine qua non of global acceptance of the CWC, and
although we can never rigorously quantify these diplomatic assess-
ments, the treaty regime will be much stronger, and much more attrac-
tive to fence-sitting countries, if the United States disposes of its
stockpile within ten, rather than fifteen, years.490 Although the treaty
does contemplate a possible extension of time,491 its exercise is un-
likely to be cost-free.492
Second, any American hesitancy in discharging the disarmament
obligations is likely to have special repercussions inside Russia, where
the government faces even more severe environmental and fiscal chal-
lenges. For decades, the Soviet military establishment was allowed to
despoil the national landscape in horrendous ways, and the scope of
the required cleanup is immense.493 Ironically, the Russian (and all
former Soviet) populace is only now becoming environmentally sensi-
tized by the unraveling truth about the consequences of the
Chernobyl disaster, as well as a host of other staggering pollution
problems; now, that increased "green consciousness" may translate
into greater obstacles for the CW disposal effort.494 CW is merely one
489 Herby, supra note 97, at 14, 17. At various stages during the stultified CWC negotiations,
some had proposed retreating from the ambitious goal of achieving a truly comprehensive CW
treaty and concluding instead a partial, interim accord that would at least "freeze" the existing
global CW stockpiles and bar further proliferation of the weaponry. This more limited type of
agreement-which would have preserved the existing monopoly in favor of the few CW-capable
states-was unacceptable to most countries, and the participants stayed at the negotiating table
until they were able to conclude a broad-reaching accord that disarmed the existing CW posses-
sors as well as prohibited the spread of the weaponry to additional states. Oudraat, supra note
97.
490 One of the last changes made in the evolving text of the CWC during the closing stages of
the negotiations was the deletion of language that would have provided that if any one state
received permission to extend its dismantling timetable, other states could respond by delaying
their own CW eliminations. TREVOR FINDLAY, PEACE THROUGH CHEmISTRY: THE NEW CHEM-
ICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 46 (1993).
491 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part IV(A).C.24-28.
492 For example, because Russia anticipates such severe difficulties in meeting the CWC dis-
mantling timetable, it might respond by delaying the deposit of its instrument of ratification of
the treaty, joining the CWC regime only later. However, failure to adhere to the CWC at the
earliest possible date would have negative consequences, such as making the country ineligible
for membership on the Organization's Executive Council and exposing the country to export
restrictions applicable to all nonparties. Herby, supra note 97, at 18-19.
493 See, e.g., MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR (1992);
Mark Sommer, Struggling to Cut the Half-Life of Moscow's Nuclear Mess, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Aug. 18, 1993, at 18.
494 Ember, supra note 9, at 18; FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 199-201. The
Chernobyl disaster killed 31 people, forced the evacuation of 135,000 more, contaminated the
land on which 4 million people live in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and substantially increased
the long-term incidence of cancer and other diseases for additional millions. Reportedly, the
incident emitted as much dangerous radiation into the atmosphere as the combined effect of all
the nuclear.weapon tests ever conducted. I&
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piece of a large, soiled fabric of Russian environmental issues; the list
of ecological disasters awaiting emergency remediation is daunting,495
and the population will no longer blindly trust the government to "do
the right thing" on environmental and security issues. 496
One telling casualty of the Russian population's newfound en-
vironmentalist instincts has been the once-secret CW destruction facil-
ity constructed near the Volga River town of Chapayevsk, about five
hundred miles southeast of Moscow. The plant, erected beginning in
1987 in a locale already infamous for horrendous chemical-related
pollution and lethal accidents, cost some $165 million and was to be
capable of neutralizing and burning up to five tons of chemical agents
daily. Local community activists mounted a stunning petition cam-
paign against the facility, rejecting assurances and promises from the
Moscow authorities and threatening to go on strike if the plant were
commissioned. Finally, in August 1989, the plant was officially con-
verted into a training facility-before its intended destruction capacity
had ever actually opened. The move leaves the Russian military with-
out any current capability for destroying its CW stockpile and has sent
the planners back to the drawing boards to design a facility, or string
of facilities, that would be environmentally acceptable in some feasi-
ble location. 497
At the same time, the Russian government must confront the fact
that it has an enormous quantity of CW stocks and materials to elimi-
nate, and precious little disposable income to apply to the task.498 The
495 It was principally the surge of local and national interest in environmentalism, rather than
a newfound appreciation for arms control or national security motivations, that led to the closure
of the facilities where the Soviet Union had traditionally conducted its nuclear weapons tests.
Despite official government statements, the local populace simply would not tolerate additional
spoliation of the test site ecology. Luther J. Carter, Soviet Nuclear Testing: The Republics Say
No, 250 SCEENCE 903 (1990); Fred Hiatt, Russian Test Site Displays Pride, Perils of a Superpower,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 18, 1992, at Al; Peter Almquist, Destruction Plant at Chapayevsk 'Safe... [If]
There Are No Accidents,' ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1990, at 14.
496 Russian experts have charged that tens of thousands of workers died, and 300 towns, hous-
ing 1 million people, were contaminated due to lax Soviet practices in the production, storage,
testing, or demolition of chemical weapons. Russians Detail Deaths Laid to Chemical Arms,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 24, 1994, at All.
497 Almquist, supra note 495; Satchell, supra note 4, at 56; Michael R. Gordon, Moscow Is
Making Little Progress in Disposal of Chemical Weapons, N.Y. TiMS, Dec. 1, 1993, at Al; Dr. B.
Richardson, Statement Before the Subcomm. on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and De-
fense Intelligence of the Senate Armed Services Comm. 8 (May 26, 1993) (stating that Russian
environmental concerns have also resulted in prohibitions against the shipment of CW across
some regions) [hereinafter Richardson Statement]; Mikulak, supra note 107, at 13; Ember, supra
note 9, at 18-19.
498 The Soviet Union's CW arsenal was the largest and most modern in the world, much
feared by NATO and the United States. The Soviet Union regularly upgraded its CW warfight-
ing capabilities and trained its troops regarding operations in a CW-contaminated environment
much more extensively than other countries. The U.S.S.R. had integrated chemical weapons
into its operational military routines, and it assembled a major infrastructure of CW-related
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Soviet Union admitted holding some 40,000 tons of weaponized
agents, and Russian authorities have recently estimated the eventual
pricetag for the destruction operations at some $10 billion.499 Some
outside observers, however, have contended that the true quantity of
the existing Russian lethal arsenal may in fact be much higher,500 and
recent disquieting revelations of dissembling about other aspects of
the modem Russian CW program501 have only exacerbated their con-
facilities, equipment, and ordnance. STOESSEL CoMM'N, supra note 75, at 25-29; Blaine Harden,
The Gassing of Washington, WASHINGTONIAN, Feb. 1984, at 125. But see Doty, supra note 132,
at 27 (explaining that much of the former Soviet CW arsenal is quite old, and a large percentage
of it has been stored in bulk containers, rather than in weapons); R.G. Sutherland, The Chemical
Weapons Convention: The Problems ofImplementation, PAC. Ras., Feb. 1994, at 7, 11 (discussing
location and composition of Russian CW stockpile).
See also SMrrHsoN HANDBOOK, supra note 92, at 13 (describing proposals for Russia to
convert an existing chemical weapons production facility at Novoceboksary to the task of CW
destruction, and to build two new destruction facilities at Gorny and Kambarka, where the
weapons are now stored); Concern About the Expense for Disposal of the Soviet Stockpile, ARMS
CONTROL REP., Feb. 1991 at 704.E-2.25 (indicating U.S.S.R. faces daunting expense in destroy-
ing CW as required by treaty, and no location in the country has been willing to accept a destruc-
tion installation).
499 Amy E. Smithson, Chemicals Destruction: The Work Begins, BuLL. ATOM. SCIENTISrS,
Apr. 1993, at 38,41; U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY FORCES IN TRANsMON 59 (1991) [here-
inafter FORCES IN TRANSIrION]. Some Russian experts have stated that the Soviet Union pro-
duced as much as 500,000 to 1 million tons of CW, much of which was buried on land or dumped
into the ocean, rather than being safely destroyed, so a massive cleanup of old munitions outside
the active stockpile awaits, too. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL.,
Mar. 1993, at 17 (quoting Russian environmental activist Lev Fedorov). Fortunately, the entire
former Soviet chemical stockpile seems now to be housed within the confines of the Russian
Republic, so the CWC will not have to deal with some of the worst "state succession" complica-
tions that have afflicted efforts at nuclear arms control, such as START. FORCES IN TRANsrrION,
supra (indicating massive consolidation of formerly forward-deployed CW has occurred since
mid-1980s, and all of the Soviet Union's CW are now stored inside Russia); ARMS CONTROL
REP., supra note 498, at 704.E-2.40 (1991) (U.S.S.R. pulling CW out of eastern Germany). In
contrast, the nuclear weapons formerly held by the Soviet Union were physically located in four
republics-Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus-a fact that has greatly complicated the
effort to secure the reduction of nuclear arsenals under the START I and II agreements. See
George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet
Union, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 323 (1993).
500 Steven R. Bowman, CRS Issue Brief. Chemical Weapons: U.S. Production, Destruction,
and Arms Control Negotiations, CONo. RES. SERV., Apr. 1990, at 5; Julian Perry Robinson, Re-
view: World CW Armament Part II: The Soviet Union, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
BULL., May 1989, at 15; R. Jeffrey Smith, Estimate of Soviet Arms Is Cut4 U.S. Revises Figure on
Chemical Weapons, WASH. Pos-r, Nov. 9, 1989, at A71 (indicating U.S. intelligence agencies had
estimated that the Soviet CW arsenal contained as much as 300,000 tons of agent). Cf. Broad,
supra note 61, at 1 (Russian official reporting that the country had 35% more nuclear warheads,
and more than twice as much highly-enriched uranium as U.S. officials had estimated).
501 T\vo Russian scientists have alleged that important Soviet CW development efforts contin-
ued even after President Gorbachev, and later President Yeltsin, had announced that the entire
CW program had been halted. One of the authors of that expose, Vil Mirzayanov, was arrested
on charges of revealing state secrets and has been subjected to extra-legal proceedings that, for
some, call into question the respectability of the Russian justice system and the fidelity of the
government's commitment to openness and an end to CW activities. Gale Colby, Fabricating
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cerns. Even the physical security of Russia's deadly arsenals has been
called into question, as reports circulate about the emergence into the
international black market of nuclear and other weapons-related
materials spirited away from military control.5 02
There is, in short, strong reason to doubt Russia's innate ability to
complete the CW dismantlings as required by the treaty.5 03 Russian
governmental spokespersons have earnestly solicited Western aid,
predicting that if left to its own devices their country would be unable
to allocate sufficient material and technological resources to the pro-
gram.5 04 Moreover, Russian authorities have expressed interest in
converting former CW production facilities to alternative uses, rather
than destroying them altogether, and in recapturing some of the com-
mercially valuable components of CW, rather than sending them up in
smoke. Those types of sophisticated recyclings, however, will inevita-
bly require more time and more money.50 5 Even if Russia were al-
lowed the greater leniency of the treaty's fifteen-year period,
compliance would be problematic.
The United States and others have already pledged a substantial
quantity of financial assistance to the constituents of the former Soviet
Union, with the ion's share being consciously allocated to efforts to
underpin emerging Russian democracy and civilian control.506 How-
ever, relatively little of the funding has actually been delivered so far,
Guilt, BuLu. ATOM. ScIaErsTs, Oct. 1993, at 12; Richard Stone, Russia Seen Poised to Drop
Prosecution of Chemist, 263 SCIENCE 1083 (1994); Fred Hiatt, Russian Court Opens Unprece-
dented Secrets Trial, WASH. Posr, Jan. 25, 1994, at A15; Satchell, supra note 4, at 56-57.
502 Frank von Hippel et al., Eliminating Nuclear Warheads, Sci. AM., Aug. 1993, at 44.
503 See FORCES IN TRANsION, supra note 499; Doty, supra note 132, at 28 (quoting Stephen
J. Ledogar, the chief U.S. CWC negotiator, "Russia cannot meet either the bilateral timetable or
the 10-year [CWC] deadline currently envisioned. They can't even find a site. They have no...
destruction plan even on the drawing board."); Thomas Stock, Chemical and Biological Weapons
Developments and Proliferation, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 1993: WORLD ARmAmrs AND Dis-
ARMAMENT 259,277 (1993).
504 George Leopold, Russia Seeks Western, U.S. Aid To Destroy Chemical Weapons, DEF.
NEWS, Nov. 16-22, 1992, at 38; George Leopold, Russia Wants Early Chemical Demolition Start,
DEF. NEws, Aug. 10-16, 1992, at 6; Smithson, supra note 4, at 38, 42 (indicating the head of the
Russian CW destruction program has recommended to the Russian parliament that Russia delay
ratification of the CWC until sufficient foreign assistance for the dismantling efforts is obtained).
505 FORCES IN TRANsrnoN, supra note 499; Leopold, supra note 504, at 6; Amy E. Smithson,
Russia Wants Plastics, Too, BULL. ATOM. SCIEIMSTS, May-June 1994, at 14.
506 U.S. Plans and Programs Regarding Dismantling of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet
Union: Hearing Before Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), passim
[hereinafter U.S. Plans and Programs]; Dunbar Lockwood, Dribbling Aid to Russia, BULL.
ATOM. SCIENTsrs, July-Aug. 1993, at 39 [hereinafter Lockwood, Dribbling Aid]; Lee Ann Pat-
terson, A 'Marshall Plan' for the Former Soviet Union: Ideological Economic and Political Con-
siderations, Athis CoN-moL, Aug. 1993, at 181; Dunbar Lockwood, U.S., Russia Sign New
Agreements on Nuclear Dismantlement Assistance, ARMs CON ROL TODAY, Oct. 1993, at 21.
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as political and other impediments insert delays and conditions.50 7
Moreover, the aid program is necessarily spread quite thin, as the
country suffers from multiple, overlapping needs for physical infra-
structure, financial reorganization, and political revitalization.50
Even the segment of the money that has to date been dedicated to
military reform and conversion has, for plausible reasons, focused
quite heavily upon nuclear, rather than chemical, weapons.50 9 Only
approximately $55 million of the overall Nunn-Lugar aid package of
$800 million has been earmarked for CW dismantling efforts, and the
countries have not yet found fully effective ways to apply even that
modest sum. 510 The largest single project, a $30 million grant to sup-
507 Congress has authorized some $1.2 billion in assistance to the demilitarization programs of
the former U.S.S.R. under 1991 legislation colloquially known as Nunn-Lugar funding. U.S.
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, FACr SHEET U.S. NUNN-LUGAR SAFETY, SE-
cuRITY, DISMANTLEMENT PROGRAM (1994). However, the processes of formalizing the neces-
sary implementing accords, identifying specific projects for using those funds, and actually
disbursing the money have been protracted. By the summer of 1993, only half of the available
funds had been committed in principle to particular projects, only $31 million had been formally
obligated, and even less had actually been spent. Lockwood, Dribbling Aid, supra note 506. In
fact, some of the Congressional allocations were "lost," because they were time-limited and the
funds were not spent soon enough. John Deni & Dunbar Lockwood, DOD Plan Calls for More
Transparency in Managing U.S.-Russian Plutonium, ARMS CoNTROL TODAY, Apr. 1994, at 23.
On the American side, impediments to faster progress have included political inhibitions
against proceeding very quickly with the program, and the military's reluctance to release the
funding from other applications. On the recipients' side, both Ukraine and Kazakhstan were
initially reluctant to enter into the Safe and Secure Dismantlement (SSD) talks for internal polit-
ical reasons, and Russia has not always welcomed the particular kinds of assistance programs
that the United States was offering. The pace of the aid program, at last, seems to be accelerat-
ing. Lockwood, Dribbling Aid, supra note 506; U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY As-
SESSMENT, DISMANTLING THE BOMB AND MANAGING THE NUCLEAR MATERIALS 130 (1993)
[hereinafter DISMANTLING THE BOMB]; Fact Sheet: Safe and Secure Dismantling of Nuclear
Weapons in the New Independent States, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DIsPATcH, Jan. 1994, at 1, 6.
508 Under the SSD "umbrella agreement," Nunn-Lugar funds may be applied to projects that
promote the safe and secure transportation, storage, disabling, and safeguarding of weapons; the
conversion of defense industries; and the assessment of the environmental damage caused by
nuclear waste disposal. Lockwood, Dribbling Aid, supra note 506. In addition, the United
States has undertaken a wide array of other public and private assistance to Russia, involving
humanitarian relief, technical advice on converting to a private sector economy, and support in
building democratic institutions. Fact Sheet, U.S. Assistance to Russia, U.S. DEP'T STATE Dis-
PATCH, Aug. 1993, at Supp. 13.
509 The programs aimed at nuclear dismantling have-for obvious reasons-seized both the
headlines and a dominant share of the decisionmakers' attention. U.S. efforts have accorded
priority to supporting Russia (and other former Soviet republics) in storing, transporting, and
disposing of their most powerful arms in a safe and secure fashion. Martin Sieff, Moscow Balks
at Verification of Scrapped Nukes, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 30,1993, at Al; Dunbar Lockwood, Clin-
ton Seeks to Accelerate START I Deactivation Measures, ARMs CoNTROL TODAY, June 1993, at
27.
510 Under a U.S.-Russia agreement for cooperation in the safe, secure, and environmentally
sound destruction of the former U.S.S.R.'s CW stockpile, up to $25 million would be allocated to
programs for assisting the Russians in developing a national destruction plan, hosting Russian
interns in U.S. destruction facilities, providing safety and environmental technology and equip-
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port the construction of a Central Chemical Weapons Destruction An-
alytical Laboratory inside Russia,511 has been agreed upon, but the
money has not yet been disbursed.5 12
It is important to note that Russia is not wholly without resources
of its own to bring to the task of CW destruction. In fact, some ex-
perts opine that the Soviet Union's historic quantitative and qualita-
tive superiority in CW and related military technologies may now give
Russia something of a lead over the United States in selected aspects
of what could become a CW disarmament race.5 13 The U.S.S.R. and
Russia have certainly experimented with various CW destruction
technologies, not always reaching the same conclusions that their
American counterparts have developed. 514 It is quite possible that
Russian experts could teach their American interlocutors as much
about environmentally sound CW elimination techniques as vice-
versa.515
It is also clear that a large cadre of displaced Russian military
scientists, formerly employed in privileged positions within govern-
ment weapons laboratories or in other sensitive positions, is now ea-
gerly seeking other remunerative employment opportunities inside
the new republic.516 Applying their talents to the task of weapons de-
ment, and training key personnel. This is projected to be merely the modest start on a much
larger cooperative CW destruction program. Richardson Statement, supra note 497, at 8; U.S.
Plans and Programs, supra note 506, at 13, 26.
511 News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Sept. 1993, at 17 [hereinaf-
ter News Chronology]. The purposes of the plant will be to conduct environmental baseline
studies, to develop techniques to be used at the actual destruction locations, to provide training,
and to perform the quality control functions. Id. See also Michael R. Gordon, Pentagon Offers
New Way to Verify Disarmament, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,1994, at A6; ARMY ALTERNATIVES, supra
note 249, at 4-2.
512 By the end of 1992, only $1.6 million of the CW-related allotment had been spent, most of
it to fund a private United States consulting firm in establishing a Moscow field office. News
Chronology, supra note 511, at 17. Germany has also agreed to support certain aspects of the
incipient Russian CW disposal operation. Sutherland, supra note 498, at 7, 11.
513 Many commentators have noted the desirability of using the former Soviet military estab-
lishment-the scientists and soldiers who created the CW arsenal in the first place-to take the
lead in cleaning it up. POTENTIAL USES, supra note 58, passim; George Perkovich & William C.
Potter, Cleaning Up Russia's Future, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1992, at C2.
514 Georgi S. Leonov & Vladislav V. Sheluchenko, Principal Technological and Environmen-
tal Aspects of the Destruction of Chemical Weapons, 15 DISAR AMENT 94 (1992).
515 George Perkovich & William C. Potter, Coping with the Soviet Nuclear Brain Drain: An
Environmental Approach, MoNTEREY INSTITuTE OF INTL STUDIES NEWS BuLL., Dec. 1991;
ARMY ALTERNATVES, supra note 249, at 4-5; Leopold, supra note 504, at 6. But see KATHLEEN
C. BAILEY, DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THlE HANDS OF MANY: TiE ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGE
OF THE '90s, at 77-78 (1991) (suggesting that the CW destruction technologies that are optimal
for use in the United States might not simultaneously be best inside Russia, given differences in
infrastructure and social circumstances); ARMY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 249, at 4-3 (noting
differences in the composition of American and Russian CW stockpiles).
516 John J. ialka, Russian Scientists Change Their Work, Not Always Along Lines the U.S.
Likes, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1992, at A16.
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struction would be a mutually-attractive bargain, reducing the arsenal
and simultaneously reducing the scientists' possible incentives to par-
ticipate in a feared "brain drain," through which they might sell their
expertise to weapons-hungry, terrorist-sponsoring renegade countries
around the world. 517 Even if the United States and others518 had to
underwrite part of the effort to retrain the Russian experts, and even
if other types of substantial outside support were also required to pro-
mote the disarmament, function, it would surely be money well
spent.519
In addition, it should be noted that there is a multilateral synergy
between the Russian and the American CW dismantling campaigns.
That is, effective global implementation of the CWC requires that
both military giants participate fully in the program of destruction or
conversion of their CW-related assets. If either were to falter in that
effort, the other might well pause too, fearful of getting too far out in
front in unilateral disarmament, and the entire treaty regime would
then be imperiled.520
It is not, of course, logically essential for the American and Rus-
sian CW disarmament efforts to proceed in lock step.521 In fact, in the
new post-Cold War world order, it may be strongly in the United
States' interest to advance with our timely implementation of the
CWC dismantling obligations, even if Russia were unable, for
whatever reason, to follow suit precisely; getting rid of our unwanted,
dangerous CW stockpile and securing the faithful treaty adherence of
other countries-such as the third world, potential proliferators of
chemical weaponry, who might be agnostic about the CWC unless
firmly led (and pushed) into it-may now be even more important
517 William J. Broad, In Russia, Secret Labs Struggle to Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at
C5; R. Jeffrey Smith, Gates Fears Soviet 'Brain Drain,' WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1992, at A22.
518 Germany, in particular, has accepted responsibility for a special role in assisting Russia in
the destruction of chemical weapons. Joachim Badelt et al., Disposing of Chemical Weapons: A
Common Heritage Calls for a Cooperative Approach, 23 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALs 43,48 (1992).
519 The United States and Russia are already deeply involved in discussions about mutually-
supportive programs to destroy or convert to civilian purposes certain other aspects of the for-
mer Soviet military apparatus, such as weapons-grade plutonium and nuclear submarines. Wil-
liam J. Broad, A Plutonium Pact Will Aid Disposal, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 6, 1993, at All; Thomas
W. Lippman, Russia Thinks Plutonium From Arms Has Commercial Value, Congress Told,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 10, 1993, at A24; John J. Fialka, U.S. Is Studying Ways to Help Russia Dispose
of Aging Nuclear Submarines, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at A5C.
520 Amy E. Smithson, Conventional Wait, BuLu. ATOM. ScEMrns's, Sept. 1993, at 10. The
bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. chemical destruction agreement, supra text accompanying note 92, also
requires the two parties to dismantle their CW arsenals, but the text of that accord, as well as the
political realities underlying it, protect either party from having to proceed with the CW destruc-
tion any faster than the more tardy country is able to do. Id.
521 Herby, supra note 97, at 18.
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than obtaining the immediate eradication of all Russian CW.522 Origi-
nally, the CWC was conceptualized as being essentially of bilateral
interest; the main goal of the negotiations was to reduce the Soviet
chemical arsenal, and if other countries could be induced to partici-
pate in the regime, too, that was a bonus. However, world events
have radically altered that picture. Today, the main effect of the CWC
is multilateral arms control, as the prime CW threat originates in the
developing world, where rogue states and others who might sincerely,
but mistakenly, conclude that CW could be an attractive security op-
tion should be disarmed.5 23 If the United States were to delay imple-
menting the CWC because of Russia's possible tardiness, we would be
guilty of failing to recognize how the stakes, and our security priori-
ties, have shifted.
Finally, it should be noted that events in other countries, too, may
affect the American demilitarization efforts. Iraq, for example, is the
one country in which chemical weapons have recently been destroyed
publicly on a large scale.5 24 The dismantling of some fifty thousand
munitions there has been accomplished under United Nations aus-
pices through an ad hoc combination of neutralization, incineration,
and crude open-pit burning, sometimes using technologies that are ba-
sically consistent with the strictures of the CWC, but often employing
methods that would be patently inadmissible inside the United
States.5 25 CW-related facilities, too, have been eliminated or con-
verted to the destruction task, but again, not always in compliance
with the environmental protection policy of the CWC.526
522 See The U.N. Assembly; In Clinton's Words: U.N. Cannot Become Engaged in Every World
Conflict, N.Y. Timms, Sept. 28, 1993, at A16 ("I have made nonproliferation one of our nation's
highest priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of all of our relationships
with the world's nations and institutions.").
523 Thomas Bernauer, Towards a Comprehensive Chemical Warfare Control Regime: Some
Thoughts on the "Why" and "How," UNIDIR NEwSL. (United Nations Institute for Disarma-
ment Research, Geneva, Switzerland), Dec. 1992, at 5; Jean Pascal Zanders, Chemical Weapons:
Beyond Emotional Concerns, 21 BuLL. PEACE PRoPosALs 87 (1990).
524 John Gee, The Destruction, Removal or Rendering Harmless of Iraq's Chemical Warfare
Capability, 15 DISARMAMENT 77 (1992); U.N. Inspectors Fly to Iraq To Destroy Chemical Arms,
N.Y. T MEs, Jan. 22, 1993, at A6; FROM VERSAILLES TO BAGHDAD: PosT-WAR ARMAMENT
CONTROL OF DEFEATED STATES 151-53 (Fred Tanner ed., 1992).
525 Gee, supra note 524; NRC ALTERNATivES, supra note 129, at 72-73 (describing that 400-
500 tons of mustard were incinerated, and 70 tons of GB were neutralized in 1992-93); Doty,
supra note 132, at 28 (describing that Iraqi arsenal is estimated at 50,000-100,000 weapons; Iraq
claims to have destroyed 25,000 munitions during summer 1992); Ambassador RolfEkeus: Un-
earthing Iraq's Arsenal, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1992, at 6-7 (indicating that the maximum
size of Iraqi CW inventory is 50,000 weapons; some are rockets already leaking chemical agent
and will be destroyed using explosives) [hereinafter Ekeus].
526 Gee, supra note 524; Ekeus, supra note 525, at 8 (explaining that the Iraqi plant at al-
Multhana, originally used for producing CW, has been converted to the CW elimination task;
United Nations inspectors also considered importing a Canadian mustard gas disposal facility).
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Some commentators doubt that United Nations investigators
have yet been able to locate the entirety of the Iraqi weapons infra-
structure; there may still be quantities of chemical agent, materiel, or
production equipment to be unearthed and eliminated.527 Should that
destruction process, too, be conducted without conformity to the high-
est standards of environmental protection? Should the international
community be so eager to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction
that we tolerate incomplete adherence to ecological and safety meas-
ures that we would otherwise insist upon in our own back yards?528 If
the CWC comes into force for Iraq, will that change the requirements
for balancing the competition between environmentalism and
disarmament? 529
No other countries have publicly admitted the current possession
of an active CW stockpile, although American intelligence experts
have long suspected that several are (or could have become) covert
members of the "CW Club," and that many others may have been
assiduously pursuing that status.530 Certainly, other countries ("past
possessors") have admitted prior CW deployment, and many have ac-
cumulated significant experience with various disposal techniques.5 31
When the treaty enters into force, and the reporting and inspection
responsibilities kick in, several more countries' well-kept national CW
secrets may come tumbling out of the closet, and the dismantling obli-
gations may become rather more dispersed.532 Abandoned and obso-
lete CW arsenals, too, will require remediation,533 so the incipient
527 Gee, supra note 524; Paul Lewis, U.N. Sends Atom-Detecting Copters to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1993, at 14; ROD BARTON, CHEMICAL WEAPONS INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ: VERIFICATION
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (Australian National University
Peace Research Center, Working Paper No. 131, 1993).
528 Badelt et al., supra note 518, at 46 (arguing that the international community should not
require Iraq to destroy its CW so quickly that environmental considerations are overlooked).
529 A small-scale incineration facility used to destroy Iraqi CW could be adapted as a model, a
training site, or an operational plant available to dispose of CW held by other Middle Eastern
countries. Morrison, supra note 196, at 1104.
530 Richardson Statement, supra note 497, at 2 (citing concerns about the spread of chemical
warfare capability to as many as 24 countries).
531 NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 62-74 (noting CW disposal experience of Canada,
Germany, and Britain); Doty, supra note 132, at 28-29 (indicating Austria, Italy, Belgium have
experience building or destroying chemical munitions).
532 Some of the CWC's key declaration requirements become operative very shortly after the
treaty enters into force. Within 30 days after the effective date of the agreement, each party
must provide initial statements about its current and previous ownership or possession of CW, its
receipt or transfer of CW, and its knowledge of any other state's CW located on its territory. In
addition, parties must provide production data for the previous three years for some chemicals
and for the upcoming calendar year for all regulated chemicals. CWC, supra note 1, art. III; Lois
R. Ember, Chemical Arms Treaty Makes Unprecedented Demands of Industry, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS, June 1993, at 7, 10.
533 Even highly industrialized and chemically-sophisticated societies, such as Germany, may
encounter severe difficulty in destroying old chemical munitions that were abandoned after
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clash between disarmament and environmentalism could be a drama
unfurled in a number of countries-none of which could afford to be
seen as insensitive to either set of imperatives.534
The world is becoming more engaged in environmental issues,
even, or especially, when there is a concomitant security dimension.535
And increasingly, that global attention has had an effect-not neces-
sarily decisive, but often influential. For example, opposition from Pa-
cific Ocean littoral states536 has played a role in scuttling any
American ideas about destroying the entire United States CW stock-
pile at Johnston Island 537 -the image of the Pacific as America's re-
luctant dumping ground has mobilized efforts culminating in a
congressional prohibition on expansion of the JACADS mandate.538
Destroying, transporting, or even long-term storing, of chemical weap-
ons or other hazards in anybody's back yard has thus become much
more complicated.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Many observers will be sympathetic to both factions in this novel
public policy debate, recognizing the importance of cleaning up the
CW arsenal without further destroying the environment. And many
observers will also be unwilling to surrender very much on either
point, reluctant to sacrifice either the CWC and the urgency of ex-
ploiting what might be a fleeting "window of opportunity" for the
achievement of chemical disarmament, or the host of hard-fought en-
vironmental priorities and standards that have finally worked their
way into American law.
The most felicitous outcome, of course, would be a technological,
economic, and political solution that allows all these values to be
served simultaneously. While we should continue to hold out hope
World Wars I and II. Badelt et al., supra note 518, at 44 (explaining Germany has only one CW
destruction facility, with very limited capacity, but a large quantity of still-lethal abandoned
munitions may yet be discovered); Doty, supra note 132, at 29.
534 See Robinson, supra note 181, at 93 (noting how many countries have adopted some ver-
sion of NEPA procedures).
535 See id. at 103 (suggesting that customary international law (i.e., rules that are binding upon
states independent of treaty obligations) is developing a requirement that countries study the
environmental impacts before undertaking actions that could adversely affect international natu-
ral resources).
536 See Micronesia Memorandum, supra note 145.
537 Johnston Island has virtually no full-time indigenous population, other than personnel as-
signed there in connection with American military activities, and is hundreds of miles away from
any substantial population centers.
538 The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-172, 105 Stat.
11506, bars the shipment of any additional chemical munitions to Johnston Island, with the ex-
ception of approximately 90 old mustard shells recently discovered in the Solomon Islands and
any other archaic U.S. CW that suddenly turns up elsewhere in the Pacific. Morrison, supra note
196, at 1104.
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for-and to work assiduously toward-that nirvana, no one can be
confident that it will prove to be fully attainable, or that it will appear
within the time frame mandated by the treaty539 and within the finan-
cial cost structure that the range of treaty parties will be willing to
bear.5 40 There is also the question, lurking in the background, of
whether there are wider implications of the unraveling CWC drama:
is this a precedent for any other arms control regimes that might be
developed in the future,541 such as the nascent efforts to destroy at last
the planet-jeopardizing stockpiles of nuclear542 and conventional5 43
539 Prior U.S. statutes, too, have incorporated timetables for the destruction of the chemical
stockpile, but those deadlines always proved quite malleable, and subsequent statutes repeatedly
moved the "finish line" back to whatever point the Army requested. Supra note 232. The
treaty, in contrast, will not be subject to unilateral American modification.
540 Perfect safety is unattainable in major human activities, as there are risks (to the environ-
ment, to public health and safety, etc.) inherent in any option. The task is to attempt to under-
stand, measure, manage, reduce, and select among the potpourri of risks. See BONINE &
McGARITY, supra note 189, at 598.
541 The United States has recently undertaken a new diplomatic initiative aimed at producing
an international agreement to limit the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. Such an
accord might require countries to place their existing stockpiles of plutonium and highly-en-
riched uranium under international safeguards, it might mandate the closure (and clean up) of
former production facilities, and it might otherwise inspire a range of environment-related activi-
ties comparable to those of the CWC. See R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Ready to Propose New Limits
On Materials for Nuclear Weapons, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,1993, at A4; FEDERATION OF AMERi-
CAN SCIENTISTS, ENDING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS; VERIFYING
THE DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS (1991).
542 As the START agreements and other important nuclear arms control accords begin to
take effect, the United States, Russia, and other countries will be driven to reduce substantially
their stockpiles of nuclear armaments. The methodology for accomplishing these eliminations is
still under development-in some instances, candidate technologies (such as cryofracture) are
strikingly similar to those under consideration for CW destruction, and the concurrent environ-
mental constraints are cognates, too. Breaking Up (a Bomb) Is Hard to Do, 261 SCIENCE 1673
(Constance Holden ed., 1993); Frans Berkhout et al., Plutonium: True Separation Anxiety, BUL.
ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Nov. 1992, at 28; Holly Idelson, Nuclear Weapons Complex Braces for Over-
haul, 50 CONG. Q. 1066 (1992); Theodore B. Taylor & Lev P. Feoktistov, Verified Elimination of
Nuclear Warheads and Disposition of Contained Nuclear Materials, in VERIFICATION: MONrrOR-
ING DISARMAMENT 45 (Francesco Calogero et al. eds., 1991); Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Is Un-
equipped to Disarm A-Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at A13; David C. Morrison, After the
Race, 25 NAT'L J. 2837 (1993); DiSMANTuNG THE BOMB, supra note 507.
543 As the U.S. military structure shrinks in response to the ending of the Cold War and the
continuation of budgetary constraints, increasing numbers of surplus conventional weapons
(everything from rockets to grenades to torpedoes) will need to be destroyed, and the closure of
now-excess military installations will also prompt a $100 billion environmental cleanup task.
Worldwide, the market for demilitarization of conventional arms could reach $5 billion. Barry
Meier, Breaking Down an Arms Buildup, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at D1; David C. Morrison,
Batting Cleanup, 24 NAT'L J. 2492 (1992); Brian Bremner, If You Can't Build Weapons, Destroy
'Em, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at 86; HIDDEN DANGERS: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF
PREPARING FOR WAR passim (Anne H. Ehrlich & John W. Birks eds., 1990).
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weaponry?544 Even aside from the fields of disarmament and environ-
mentalism,545 might other, more distant, areas of public policy also
benefit from the attempt here to develop a simultaneous solution to
two conflicting, pressing social and technical problems?546
This Article recommends that the efforts to pursue both CW dis-
mantling and environmental protection should now proceed via
"bending" United States commitments and policies-in two different
senses. 547 First, some of our existing national priorities will have to be
"bent" (to yield, to be stretched or twisted-but not quite to be bro-
ken) to accommodate competing concerns. Second, some of our na-
tional policy tools and implementing powers should be "bent," in the
sense of being harnessed and applied to a task, to exercise and effectu-
ate a set of necessary compromises. This section sketches five such
bending transformations.
A. Bend Existing Environmental Law
Timely and effective exercise of the disarmament and verification
obligations of the CWC will require some relief from existing state
and federal environmental statutes and regulations. The implement-
ing legislation for the treaty548 (or perhaps some later enactment)
should therefore specify that NEPA, the host of federal antipollution
544 Herby, supra note 97, at 14 (explaining that for many of its parties, the CWC will be the
first experience with an arms control agreement requiring truly intrusive verification; its success
may encourage them to accept additional such measures).
545 Aside from the weapons applications of nuclear technology, civilian nuclear power plants
have also incited a range of environmental and other policy concerns, such as how to dispose of
the resulting waste products, how to ensure safe and clean operation, and how to retrofit hazard-
ous Eastern European reactors with adequate protective devices to avoid a second Chernobyl.
The tradeoffs between environmentalism and society's need for electricity is another complex
social dilemma, comparable in some ways to those assessed in this Article. Paul Lewis, Aid Plan
Drafted for Atomic Safety in Eastern Europe, N.Y. TimEs, May 21, 1992, at Al; Margaret Kriz,
Wasting Away, 25 NAT'L J. 2430 (1993).
546 For example, there is also an emerging tension today between the important public values
of increased international "free trade" and enhanced protection of the natural environment, as
manifest in the controversies regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement, supra text
accompanying notes 219-20, and in connection with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Case for Free Trade, Sci. AM., Nov. 1993, at 42; Herman E.
Daly, The Perils of Free Trade, Sci. AM., Nov. 1993, at 50.
547 Cf HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrTY CONSTtTTON: SHARING POWER AFrER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 43-44 (1990) (indicating executive branch strives to "bend," if not
"break," treaties).
548 The CWC, like many international agreements, is at least partially non-self-executing, re-
quiring the passage of domestic implementing legislation before it can become fully operative as
internal law for the United States. RESTATEMENT, supra note 203, § 111. Numerous provisions
of the CWC explicitly contemplate subsequent domestic enactments to bring the parties into full
compliance. IMPLEMENTAnON MANUAL, supra note 197, at 6. See, eg., CWC, supra note 1, art.
VII.1; see also Felix C. Calderon, National Implementation Measures, UNIDIR NEwsL. (United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzerland), Dec. 1992, at 14.
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statutes, and the environmental laws of the several affected states
shall be waived in certain respects, not to apply with their usual vigor
to all aspects of the CWC construction, operation, and inspection
functions.
These exceptions, however, should be crafted narrowly. For ex-
ample, regarding the NEPA requirements, the Army and cooperating
agencies should still be required to write all the relevant environmen-
tal impact statements for major federal actions and should still circu-
late them at the appropriate stages for widespread public information
and comment. But the construction activity on the CW elimination
facilities should be allowed to proceed independently, without being
held up by endless delays in the EIS process. 549 Similarly, the Army
should be held to full compliance with the requirements to provide
community awareness and emergency preparedness planning, but
should not defer construction and procurement pending the comple-
tion of those documents and procedures.
In the same vein, the Army should be held to full compliance
with reasonable substantive emissions ceilings incorporated into rele-
vant federal and state antipollution standards, but states should not be
allowed to veto the projects, and the timetable for state action in re-
viewing and granting the necessary permits should be expedited by
federal law. For example, if a particular state is taking too long to
evaluate and issue a required RCRA or Clean Air permit, the Army
should be able to obtain a federal release in order to allow the activity
(construction or testing, for example) to proceed as required.550 In
addition, there should be a provision allowing expeditious waiver of
applicable permit limitations where necessary to facilitate a fully ef-
fective on-site inspection under the treaty. The objective should be to
allow the inspection to occur as required by the CWC, to ensure that
it be completed as safely and cleanly as possible, and to report and
remediate ex post whenever the relevant permit has been exceeded.
The Army should also be required to perform the elimination
functions as cleanly and safely as possible, but timeliness should also
549 This recommendation might appear to turn NEPA on its head: the statute contemplates
that ordinarily an EIS would be drafted prior to undertaking any major federal action, as an aid
to the agency in making an intelligent choice. My proposal, on the other hand, would allow the
government to proceed with the CW elimination and only concurrently or subsequently study
and publicize the environmental effects. In fact, however, critics of NEPA assert that in a great
many instances the preparation of an EIS is already largely a post hoc exercise, used by the
agency to justify a course of action that it has already selected. See Wood, supra note 202, at 197.
550 See MITRE, supra note 289, at 3-8 (describing tardiness by Army and individual states in
seeking and reviewing necessary permits); Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that state
governments, being either conciliatory or reticent, can greatly speed up or slow down the pro-
cess of obtaining a RCRA or Clean Air permit necessary to begin construction of an incinera-
tor); IssuEs AFFEcrrNG, supra note 254, at 28-29; OBSTACLEs TO THE PLAN, supra note 306, at
23-24.
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be included as a fixed parameter. This means, for example, that to the
extent incinerators continue to be used for CW destruction, the NRC
recommendations regarding pollution abatement techniques for
smoke stack emissions551 should be incorporated, even if they are
costly and their ultimate contribution to a cleaner smoke plume is
marginal. In a sense, if "something has to give" in balancing our com-
peting social interests, the first constraint to loosen should be the
budget-if necessary, we will spend somewhat more to accomplish the
disarmament; then the details, especially the procedural and timeli-
ness standards, of existing environmental law; and only last the inter-
national law obligations of the CWC.
A major function of environmental laws such as NEPA, of course,
is to help the government make better, more informed decisions about
potentially polluting activities, and these managerial measures should
be fully effectuated and enhanced. 552 The CWC, for example, would
benefit from a complete legislative environmental impact statement.
Even if the document arrives far later than the usual timetable, Con-
gress and the public should be apprised of the full range of environ-
mental consequences and the potential alternative methodologies and
locations that might be available.5 53 Likewise, the Army should un-
dertake more citizen outreach efforts, to attempt to inform a skeptical
public and to provide affected communities the most current data on
the range of possible activities and hazards.5 54 But there should be no
551 Supra text accompanying notes 435-40.
552 See Robinson, supra note 181, at 110 (calling the environmental assessment process "the
single best management handle for reaching the point of decision-making, in whatever agency");
Doyle, supra note 181, at 19 (noting the Army has learned that "the NEPA process is a valuable
tool to decision making"). But see Wood, supra note 202, at 197 (stating that EISs are mostly not
cost-effective substantive decisionmaking tools); Robert Davis, Do We Exalt EIS Form Over
Substance?, in ENVIROMENTAL IMPACr ASSESSMENT, supra note 181, at 203 (indicating that form
is often more important than substance in EIS documentation).
553 Inherent in the EIS process is the requirement that the agency's survey of available policy
alternatives should include study of all the reasonable options, not just the agency's favored one
or few. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4332(2)(C)(iii), 2(E) (West 1977); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1993); LArros &
TOMAiN, supra note 197, at 236-38. In the case of a treaty the primary choices might appear to
be simply two: approve the treaty as signed, or reject it (the "no action" alternative). In fact,
however, in many instances, renegotiation of the treaty, or approval of it with reservations might
also have noticeably different environmental impacts. See ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY, supra note 184. However, the CWC does not allow reservations to its major provi-
sions, so only "renegotiation" would be a legal possibility, and it is not likely to be a politically
viable alternative. See CWC, supra note 1, art. XXII.
554 The Army has undertaken substantial community awareness programs at each of the eight
intended locations in connection with the preparation of the programmatic and site-specific
EISs. See PEIS, supra note 130, at 1.8-11, supp. R; Owen Statement, supra note 4, at 16; Meet-
ings and Workshops Inform the Public and Clarify Misconceptions, CHEMICAL DEMILrrARiZA-
TION UPDATE, Nov. 1993, at 5. Citizen Advisory Commissions (with members appointed by the
governor) have been established at many of the sites, New Year-New Legislation, CHEMICAL
DEMILIrARIZATION UPDATE, Jan. 1993 at 1, and national meetings of Intergovernmental Con-
89.445 (1995)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
veto or impediment of the CWC's obligations-the dismantling
should proceed; the inspectors should be allowed to enter, take sam-
ples, and conduct their inquiries; and all the other operational aspects
of the treaty should be effectuated in a timely fashion, in pursuit of the
enduring, overriding national policy of chemical disarmament.
B. Bend the CWC
At the same time, the arms control side of the equation cannot
emerge unscathed from the conflict with environmental law. In par-
ticular, I recommend that the Army now abandon its plans to accom-
plish the complete destruction of the CW stockpile and non-stockpile
materiel within the treaty's ten-year period through exclusive reliance
upon the baseline incineration technology at the eight continental
U.S. sites. Instead, I suggest a common sense compromise, taking ad-
vantage of existing resources and seeking out new opportunities, as
follows: (1) proceed with testing and, if reasonable existing environ-
mental standards can be met, operation of the JACADS-style inciner-
ator at Tooele, Utah because that facility is simply too far along to
abandon;555 (2) advance cautiously with the permit applications for
only one additional incinerator, probably the Anniston, Alabama unit,
which is the next furthest along in the convoluted chain of develop-
ment, as a "standby" or fallback option, without now making an irrev-
ocable commitment to constructing or operating it;556 (3) explore
diverse alternative elimination technologies with vigor and rigor, and
prove our sincerity in the search for better methodologies by prudent
investment of substantial governmental research funds;557 and (4) to
ensure that the CWC's' ten-year timetable can be met, the Army
should now begin making plans for undertaking a timely neutraliza-
tion operation, to deweaponize the arsenal, denature and stabilize the
components, and seek a more completely tolerable future environ-
sultation and Coordination Boards have been convened. 1992 Annual Report, supra note 141, at
10; NAS STocKPILE CoMMrraEE, supra note 140, at 123-24.
555 This one facility is already projected to destroy almost half the existing U.S. chemical
weapons stockpile within three years. That component of the overall job alone is too valuable to
throw away, and if the Tooele, Utah plant were to operate for an additional four years, it could
solve a big part of the total stockpile problem. PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-2, 2-65.
556 With two incineration facilities (Tooele, Utah and Anniston, Alabama) operating concur-
rently, the entire CW stockpile could be eliminated well within the treaty's allowed ten years. In
addition, if alternative technologies came on-line during the relevant period, one or both of the
incinerators could be de-commissioned. Moreover, the drain-denature-store strategy would pro-
vide additional time to research and develop a more satisfactory solution to the destruction
problem, while still complying with the basic mandate of the CWC.
557 Infra notes 598-99. A broad-ranging research agenda could plausibly include investigation
of improved incineration technologies to make the JACADS-style "baseline" approach even
safer and cleaner, as well as inquiry into completely different CW destruction methodologies.
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mental solution to the problem of ultimate destruction of the toxic
materials.
It is important to recall that the treaty requires the parties to "de-
stroy" their chemical weapons, but it does not specify incineration or
any other technology; the goal is to preclude weaponization of the
chemical substances, and that prophylaxis could be accomplished via
means far short of complete eradication of the chemicals and all their
residues.5 58 In the treaty's terms, "'Destruction of chemical weapons'
means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially
irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical
weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and
other devices unusable as such."55 9
The substantive arms control interests would thus be amply satis-
fied if the United States were, in a reliable and verifiable fashion, to:
(1) separate the lethal agent from the ordnance; (2) cut, crush, or
puncture any operational delivery systems, such as shells, bombs, or
mines; (3) chemically denature the toxic agents, so they were,
although perhaps still terribly hazardous, no longer suitable for war-
fare purposes, such as by forcing an irreversible chemical reaction, ad-
ding impurities or otherwise; and (4) store the resulting toxic waste
products, under international safeguards,5 60 pending the evolution of
acceptable technologies for their complete incineration or other
elimination. 561
This deferral of the ultimate eradication of the lethal chemicals
will not be inexpensive. Any denaturing procedures would require
558 The process of "demilitarizing" the chemical weapons, as a first step toward "destroying"
them, implies more than simply draining the lethal agent out of the munition. In addition, the
munitions must be rendered useless, the agents must be safeguarded against accidents or sabo-
tage, and reliable assurances must be provided to guard against a party's later simply repouring
the agent into new weapons. SIEGEL, supra note 256, at 14. Cf. Robert Seely, Ukrainian Retreats
on A-Pledge, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1993, at A31 (noting that the Ukraine proposes, as an alter-
native to dismantling the nuclear missiles on its territory, "creatively" partially neutralizing
them, by deactivating their coding mechanisms, so they could no longer threaten the United
States).
559 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, part IV(A).C.12.
560 The United States could provide reliable assurances that the denatured chemical residues
were no longer suitable for chemical weapons applications and that they were not, in fact, being
adapted for those purposes. The Army could invite international observers to visit the storage
facilities, install permanent technical monitoring equipment, and emplace self-authenticating,
tamper-proof seals or tags on the containers, comparable to those employed in other arms con-
trol applications. See Mark Mullen, Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention: Summary
of Lessons Learned from the Verification Experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
CENTER FOR NATIONAL SEcuRrms STUDIES BRIEFING, Dec. 1991.
561 See NRC ALTERNATIVES, supra note 129, at 196-205. A variety of techniques could be
employed to detoxify the chemical agents. Even if the reaction stopped far short of complete
neutralization, it could be sufficient to render the resulting substance unsuitable for weapons
purposes. Id. at 110-22; GREENPEACE ALTERNATIVES, supra note 425, at 81; NAS STocKPILE
COMMrrEE, supra note 140, at 109, 126, 159.
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new laboratories in which to develop and conduct the de-weaponiza-
tion reactions, possibly expensive chemical inputs, and additional se-
cure long-term, large-volume storage facilities.562 Handling the lethal
agents more often than absolutely necessary will run additional envi-
ronmental risks-some experts conclude that the "front-end process-
ing" (the manipulation of the munitions prior to the incineration of
the chemicals) is the most dangerous, unstable aspect of any disman-
tling operation,563 and under this recommended type of two-step sce-
nario, we would have to undertake that preparatory handling activity
twice.5 64
Also, any chemical processing to eliminate the weapons capacity
of the toxic agents would surely create a much larger overall quantity
of hazardous wastes-a morass that would still be highly dangerous to
the environment, exposed for an additional period of time to all man-
ner of natural and human risk factors.56 5 In addition, it should be
noted that neutralization processes are applicable for disposal of the
agents alone; some other mechanism (incineration or an alternative)
would still be required to consume, clean, or dispose of the shell cas-
ings, explosives, dunnage, etc.566
But the drain-denature-and-store scenario does buy time. It al-
lows military and civilian experts an additional opportunity to invent
or adapt a more secure, environmentally-friendly destruction tech-
nique and still comply with the CWC's ten-year goal. By "punting"
the problem into the future-hopefully only a short time into the fu-
ture-we can create a breathing space within which to allow addi-
562 The storage costs for lethal chemical weapons (or for the still-toxic products generated by
denaturing the agents) would be substantial. If long-term retention is a possibility (to provide an
additional opportunity for developing more satisfactory destruction methodologies), then the
storage system would likely be even more expensive than the existing $60-100 million per year
programs. See Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989 and Over-
sight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the House Armed Services Comm., supra note
141, at 158; Department of Defense Appropriations for 1988: Hearings before Subcomm. of
House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 1987, part 5; Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1989: Hearing before Subcomm. on the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm.
on Appropriations, supra note 140, at 13, 25; Status of 1990 Bilaterals, supra note 123, at 21-22;
1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 20. In addition, as the overall destruction program is
stretched out, the total costs inevitably rise. See Government Operations Hearings, supra note
306, at 125 (estimating that each year of delay in the CW destruction program costs $350
million).
563 See PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-29 to 2-34; Mikulak, supra note 107, at 13.
564 On the other hand, the disassembly is also by far the most expensive phase of CWV elimina-
tion (e.g., 10 to 20 times as costly as agent destruction), and under either program, that major
cost would be incurred only once. Doty, supra note 132, at 25.
565 Supra note 384. The Army has undertaken to perform additional stockpile surveillance, in
order to ensure that leaks or other accidents in the about-to-be-destroyed stockpile do not jeop-
ardize the community. ARmy ALTERNATivEs, supra note 249, at 3-27.
566 ARmy ALTERNATVES, supra note 249, at 3-9.
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tional creativity and additional resources to come to bear upon the
problem and still achieve the overarching disarmament objectives.5 67
C. Bend "NIMBY"
The popular public anathema against undertaking any hazardous
activities in any particular locale will also have to yield-the weapons
are here, and we simply have to do something about them. In the case
of the CW elimination function, this means making some hard polit-
ical choices that might temporarily disadvantage one community in
favor of other communities and the country as a whole-not an easy
policy to implement in a democracy.
The rational thing to do at this point is to reverse the Army's
1988 decision to destroy the weapons on-site at all eight installa-
tions.568 At some of the locations, the quantity of stored CW is so
small that on-site disposal is not cost-effective; removal under even
very elaborate and painstaking transportation arrangements would be
more sensible. At some sites, the weapons are housed so near a popu-
lation center that the social dangers are too great. No matter how
many precautions we build into the incineration or other elimination
operations, it is still prudent to try to reduce the probability of mass
human exposure.569 At some sites, grass roots organizations have
been so successful at marshalling public opposition that it would be
foolhardy to persist with the projected facility-even a massive public
relations campaign might be insufficient to quell the dysfunctional
popular antagonism. At some sites, the process of obtaining the ap-
propriate permits and constructing the necessary facilities is already so
567 In fact, it might be appealing, under this logic, to "punt" the entire problem of CW de-
struction into the future, by not doing any incineration right now, and holding all the drained
and denatured chemicals indefinitely, until a better technology is invented. I propose, however,
that the United States should proceed cautiously but promptly to begin getting rid of at least
some of its CW arsenal. My suggested compromise is to advance slowly with incineration and
simultaneously to increase our research effort into more viable alternatives-but not to defer the
problem forever. I would also sustain the operations of the current CAMDS incineration facility
at Tooele, Utah (upgraded by the retrofitting of additional suitable environmental protection
enhancements) to help work down the existing stockpile. See PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-37;
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1988: Hearing Before Subcomm. of House Comm. on
Appropriations, supra note 562, at 46 (explaining that delaying the CW destruction in order to
investigate alternative technologies will raise programmatic costs); see also ARmY ALTERNA-
Tvas, supra note 249, at 3-22 (discussing maintaining CAMDS).
568 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-131. This would require a change in the existing statutory
mandate, which currently forbids the Army from even studying relocation alternatives. See
supra note 335.
569 See PEIS, supra note 130, at 3-5 to 3-22 (characterizing the population, schools, develop-
ment, and other resources near the Aberdeen, Maryland facility), 3-37 to 3-55 (undertaking the
same neighborhood analysis for Lexington, Kentucky); Satcheil, supra note 4; Government Op-
erations Hearings, supra note 306, at 143 (identifying, for each of the 8 proposed sites, how many
people live within a 35 kilometer (22 mile) radius, and illustrating that Aberdeen is by far the
largest, with 1.2 million people).
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far behind schedule that there are real questions about the Army's
ability to achieve the local goals even under the best of circum-
stances-a late, slow start may prove fatal to a location's ability to
make a timely contribution to the CWC.570
Using these criteria, the three most problematic sites are Aber-
deen, Maryland; Lexington, Kentucky; and Newport, Indiana. Omit-
ting them from the roster of incineration or other elimination depots
would not substantially increase the physical burden at the other loca-
tions and would appreciably ease the financial and regulatory burden
upon the overall dismantling program. 571 If the project were altered
in a more substantial way, such as by concentrating all the elimina-
tions at only two or three national locations (Tooele, Utah; Anniston,
Alabama; and perhaps Umatilla, Oregon or the experimental cry-
ofracture facility at Pueblo, Colorado572) the balance of political and
economic factors might be even more favorable, and the logistical ob-
jections, though serious, could be overcome.5 73
I also recommend that at each location where an incinerator or
other elimination facility will be built, the affected community574
should have the local option to decide whether the plant should be
promptly dismantled by the Army at the conclusion of the CW cam-
paign, or whether it should be converted for purposes of handling
other types of municipal or industrial wastes in the future.575 Some
570 Of course, shifting more of the elimination burden to the Tooele, Utah facility would
likely pose additional costs and environmental risks at that site. PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-103
to 2-112.
571 Those three facilities together contain only approximately 11% of the total U.S. stockpile.
Supra text accompanying note 136.
572 An additional relevant consideration, beyond the scope of this Article, arises from the
growing concept of "environmental justice." This set of concerns would question the placement
of hazardous activities such as CW elimination facilities, to ensure that they were not dispropor-
tionately located in low-income, minority, or other communities that were consistently disadvan-
taged by government policies. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton to Order Pollution Policy
Cleared of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1994, at Al; American Bar Association, Standing Comm.
on Environmental Law, Comm'n on Homelessness and Poverty et al., Draft Report to the House
of Delegates (June 29, 1993); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental
Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993). In
fact, most of the communities where American strategic weapons are based are noticeably below
the national medians in key economic indicators of income and growth. START I LEIS, supra
note 47, at 4.75, 78.
573 See infra text acompanying notes 581-97 (regarding transportation routes).
574 One difficulty not addressed in this Article is what, precisely, is the relevant "community"
for purposes of making this decision about dismantling or converting the CW elimination facil-
ity. It is possible that the affected town, county, region, and state citizens and officials might
come to different conclusions.
575 Some experts have opined that the small size and specialized design of the JACADS-style
incineration facilities make them unsuited for conversion to other waste disposal applications. A
MITRE Corporation report concluded that "for many potential future uses, the demilitarization
facilities are not economically viable options." Morrison, supra note 196, at 1104.
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localities may already have adequate waste disposal mechanisms, but
others are still searching for alternatives and might consider retention
of a small incinerator or other facility suitable for a niche in the econ-
omy. Different communities might therefore weigh the tradeoff be-
tween environment and jobs differently, and the new technologies to
be created in the coming years might alter the balance of interests,
too. In this circumstance, it should be a local choice.5 76
In addition, I recommend that the JACADS facility be strength-
ened and kept operating. For all its imperfections, JACADS is cur-
rently the only functioning CW destruction installation available to
the United States. Although its small size would make it impractical
to expect it to accept any major portion of the total CW elimination
operation, it can still make a contribution.5 77 At least on a public rela-
tions level, the fact that the United States has already started disman-
tling its CW stockpile and is sustaining that function month after
month, while seeking even better technologies, creates a favorable
picture. And JACADS could serve a valuable training function, in-
structing those who would later operate comparable incinerators in-
side the United States and elsewhere.5 78 It is even possible that
JACADS could serve as a suitable location for the destruction of
other countries' CW stockpiles, where the small size of a particular
CWC party's national arsenal suggested that construction of a local
incineration or other facility was inefficient.579 To those who protest
continued American usage of the Pacific Ocean as a remote "dumping
ground" for hazardous activities,58 0 we could note that the continental
576 Cf. lm Carrington, A Kentucky County And the Army Have Nervous Relationship, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1; Ken Wells, Utah Town Likes Its Nerve-Gas Bombs Because They Help
the Local Economy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 22.
577 The Army did evaluate, in summary fashion, the options of relocating the entire CW in-
ventory (or, alternatively, solely the Aberdeen, Maryland portion of the stockpile) to Johnston
Atoll for destruction, but rejected that alternative due to the cumbersome logistics. PEIS, supra
note 130, at 2-81 to 2-84.
578 The Army has constructed a Chemical Demilitarization Training Facility (CDTF) at the
Aberdeen, Maryland base, to train the operators, maintenance workers, and others for actual
operations at JACADS, Tooele, Utah, and elsewhere. CDTF also plays a valuable role in
"trouble shooting" problems that have arisen during the destruction process. Owen Statement,
supra note 4, at 10-11; The CDTF-Dual Purposes, CHEmiCAL DEMILrrARIZATION UPDATE,
July 1993, at 2; Department of Defense Appropriations for 1989: Hearings before Subcomm. on
the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, supra note 140, at 57-58.
579 Most other likely CWC parties have not yet admitted the possession of any weapons or
other items subject to elimination under the treaty, but when it enters into force, some of them
may well be compelled to declare hidden materiel. In some instances, the revealed quantity may
justify the construction of an on-site destruction facility, but in others, it would be wasteful to
insist upon erecting a dedicated facility of such short-term utility. See David Pugliese, Canada
Puts New Spin on Incineration, DEF. NEws, July 27, 1992, at 9 (explaining that Canada used a
portable incinerator to destroy its small stockpile of mustard and nerve agents).
580 Ember, supra note 9, at 14-15. When the Army proposed moving American chemical
weapons from Okinawa to Umatilla, Oregon, Congress reacted by passing Section 13 of Pub. L.
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United States territory, too, will house at least one or two larger-scale
destruction facilities, sharing the burdens and risks of the overall
program.
All of this requires, of course, that chemical weapons will be
transported from one secure military reservation to another for disas-
sembly and destruction.58' Previous studies have identified this type
of long-distance movement as one of the most hazardous aspects of
any dismantling program,582 and the Army will have to develop tech-
niques for avoiding or mitigating a myriad of dangers, such as vehicle
accidents, weather mishaps, and terrorist attacks.5 83 Preliminary indi-
cations are that rail transport should be used, rather than truck (be-
cause too many trips would be required 584 ) or air (because of the
danger of a catastrophic accident5s8 ), and that the routing should be
arranged to avoid major population centers to the extent feasible.586
Obviously, extra precautions, such as providing military security es-
corts,587 selecting the track routes that are in the best physical condi-
tion,588 and rerouting other traffic, should be implemented. Special
packaging for the agents and munitions should be developed, and it
No. 91-672, 50 U.S.C.A. 1512, prohibiting those munitions from entering the continental United
States. The weapons were then shipped to Johnston Atoll. RECORD OF DECISION, supra note
145, at 4 n.2; GREENPEACE 9/90 REvIEw, supra note 145, at 12-15; Disposal of Chemical Muni-
tions Hearings, supra note 141, at 19. Johnston Atoll itself now requires extensive cleanup; in
1985, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service declared it to be one of the 10 areas most in need of
environmental resuscitation in the United States and its territories. Davis, supra note 196, at 7.
581 It would be possible, at least on a limited scale, to move the destruction equipment to the
CW stockpile, rather than vice versa, and the United States has developed a small capacity port-
able Drill and Transfer System (DATS) to destroy chemical munitions on site. DATS, however,
is expensive and can handle only a very limited quantity; it is most suitable for disposing of small
caches of newly-discovered abandoned CW munitions that are too fragile to transport to a se-
cure storage facility. Rouse, supra note 9, at 42.
582 See PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-50 to 2-73, 2-87.
583 Rouse, supra note 9, at 76-77. Transporting the CW stockpile from a current base through
other communities to a destruction center will be politically unpopular with the states and locali-
ties being transited. The Army will have to deal, as well as it can, with that community disquiet,
too. Id. at 60, 79.
584 The Army projects that relocation of the entire CW stockpile to a single national destruc-
tion center at Tooele, Utah would require 70-75 rail shipments; if two regional destruction facili-
ties were employed (at Tooele and at Anniston, Alabama), some 50 to 55 rail shipments would
be necessary. PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-51, 2-63. If truck transportation were used, some 820
truck convoys (or 610 for the 2-site alternative) would be required. Id. at 2-87.
585 Id. at 2.65-73, supp. G-19 (studying proposed relocation of CW inventories from low-
quantity sites at Aberdeen, Maryland and Lexington, Kentucky to Tooele, Utah). Some 1400
ffights would be necessary solely to remove the CW stockpile from the Lexington, Kentucky
base. Morrison, supra note 196, at 1104. The Army also briefly evaluated the possibility of
ocean shipment of the Aberdeen stockpile to Johnston Atoll. PEIS, supra note 130, supp. S.
586 PEIS, supra note 130, at 3-119, supp. G.18.
587 Id. supp. G.21.
588 Id. at 2-51.
89:445 (1995) Dismantling Excess Weapons
might be useful to chill the chemicals, rendering them less volatile
during transportation. 58 9
While no guaranties can be given that the movement of the muni-
tions will be incident free,59 there are some precedents that provide a
basis for optimism. Most directly, the Army was spectacularly suc-
cessful in the "Retrograde Project,"' 591 withdrawing the United States
CW stockpile from Germany in 1990 and conveying it several thou-
sand miles via truck, rail, and ship to Johnston Island.5 92 Similarly, the
chemical weapons now housed at the eight continental United States
locations were, for the most part, originally transported to those sites
by rail.593 More recently (albeit, on a very small scale), the Army has
periodically been compelled to convey old, abandoned CW munitions
and materiel from a suddenly-discovered burial pit to a more secure
location for storage or destruction. The task of shipping a small quan-
tity of unstable items is surely not the same as the task of moving a
much larger quantity of more standardized weaponry, but perhaps
some useful lessons have already been learned.5 94 Additionally, it
should be noted that the United States government regularly moves
components for many types of weapons-including nuclear weap-
589 Rouse, supra note 9, at 71; PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-50 to 2-65, supp. G.9 (describing
special freight cars, handling and packing procedures, and support crews that would be used to
transport CW via rail). See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, supra note 145 (describing
inadequacy of Army's vehicles for conveying CW stockpile from Germany to Johnston Atoll and
stating that extensive repairs were necessary before arsenal could be transported consistently
with international safety standards). Chilling the CW will thicken mustard agent, making it less
problematic in the event of an accident or leak, but will have little effect on nerve agents.
590 See Don Phillips, Recent Bridge Accidents Seen as "Wake-Up Call" on Safety, WASH. POST,
Oct. 10, 1993, at A3 (reporting on numerous occasions when a river barge or other vessel has
rammed into a bridge (often, a railroad bridge), damaging it and causing a subsequent accident.
There is little systematic monitoring of such incidents, and even if there were, in one recent
Louisiana incident, a barge struck the bridge only minutes before Amtrak's passenger liner at-
tempted to go over it; only a very swift, sophisticated sensor system could have avoided the fatal
accident).
591 The program withdrawing the U.S. CW stockpile from Germany was also known as "Op-
eration Lindworm." Marc Fisher, U.S. Starts Pullout of Chemical Arms, WASH. PosT, July 27,
1990, at Al.
592 Supra text accompanying notes 144-45 (discussing relocation of CW from Germany to
Johnston).
593 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-87, supp. G. It should be noted that these shipments occurred
only gradually, over a period of years, and at a time when the munitions were newer and pre-
sumably in better condition to withstand the rigors of repeated handling and transportation.
Moreover, the applicable state and federal environmental protection laws were much less strin-
gent when those shipments occurred. For the most part, these shipments were incident-free,
although some accidents, involving agent leaks or spills and personnel injuries, did occur. Id. at
G-3. See also Rouse, supra note 9, at 70-81; Disposal of Chemical Munitions Hearings, supra
note 141, at 63-72.
594 See NON-STOCKPILE REPORT, supra note 147, at 8.1-8.3; PEIS, supra note 130, at 4-148 to
4-168 (discussing mitigation of accidents that might occur during shipment of CW).
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ons-around the continental United States via rail and truck.595 All
manner of other hazardous military and civilian products, including
bombs, rockets, hazardous wastes, and other inevitable products of a
complex society, have also been routinely shipped; CW will not be the
first dangerous cargoes to venture onto the American public
roadways.5 96
As noted above, I recommend that in this sensitive, rare situation,
the balance between environmentalism and security be struck by: (1)
requiring the Army to adhere to the substance of all reasonable fed-
eral and state standards, but (2) releasing the Army from full compli-
ance with the administrative interstices of the system of local permits
and notifications. Thus, here, too, the Army should be relieved of the
requirements to obtain permission from the states and municipalities
that will be traversed in moving the chemical weapons, and I would
deny the affected governors and mayors the opportunity to frustrate
the dismantling effort by forcing a rerouting.597 In return, the Army
should be mandated to adhere to the highest state-of-the-art standards
for safe transportation, even where that involves spending more
money for additional layers of redundant security.
D. Bend the Budget
As suggested, there are several points in the CW elimination ef-
fort where something has to "give." In order to preserve as much as
possible our commitment to the CWC and simultaneously respect as
much as possible the corpus of environmental protection standards,
we have to be prepared to purchase multiple levels of protection, even
at a substantial price. My recommendations will initially reduce some
of the Army's projected expenses-billions will be saved by foregoing
the construction of six or seven of the planned incinerators-but
those economies are likely to be swamped by offsetting increases in
other areas.
One manifestation of the willingness to bend the budget should
be a commitment to accelerated research and development of alterna-
tive CW destruction technologies. Simultaneous pursuit of diverse,
595 INF TRErv ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 186, apps. B, C; START I LEIS,
supra note 47, at 2.33, 4.63-64; Kevin Cameron, Taking Apart the Bomb, POPULAR Sci., Apr.
1993, at 64, 66; Gerald Jacob & Andrew Kirby, On the Road to Ruin: The Transport of Military
Cargoes, in HIDDEN DANGERS: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREPARING FOR WAR 71
(Anne H. Ehrlich & John W. Birks eds., 1990).
596 Cf Keith Schneider, Bill Would Exempt Navy From Environment Law, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1993, at A19 (discussing that Navy stores spent nuclear fuel from 114 submarines and fifteen
other ocean-going vessels at military reservation in Idaho); Phyllis W. Jordan, Deal in Works to
Get Rid of Nuclear Waste, NORFOLK VIRGIN,N-PILOT, July 28, 1993, at D1 (describing that
nuclear waste materials are stored on barges in James River).
597 Supra text accompanying notes 334-37 (discussing Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act).
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complex methodologies will not be cheap, especially when large-scale,
long-duration testing will be needed to validate and refine any promis-
ing concepts. On the other hand, to some extent, these expenditures
should be seen as seed money for development of an important new
civilian industry: safe, clean disposal of wastes is an unresolved, grow-
ing imperative in the United States and elsewhere,598 and it is possible
that some equipment, facilities, and technologies developed for the
CW destruction mission could be spun off to other, wide-spread com-
mercial applications. A CW-related technology, especially where it
holds the potential for that type of remote employment, should be
vigorously pursued.5 99
The goals of the research effort should remain suitably modest.
We are unlikely to find any "magic bullet" solution that solves all our
arms control and ecological problems simultaneously and efficiently.
No technology will satisfy everyone, and even if the Army were to
announce tomorrow that it was suddenly shifting from incineration to
"molten metals" or "bioremediation" or some other promising candi-
date, instant opposition would surely arise, with critics identifying the
shortcomings, along some important parameters, of the new favorite.
For this reason, the Army should remain open to the possibility
that different technologies will prove most suitable to different combi-
nations of munitions, agents, and locations. While the "one size fits
all" approach of the baseline incinerator technology might seem most
efficient, there are, in fact, substantial variances among the elements
to be destroyed, and those variances might lend themselves to differ-
ent optimal technologies and equipment.6 ° At Pueblo, Colorado, for
example, the entire arsenal consists of munitions and containers of
mustard gas.601 It seems intuitive that a specialized elimination tech-
nology, tailor-made to the circumstances of this particular location,
might be optimally able to exploit those limited characteristics. Simi-
598 See Tom Kenworthy, Incinerators May Face Tougher EPA Standards, WASH. POST, May
19, 1993, at A3; Editorial, Managing the Waste Stream, N.Y. TimEs, May 22, 1993, at 18;
COsrER & THORNrON, supra note 307, at 7,44-50 (stating that U.S. industry produces over one
trillion pounds of hazardous wastes per year, with the total increasing at a rate of 5.5% per
year); POTEMAL USES, supra note 58, at 31-32 ("New capabilities are urgently needed for the
treatment of both the hazardous and, in the case of radioisotopic waste, the mixed (radioactive
and hazardous) wastes that are produced.").
599 Other researchers, outside the chemical weapons area, are also vigorously pursuing alter-
native technologies for the treatment of hazardous wastes, and there may eventually be some
symbiosis between the different types of efforts. OTA ALTERNATIVES, supra note 140, at 9-10;
Army Seeks Funds to Study Alternative Disposal Methods, CHEMICAL DEMrLrrARZKATON UP-
D)ATE, Apr. 1994, at 6.
600 See PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-78 to 2-80 (explaining that the Army does evaluate some
site-unique options for disposal of materiel at the eight locations). But see A.MY ALTERNA-
TIVES, supra note 249, at 6-6 (rejecting the notion that different disposal technologies could be
employed at different CW storage sites).
601 PEIS, supra note 130, at 2-8.
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larly, the existing inventory of binary weapons might be sufficiently
different from the unitary stockpile that a dedicated destruction tech-
nique and facility would be appropriate. In the same vein, the task of
eliminating the abandoned non-stockpile items will be extremely va-
ried, having to cope with small volumes, but a great diversity of types
of inputs; a specialized facility might need to be developed to incorpo-
rate the necessary adaptability.
In another recommendation with substantial budgetary implica-
tions, I suggest that the Army undertake a very vigorous campaign to
attempt to locate all the old and abandoned chemical weapons and
associated toxic materials that it possibly can, and that the United
States undertake to destroy those that can be safely retrieved, even
where we are not legally obligated to do so under the CWC.602
Whether abandoned on alien territory, dumped under the high seas,
or deposited in American soil, these archaic weapons pose an acute
long-term danger, and the United States has the greatest capacity to
rid the world of the hazard.60 3 Moreover, zealously seeking out and
destroying these devices, even when we are not legally compelled to
be quite so aggressive, is precisely the type of symbolic eleemosynary
activity that the world's sole remaining superpower should undertake,
vigorously confirming that the era of chemical weapons is finally fin-
ished on this planet, and we are determined to root out the last ves-
tiges of that loathsome legacy of an earlier era.
One final budgetary consideration deserves mention. The CWC
contains provisions-but a tone of profound mistrust and apprehen-
sion-on the subject of converting CW-related chemicals and produc-
tion facilities to civilian applications.604 These worries are legitimate,
and the treaty's verification measures designed to guard against covert
reconversion back to military applications should be vigorously en-
forced. But we cannot afford to overlook the possibilities for bending
existing resources to better applications. Where former CW-related
facilities can be cleaned up and reliably safeguarded, the owner should
be allowed to re-tool for pesticides, plastics, or other production. In
contrast to the usual configuration of American CW facilities, for ex-
ample, the chemical weapons production units inside Russia are not
602 The CWC obligates each party to destroy chemical weapons that it abandoned on the
territory of another party. CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part IV (B).C.
603 The difficulty and expense of retrieving and destroying abandoned chemical weapons
should not be underestimated. In some circumstances, the fragility of the munitions and the
circumstances of their undersea or underground location might suggest that the safest course of
action is simply to leave them undisturbed. But where they can be recovered-or at least where
they can be stabilized, wrapped in new layers of protective coating, and further insulated from
contact with the environment-the United States ought to assume a leading role in promoting
that safety. See Phillip Knightley, Dumps of Death, SUNDAY TIMEs (LorDoN) MAG., Apr. 5,
1992, at 26, 30; Krohn, supra note 376, at 93.
604 CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part V.D.
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usually stand-alone, isolated installations, but are well-integrated into
the large civilian chemical complexes, so conversion of those struc-
tures is even more plausible and worth exploring. Similarly, the
"swords" of CW could themselves be beaten into "plowshares," as the
possibility exists, for example, of extracting commercially valuable ar-
senic (in the form of gallium arsenide, useful in the manufacture of
microchips) from reprocessed blister agent Lewisite.60 5 Perhaps in
modern industrialized societies, it will usually be preferable to con-
struct such facilities and materials from scratch, rather than to recycle
existing items, but other countries' economies might balance the costs
and benefits differently and should be encouraged to do so.60 6
E. Bend Our Diplomacy
Widespread adherence and effective global implementation are
essential for the success of the CWC.6 07 If the treaty were unable to
build substantial momentum toward universal membership, and if it
were unsuccessful at quelling fears about spotty enforcement, then no
one could have confidence that the world had been reliably freed from
the specter of poison gas. And in all these enterprises, the United
States-the key negotiator in drafting the text of the treaty and the
dominant military power on Earth-will have to play a leading
role.6 08
Regarding Russia, the United States should act promptly to en-
hance the prospects for Moscow's immediate participation in the
CWC regime. Urgently, this means providing assistance in achieving
the dismantling of Russia's stockpile of CW weapons and materials-
605 Leonov & Sheluchenko, supra note 514, at 99; David C. Morrison, Chemical Arms Aren't
Easy to Destroy, 24 NAT'L J. 2068 (1992); Amy E. Smithson, Chemicals Destruction: The Work
Begins, BULL. ATOM. ScIENSrs, Apr. 1993, at 38,42. Russian CW authorities have expressed a
particular interest in this type of recycling, concluding that arsenic (even if it threatens to be-
come a glut on the Western market) is too valuable for them to throw away. Leopold, supra
note 504, at 6. Similarly, some Russian experts have suggested that nerve gas components may
also be subject to recycling for use in phosphate fertilizers. Doty, supra note 132, at 28; Morri-
son, supra; David Dickson, Fertile Ground for Arms Control, 243 SciaFcE 1001 (1989). But see
GREENPEACE ALTERNATIVES, supra note 425, at 90 (discounting the practicality of recycling
nerve agents). See also RLE. Roberts, Verification Problems-Monitoring of Conversion and
Destruction of Chemical-Warfare Agent Plant, in STocKHorM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RE-
SEARCH INsTruTE, CHEMICAL WEAPONS: DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION 129 (1980).
606 Recycling of chemical agents or related facilities may also result in changes in the gov-
erning environmental protection laws. Certain parts of RCRA, for example, are generally appli-
cable only to scrap or waste products, not to items that are being recycled or converted for re-
use. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.2 (a), (d), (e) (1993); BONn-E & McGAgrry, supra note 189, at 733-34.
607 Some critics have doubted the CWC's ability to attract universal adherence, and the likeli-
hood of problematic "holdout" countries will be a major challenge to the integrity of the regime.
Smithson, supra note 4, at 38; Jones & Wagner, supra note 69, at 585-86.
608 See Max L. Friedersdorf, Chemical Weapons Disposal Program, DEP'T ST. BULL, June
1989, at 19 (discussing how the U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament described
American CW destruction efforts and urged others to follow that lead).
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the world's largest such arsenal. 60 9 Both financial and technological
support will be required, and it will be a major undertaking simply to
identify the types of assistance that can be put to most effective,
prompt use. The United States has to date wedged open its pocket-
book only a bit, and the funds allocated to Russian disarmament and
weapons security have so far been disproportionately earmarked for
nuclear, rather than chemical, adaptations. Creativity, as well as dol-
lars, will be required to surmount the challenges of Russian CW dis-
mantling. In the current political climate, Moscow can be no less
attentive to ecological and other concerns than is Washington, D.C.
At the same time, the United States should attempt to gain, as
well as to share, technology. Soviet engineers and weapons designers
had achieved a substantial measure of success, and certainly played a
very active role in building their country's security structure. Is it not
plausible that those same organizations, laboratories, and individuals
can now be bent to the task of dismantling? In the post-cold war era
of "new thinking," both countries should recognize a shared interest
in developing and implementing technologies that can perform the
CW eliminations as rapidly, safely, cleanly, and inexpensively as possi-
ble, and both can contribute to the joint enterprise.
Regarding other countries, the United States should bend every
diplomatic effort to promote widespread acceptance of the CWC obli-
gations. In most instances, this should prove an easy task: the world
strongly supports the notion of CW elimination,610 it is a familiar con-
cept that has been on the international disarmament agenda for de-
cades, and the recent surge in multilateral affiliations with other arms
control treaties611 augurs success for global acclamation of the CWC,
too. But there will likely be holdouts, renegades, and at least tempo-
609 The United States has recently undertaken a program of hosting Russian technical and
political visitors at American CW-related sites and training Russian interns in the operation of
the destruction equipment. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 5; Russian Delegation
Tours Demil Plants, CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION UPDATE, Apr. 1993, at 3; Intern Familiariza-
tion Program Gears Up, CHEMICAL DEMIrARIZATION UPDATE, Jan. 1993, at 3; Russian Interns
Start Training at USACMDA, CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION UPDATE, Nov. 1993, at 3.
610 Supra note 84 (describing the 1989 Paris conference); Jill Smolowe, The Search for a
Poison Antidote, TIME, Jan. 16, 1989, at 22; Edward Cody, 149 Nations Vow to Shun Poison Gas,
WASH. PoST, Jan. 12, 1989, at Al; Jones & Wagner, supra note 69, at 601-04.
611 For example, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, supra note 14, in some
respects the nuclear counterpart of the CWC, has benefitted from a recent surge in international
interest and participation, now bringing 157 parties within its regime. If that dramatic-but still
not quite universal-growth in membership can be replicated for the CWC, the chemical accord
will be very successful, indeed. See Thomas Graham, Jr., Some Personal Observations on
Proliferation in the 1990s, Address at the AFCEA Seminar on Mobilizing the U.S. Counter-
proliferation Effort (May 24-25, 1993).
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rary resisters.612 The United States diplomatic corps should go to
work on them vigorously, attempting to secure the necessary sixty-five
adherences by July 1994, enabling the CWC to enter into force at the
earliest possible moment, in January 1995.613 Only if the United
States and Russia have their respective houses in order-only if they
have in hand realistic plans for timely elimination of their chemical
arms-can this diplomacy be entirely successful.
Prompt creation of the CWC's administrative infrastructure and
robust enforcement of its monitoring obligations are also essential.
The United States, working first through the treaty's Preparatory
Committee and provisional technical secretariat,614 and later through
the permanent structures of the full Organization, must ensure that
the verification functions are vigilantly exercised, guarding against any
covert "breakout" capabilities. A great deal of previously-secret in-
formation about countries' CW programs may soon be erupting,615
and the United States should take the lead in ensuring that even the
most deeply entrenched, darkly hidden CW enterprises and capabili-
ties are rooted out.616
Of course, in all these diplomatic activities, the United States
need not shoulder the entire burden. The CWC-by establishing a
large, permanent, expert corps of inspectors and other international
civil servants and treaty-enforcers-is a leading illustration of the type
of "assertive multilateralism 617 that the Clinton Administration has
been touting. All countries have a profound stake in the success of
the CWC, and all of them-led, inevitably, by the United States-
should press it forward.618
VIII. CONCLUSION
This excursion into the intersecting worlds of disarmament and
environmentalism has established, once again, that politics makes for
612 See SMrrnsoN HANDBOOK, supra note 92, at 44 (identifying countries that have not yet
signed the CWC, including Angola, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and
Taiwan).
613 See supra text accompanying note 1 (discussing procedures for entry into force of CWC).
614 Supra text accompanying notes 97-98 (discussing the Preparatory Committee).
615 Supra text accompanying notes 112-13 (indicating that the CWC will soon require coun-
tries to make revealing declarations). Under the confidentiality provisions of the CWC, certain
industrial declarations and reports are entitled to confidentiality, to guard against the unwar-
ranted release of confidential business information, but national declarations about the history
of CW production and possession are not restricted in that way.
616 See supra text accompanying note 501 (revealing that Russia's secret CW program contin-
ued even after the leadership said it had been halted).
617 Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Narrows Terms for Its Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at
A8 (quoting U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine K. Albright).
618 See Badelt et al., supra note 518 (regarding Germany's special role in ridding the world of
Cw).
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strange-and rotating-bedfellows. Not long ago, arms controllers
and environmentalists viewed each other as presumptive allies across
a wide range of social issues. From their joint opposition to the de-
ployment of the MX missile,619 to their concerted support for the ne-
gotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty,620 the two
factions have regularly been stalwart contributors to the same peace
coalitions.
Regarding chemical weapons, however, the erstwhile alliance is
torn asunder-as one participant expressed it, "my knee jerks both
ways" on this issue. Although both groups are clear in their support
for the CWC, and both are eager to rid the world of the scourge of
chemical warfare, they do adopt starkly different attitudes on the
question of CW elimination methodologies. 621 It seems to matter a
great deal whether an individual approaches the CW dismantling
question principally from the perspective of an arms controller, seeing
the network of domestic environmental law as yet another, largely ir-
relevant, hurdle that the CWC must surmount in order to accomplish
its security objectives, or from the vantage point of an environmental-
ist, viewing the CWC as yet another of the diverse threats to ecologi-
cal stability, so many of which speciously claim to represent urgent
national priorities. 622 Both perspectives, in fact, incorporate more
than a grain of truth, as both social policies are to be respected and
advanced. But what should be done when their fundamental, legiti-
mate concerns move into conflict?
Moreover, dismantling the CW stockpile and the non-stockpile
materiel will be frightfully expensive. Disposal of this and the other
detritus of the cold war is a costly proposition, and doing a thorough,
environmentally protective, and safe job of it will inevitably eat up a
major segment of the anticipated "peace dividend" from the establish-
619 The MX (missile experimental) was a new intercontinental-range ballistic missile for
which the executive branch struggled through the late 1970s and early 1980s to develop a suita-
ble (and politically acceptable) basing mode. Arms control groups criticized the MX as destabi-
lizing and provocative; environmentalists argued that it would occupy immense areas of fragile
Southwestern land and consume huge quantities of scarce water and other resources. See gener-
ally Friends of the Earth v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed, 725
F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1988).
620 See PImP G. SCHRAG, GLOBAL AcrION: NUCLEAR TErST BAN DIPLOMACY AT THE END
OF THE COLD WAR 46, 144, 146 (1992).
621 John Isaacs, Arms Controllers v. Greenpeace, BULL ATOM. SmENT=IS, Nov. 1990, at 4.
Cf. DISM AriNG THE BOMB, supra note 507, at 45 (discussing the comparable clash of interests
regarding nuclear weapons disposal).
622 Davis, supra note 196 (quoting environmental activists in the context of CW elimination,
"We don't think environmental destruction is a requisite for peace," and "Disarmament is a very
good idea. We'd never deny that. But it has to be done in an environmentally acceptable
manner.").
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ment of a new world order.6 23 The final irony of the world's centuries-
old fascination with chemical weapons may be the fact that finally get-
ting rid of these things will cost so much more than building, maintain-
ing, and storing them ever did.624
This situation presents what might be a classic formula for mak-
ing a poor social decision, as we have: (1) a clash of scientific experts,
who disagree profoundly on the maturity and risks of incineration
technology; (2) a dearth of tested data regarding the feasibility of al-
ternative technologies; (3) powerful, mobilized, and indignant social
groups pressing their separate agendas on both sides of the political
spectrum; (4) not much time available to make a decision due to the
lengthy lead times associated with testing, licensing, and constructing
any demolition facilities; (5) international pressures to set a viable
precedent for other countries to follow; and (6) elements of law
(treaty and statute) weighing on both sides of the scale. Where uncer-
tainty, urgency, and importance lurk together, there may be little el-
bow room for compromise or wisdom.
The difficulty in reconciling arms control and environmentalism is
magnified by the fact that there is no reliably safe course of action.
Instead, all our policy options-even stagnant preservation of the sta-
tus quo-involve some degree of risk to public health and security. I
cannot assert that my recommendations are any safer than the Army's
current disposal program; it involves, rather, the substitution of one
set of imperfectly-known risks for another. Each of these dangers is
difficult to identify and quantify on its own; when we have to trade off
incommensurable hazards such as weapons proliferation vs. toxic
waste, the calculation becomes ineffably complex.625
Public choice theory, in fact, would suggest profound, inherent
constraints upon a society's ability to make intelligent decisions even
under more favorable circumstances. 626 The limitations upon any
group's ability to wrap itself around complex, multi-dimensional op-
tions and to select among them in a determined, defensible fashion,
are substantial. Fundamental legal tasks, such as passing a law or con-
struing a statute, are surrounded by the indeterminacy of collabora-
623 Warren Strobel, Cost of Destroying Arms Leaves Old Pacts Ignored, WASH. TimEs, July
29, 1991, at Al; Rick Wartzman, Weapons Makers Unite to Dismantle Nuclear Arsenals, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 31, 1992, at A3.
624 See POTENTIAL USES, supra note 58, at 15 (costs of reversing the global environmental
crisis might amount to $774 billion over the next 10 years); Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., Cleanups
Should Begin At Home, WASH. PosT, June 16, 1992, at 3B (discussing that the 3700 nuclear
hazardous waste sites in the United States will cost $150-200 billion to clean up).
625 See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 197, at 167-89; START I LEIS, supra note 47, at 2.32-
33; Ellen J. Case, The Public's Role in Scientific Risk Assessment, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVmL. L. REv.
479 (1993); M. Granger Morgan, Risk Analysis and Management, Sci. Am., July 1993, at 32.
626 DANIEL A. FARBER & P-ILIP P. Fmiccny, LAW AND PUBLIC CHoiCE: A CRrTCAL INTRO-
DUCTION (1991).
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tion and sub-group politicking. These dilemmas multiply when the
values at stake-environmentalism and disarmament-have the char-
acter of "public goods," the enjoyment of which is available even to
noncooperating "free riders. ' 627 As pluralism spreads around the
world, the newly emerging democracies may suddenly confront the
disabilities of undisciplined decisionmaking; an authoritarian govern-
ment might be able to enforce a one-sided choice between arms con-
trol and environmentalism via strong central control, but the United
States, and increasing legions of other putative CWC parties, cannot.
The Chemical Weapons Convention, and the resulting social di-
lemmas surrounding the complete and permanent elimination of these
horrid armaments, therefore pose a dramatic and irresistible problem
for the United States and other countries. The best hope at this time
is for some sort of just-barely-tolerable compromise, cobbling to-
gether the bare minimum conditions that arms controllers, environ-
mentalists, budgeteers, and others would insist upon, in order to
fashion a package that all elements might be able to live with. And
with that technique, perhaps the implementation of the CWC may, in
fact, be able to mimic at least a portion of the stunning, long-awaited
successes of the treaty's negotiation.
627 BERNAUER, supra note 69, at 209-11.
